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Prologue 
 
 
There are no safe paths in this part of the world. 
Remember you are over the edge of the wild now, and in 
for all sorts of fun wherever you go (Tolkien 2006: 161). 
 
 
 
Do you remember? – No, I have deleted it. In this final part of a dialogue I recently had, 
I was just asked, if I remember a particular event. But I had to acknowledge that I did 
not only forget it by accident, I really wanted to forget it, because it was not an 
afterglow. What was really shocking for me, was not the resurgence of the memory, 
but the response for my forced oblivion … No, I have deleted it. 
Is our mind a computer? Do we simply delete events and experiences? In a paper 
I recently wrote I denied such a conclusion (Galuschek and Lütjohann 2014). In this 
paper I consider our mind as well, where memories fall in but are not forgotten, rather 
they are stored in the well’s abyss (Galuschek and Lütjohann 2014: 24f). Memories 
are in the depth of the well, and wait to be set in new contexts (Galuschek and 
Lütjohann 2014: 25). In fact, memories ‘wait’ to be recounted in presumed ‘new 
storylines’. I realized, every story I compose of my life − even this one here in the book 
– is reconstructed from memories and experiences I already had. Sometimes, they 
seem to be forgotten, actually they are deep in the well’s abyss, and they are 
sometimes hard to find. So, everything in my mind, all memories, all my experiences, 
is stored. And: I can arrange them freely; I can compose contexts and chronologies, 
where I did not expect it when I made these experiences. By this means, I store my 
lifetime, but in fact, I store countless possible stories of my lifetime. Thus, I imagined a 
picture: 
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Figure 1: my self as a tree (source: CanStockPhoto). 
 
Let us take this picture as example for being ourselves as persons. The tree’s branches 
can be imagined as composed of narrative threads, as though like every single one 
would be a biography. They merge in the tree’s trunk. The roots are hidden in the 
ground; they are one with the world. Perceived this way, the roots in the ground have 
paramount meanings. They can be regarded as the unconscious which is hidden from 
the outer world, as well as they can be perceived as genetic roots which show that we 
are coming from the earth. But, at the center stage is the symbiosis of being and world 
which occurs here. This picture is that of me, a human, in the world. I am individual, 
but without doubt, I am still interwoven with the surrounding world. Take into 
account this example of a tree: I breathe the air of the world, I nourish myself from 
the earth, and I have – some kind of –relationships with birds, butterflies, bees etc. All 
these relationships are mirrored in my experiences and memories. Maybe this 
analogy is a bit too fantastic, but it perfectly fits in the image of ourselves in our social 
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world: we always experience ourselves as both an individual as well as socially related 
at the same time. But, what does this folk psychological realization actually mean? 
Without doubt, nowadays folk psychological realizations and investigations are 
already used to build up entire scientific constructs, like theories of mind, behavior 
theories, agency theories and belief-desire-theories, to mention a few (Hutto 2007a). 
Let us walk this folk psychological path a little bit further. 
Experiences and memories are captured in narratives, they can be 
autobiographic or fantastic, episodic or more or less coherent, but they always 
constitute a story. Such narratives can even be unconsciouss, and thus only occur in a 
particular situation where they come to mind. The distinctive thing about these 
experience-based narratives is that they are always related to others, since no 
experience is made alone. By recounting these narratives, we also capture the 
experiences and stories of others, since they were part of a particular experience. In 
turn, we influence the life of others through our presence and our acting. In other 
words, we influence another’s experiences by interaction. In doing this, we receive 
reactions for our actions, which we can evaluate. In this manner, we learn “about the 
flow of relationships” (Josephides 2008: 78). Other’s reactions to our actions mirror 
their evaluation of our acting. From this, we can update our behavior. In addition, 
through the reactions of others we learn to evaluate ourselves, and compose our self-
perception. Thus, we live in a steady flow of relationships with others and with our 
self. However, how does this extreme social anchoring fit in the Western modern 
pursuit of individuality? 
Self-perception composes a particular image of our self with particular desires, 
needs, and expectations. This composition of our self-perception makes us individuals 
distinctive from others. In turn, we claim recognition of our individuality and our self-
being. In fact, every one of us is striving for recognition of our own individuality, 
characteristics, abilities, and traits. It is true, however, that most of us already have 
had mixed experiences with recognition. Assuming that we have an almost complete 
image of our self-perception, we naturally lack in disclosing our full individuality to 
others, since we always only have a particular personal habitus in a particular social 
field (Bourdieu 1984). This means, we are only able to disclose parts of our 
individuality. Therefore, it never works to be recognized in our full individuality, it is 
always given a restriction by the social field. Due to this particular action in a social 
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field, we are sometimes recognized as another, since others miss to recognize other 
essential parts of our individuality. It seems as though we have to act as another to 
reach particular individual goals. Regularly, such acting does not have significant 
effect on our self-perception, since we still know who we are. How does this inner 
dichotomy of being oneself and being another work? 
In this account, it does not matter ”[w]hether the self is real or fictional, one 
thing or many, it is clearly something that needs explanation” (Gallagher and Zahavi 
2012: 213). Apparently, our self is related to experiences, individuality, personality, 
sociality, otherness, agency, and feelings, to mention a few. By approaching the self 
from the acting human − this means, to come to the self −, we have to go through the 
terms ‘individual’ and ‘person’. However, a distinction between person and self is not 
easy to formulate. A logical and easy way to define personhood could be: “’[p]erson’ 
is an entity denominated from the outside; from the inside, each of us thinks of her or 
his self. The term ‘self’, then, has an intimate character that more easily spans the 
insider and outsider perspective” (Josephides 2008: 23). It is true that the person has 
a social character, the self makes rather more problems. It refers to the ‘I’ as oneself 
as well as it possesses a relational, self-reflexive dimension, which makes it 
necessarily social. 
By this means, I connect Western approaches in phenomenological and 
hermeneutical considerations as well as narrativity and human biography (like the 
perception of the life-world as a surrounding environment) and non-Western 
approaches (like the Melanesian perception of personhood as a relational dividual) to 
emphasize the ‘docking stations’ of both approaches. This frame must comply with 
Strathernian critics: the popular literal term ‘the Melanesian’ does not exist in reality, 
rather it is an intellectual construct. ‘The Melanesian’ thus is 
 
a manner of speaking, or more precisely the site of certain problems of 
expression and understanding, peculiar to the cultural problems of 
anthropology, which is (almost) exclusively a ‘western’ project, like it or 
not (Gell 1999: 34). 
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This, however, should not be the problem of this book. As ‘the Melanesian’ does not 
exist in reality, the same might be true of the modern Western subject1. Both are 
concepts or constructs, but in any case, a particular scientific point of view. And, that 
exactly is the point this book deals with: in fact, either concept has its historical and 
cultural background. Both have in common the rendering of the human as a social 
acting entity. Coming to the point: in this case, personhood is bound to particular 
characteristics, qualities, attributes, or some kinds of personal and social 
achievements; the notion of personhood in relation to a particular human has longer 
or shorter downtimes. Against this backdrop, the problem with classical notions of 
personhood is that the constructed image of the human appears holey: personhood 
would be turned off and on ‘on an hourly base’ (Härle 2012: 97f). The premise which 
I suggest to follow is: “[w]ho becomes a person, is always a person, she or he becomes 
as a person, not to a person” (Härle 2012: 98).2 To ensure the effect of acting within 
the life-world, a concept of personhood, understood as a shaping concept, 
accomplishes the anthropological concept of personhood. 
In academia, it is common ground that increasing individuality causes an 
increasing claim to recognition, especially since Axel Honneth’s revival and 
actualization of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s concept of recognition. It is also 
Honneth who actually is inseparably linked with the recent philosophical discussion 
about recognition. We are recognized and we recognize others both on a personal as 
well as on a social level. The leading question, still unsolved and at the same time 
unsolvably linked with the relationship of individual and society, is: why are we 
relying on recognition? In other words: what does it mean to recognize me, my self, and 
the other? 
                                            
1 In German three meanings of the subject can be distinguished: (1) an ontological one as carrier of 
accidents, qualities, and actions, (2) a logical one as part of a sentence, and (3) as matter of scientific 
research (Kible 1998: 374). The meaning of subject I refer to is the first one. In this sense, Descartes, 
the founder of modern subject-theory, used the term ‘subject’. For him, the subject is carrier of 
cognitive attributes, through which the subject recognizes the outer world. From this perception of the 
metaphysical, ontological subject the way is not far to the epistemic subject, understood as the 
‘recognizing ego’. It gains this meaning through German Idealism, which also includes Hegel’s thinking 
of the Absolute Spirit. Today, the concept of the subject has an epistemic meaning with all cognitive 
capacities and imagination. That makes the subject the recognizing figure in philosophical 
interpretation (Stolzenberger 1998: 383) regarded as comprising unique experience and unique 
consciousness, understood as an observer in contrast to the passive and observable object. 
2 This passage is translatied by the author; German original: “Wer Person wird, ist immer schon 
Person, wird also als Person und wird nicht zur Person” (Härle 2012: 98). 
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Western discourse has been struggling with this question for decades. 
Apparently, it seems that Western accounts are not able to deliver a sufficient answer 
to this question. I suggest, therefore, a rethinking of the concept of the self. In doing 
so, other accounts have to be considered. Assuming the premise that recognition is a 
gift, a strongly subject-based account is limited to move along its way. 
 
’Everything is subjective’, you say: but that itself is an interpretation, for 
the ‘subject’ is not something given but a fiction added on, tucked behind 
− Is it even necessary to posit the interpreter behind the interpretation? 
Even that is fiction, hypothesis (Nietzsche 2003: 7[60]). 
 
What Nietzsche here means, indeed, is already, even if subjectivity means that 
something is perceived in relation to oneself, an interpretation of the true being of 
that something. Thus, an objective stance never can be reached. Regarded in this way, 
Nietzsche’s quote should be the keyword of this work, since the objective of this work 
is to look behind and examine what is beyond concepts of subjectivity. Therefore, the 
central part of this work is the idea of bringing together researches from two scientific 
disciplines which do not talk that much with each other. “The relationship between 
anthropology and philosophy is characterized by a complex history that includes 
mutual attraction as well as mutual mistrust” (Duranti 2008: 490). Both disciplines 
have one outstanding subject in common: they deal with the human being, her or his 
emotions, rationality, and performance; but they differ in their approach. Philosophy 
approaches the human from the rational and transcendental direction, whereas 
cultural and social anthropology addresses the human being’s everyday life. Taking 
both disciplines together means to receive an image of the human in her or his 
transcendental view and from her or his performance in the life-world, as she or he is 
doing in everyday life. Philosophy helps to give sense to the doings of everyday life 
which is only observeable from the anthropological point of view. 
The connection of philosophical and anthropological approaches to identity, 
personhood, and self-recognition, seems to be very fruitful to develop a holistic 
approach to mutual recognition. The combination of both disciplines enables, at the 
same time, a theoretical as well as a practical view. In consequence, the Cartesian Ego 
is rejected in favor of a decentralised, cosmomorphic and sociocentric approach to 
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personhood which merges with its surrounding as its life-world. This approach is 
enriched by the Western philosophical idea of narrative identity. Finally, the center of 
the life-world is empty, and is replaced by a notion of personhood which is merged 
with the life-world. The surrounding world is not an object anymore; rather it is 
considered as us: person and life-world build a unity. In such an approach sociality is 
not an ‘add-on’ anymore which has to be attached on a solipsistic subject by nature; 
rather it is inherent. An anthropological model of personhood is called in to insure the 
cultural framework of the elaborated concept of personhood and show basic 
principles of a model of subjectless personhood. This anthropological approach is 
merged with a narrative concept of identity to emphasize the self-reflexive way of 
personal identity. Such an approach has a direct effect on classical notions of 
personhood. 
Even contemporary approaches to the self remain in the tradition of the 
epistemological subject (e.g. Gallagher and Zahavi 2012; Henry and Thompson 2011; 
Legrand 2011). Nevertheless, these approaches attempt to investigate accounts of an 
embodied perception of the self as person. This includes a sensual and enworlded 
perception of our self-being and the life-world. It is fruitful to follow these approaches, 
despite their anchoring in the obsolete tradition of the philosophical subject.  
Following this way, recognition is strictly bound to our identity, our self and 
personhood which constitutes the basis for social development and social acting. To 
show this relation between recognition and our selfhood in dependence of our 
identity and personhood, I follow Laitinen (2010: 321f) who points out “five further 
(related) ways in which getting recognition matters”. First, “recognition is directly 
desirable in itself”. Such a desire makes recognition an “intelligent, independent 
motivational force”. Second, “recognizing and getting recognition are constitutive of 
non-alienated horizontal relationships of unity, of different kinds (for example, mutual 
respect, mutual care)” and they are “constitutive also of nonalienated vertical 
relationships of unity, of different kinds (for example, living under just, legitimate, 
self-governed institutions, living under institutions whose goals and principles one 
can identify with)”. Third, “via affecting self-relations of the relevant parties, getting 
recognition is a precondition of agency”. Fourth, “recognizing and getting recognition 
is arguably in different ways a precondition of identity formation, self-realization, 
good life and positive freedom”. Fifth, recognition has a “possible ontological 
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relevance for the very existence of groups, institutions, states, even persons”. Laitinen 
shows with these five basic definitions where recognition is virulent. To reach a level 
of mutual recognition within which we are adequately recognized in our self-being 
from others, the basis of the concept of recognition introduced so far in scientific 
discourse has to be renewed and reordered. These five premises being fulfilled, we 
and the self-related possibility of mutual recognition can be enabled. First, a sufficient 
concept of our self-being as recognizing self and recognizing other has to be 
elaborated. Therefore, we should look “for a theory of personhood that can articulate, 
organize, and philosophically justify our deepest intuitions about what makes us what 
we are” (Ikäheimo 2010: 356). 
For that reason, my approach to a self-based model of mutual recognition 
follows two methodological paradigms: phenomenology and hermeneutics.  
In this work, the phenomenologist’s approach constitutes the first main basis of 
the approach to a self-based concept of mutual recognition. By this means, our self is 
explained within the traditional first-person-account. “That is, the phenomenologist 
is concerned to understand the perception in terms of the meaning it has for the 
subject” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 7). Perception and related experiences are 
nothing that happens in the brain. By this means, they are not cognitive processes. 
 
The typical cognitive scientist […] takes a third-person approach, that is, 
an approach from the perspective of the scientist as external observer 
rather than from the perspective of the experiencing subject (Gallagher 
and Zahavi 2012: 7). 
 
In the cognitivist case, the perspective is objective, and the purpose of investigation 
represents only “for example certain objective (and usually sub-personal) processes 
like brain states or functional mechanisms” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 7). In relation 
to that, I follow an intrinsic actionism because, according to my main thesis, 
recognition begins on the level of the single human being; but also, on other levels of 
mutual recognition, there is an extrinsic actionism which mirrors our perception and 
acting in every aspect of the life-world. 
In a second step, we use hermeneutics as a “philosophy of detour” (Reagan 2002: 
5), thus this hermeneutical investigation of our self in relation to mutual recognition 
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has to start at the current state of the recognition debate and take a detour to the 
anthropological state of personhood- and self-debate. Since “[t]he self is not a 
monolith” (Cohen 1994: 2), this scientific multifaceted way through various 
anthropological concepts has to be made. 
I want to suggest a philosophical-anthropological approach, which enables 
investigations in empathy and care by using an approach to the motivation of 
recognition. I show how biographies as narratives can help to understand the other 
within her or his very own life-world, even if the life-world is the very part of the 
human’s personality as a dividual. The Western approach to personhood, on the other 
hand, can conceive a new concept of personhood that is understood as a category of 
the human being, with a stronger focus on culturally and historically founded 
dividuality instead of a mere individuality. Understood in such a way, the act of 
recognition nourishes itself from the motivation of acting and performance within the 
life-world. In a classical sense, motivation is conceived as “representing those forces 
that arouse organisms to action towards a desired goal and provide the reason and 
purpose for behavior” (Kreitler 2013: 2). Not surprisingly, due to its Western roots, 
this definition highlights the intentional character of motivation. For the purpose of 
this work, however, intentionality is not relevant, since action intentionality is a 
sufficient condition for action, but not a necessary one. There exist many concepts of 
personhood and action motivation which have in common that people act, but differ 
in the definition of their purpose (LiPuma 2000: 136–138). Therefore, I would rather 
suggest to take ‘motivation’ only as action force, without including the necessity for 
action intention. 
In summary, on the sketched basis of philosophical and anthropological 
approaches, the purpose of this work is to draw a self-based model of mutual 
recognition which includes all stages of mutual recognition: recognition of our own 
identity, recognition of our own acting, recognition of others, and evaluative 
recognition. Therefore, I begin this journey with preliminary remarks on recognition, 
person, and self by elaborating the state of the art in approaches to mutual 
recognition, the anthropological notion of personhood, individual, and self, and the 
philosophical notion of personhood, identity and self. In the second part of my work, 
I show how these approaches compose a self-based model of mutual recognition. 
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Part I: 
Preliminary Remarks on Mutual 
Recognition, Person and Self 
 
 
In Western Philosophy “[t]he idea of an individual unique self” precedes and founds 
most of all investigations on being human and personhood (Wassmann and Funke 
2013: 233). It does not comply with usual Western thinking to apply personhood to 
relational frameworks, rather personhood is brought in context with subjectivity 
(Härle 2012: 96f). First, Descartes in his Meditations on First Philosophy (1990) 
introduced the later well-established Western philosophical focus on a conscious 
subject and this conscious subject’s ability of introspection and thinking. With this 
structure, Descartes and his followers attempted to answer the main questions which 
at the time occupied Western thinkers the most: ‘what is the human aware of?’ and 
‘what can the human really know for sure?’. 
From doubting and derived from the certainty “that there is nothing certain” 
(Descartes 1990: 99) has resulted the famous insight “Ego sum, ergo existo” (Descartes 
1990: 100). This realization “is necessarily true, so often as it is uttered by me or 
conceived by the mind” (Descartes 1990: 101). By implication, the subject can only 
recognize what it knows for sure. This epistemological approach to the human 
perception of the world centralizes the awareness of consciousness: we are the center 
of our world, from this derives that our perception necessarily is egocentric. As a 
result, philosophical thinkers like Edmund Husserl and other Phenomenologists try 
to explain the world as consisting of environment and life-world from the egocentric 
point of view. 
In fact, this is a consciousness-based European idea which became so much 
popular all over the world through imperialism and mission. The structure of this 
Western philosophical subject, however, is limited, since the subject stands for itself. 
It can neither experience nor recognize itself without the outer world, to be more 
precise, without other human beings. Thinking this train of thought to its conclusion, 
an egocentric perspective on the world limits the account of this world. It can only 
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16 
secure the own subjective point of view. Therefore, it seems paradoxically that such 
an account of the world claims to be absolute and universal in the entire world.  
In recent approaches to mutual recognition, which here in chapter one are 
reported as state of the art within the debate on social and mutual recognition, many 
social sciences like cultural sciences, sociology, and psychology have focused on 
traditional Western concepts of mutual – or in this case ‘intersubjective’ − recognition. 
Groundbreaking and most influential in recent investigations in this field has been the 
revival of Hegel’s theory of recognition. Honneth (1995, 2003, 2008, 2012), Judith 
Butler (2005), and, especially in German approaches, Thomas Bedorf (2010) 
published considerable and influential works about the structure and the concept of 
mutual recognition. Within this scientific area, Honneth (1995), above all, provides a 
systematic approach to the Struggle for Recognition. All these investigations focus on 
struggles for recognition from the perspective that recognition of the subject is 
dependent on the other. Regarding recognition as a social phenomenon, it only can be 
conceived through the other. Therefore, the recognition of the own self is unsolvably 
bound to the other. The subject, however, struggles against these bonds striving to be 
for itself. 
The crucial point in these investigations is to include individual motivations to 
engage in this struggle of mutual recognition. Individual reasons depend on cultural 
and social heritage, the constitution of personal identity, and preferences, personal 
objectives and pursuits related with these factors. In this respect, the individual 
human cannot be ignored. Fundamentally, it might be said that the primary subject of 
recognition is not society, but the single human considered as person. We might go 
even a step further by formulating the hypothesis that the primary subject of 
recognition is not society but the single human. Thus, above all, it has to be 
investigated how and why the human is motivated to gain recognition. Therefore, my 
general critiques of these approaches are: individual motives and intentions are not 
sufficiently investigated because we might forget that the subject is bound to social 
relations from the beginning. In contrast, I claim to regard mutual recognition as a 
dialogue, since self-confirmation is not only dependent on ourselves, but also on the 
other and her or his reaction or ‘feedback’ to our behavior. Therefore, recognition is 
based on − well balanced − mutuality (Bedorf 2010: 102). The recognized human has 
to be naturally involved in social relationships. Indeed, the Western philosophical 
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subject is bounded by force, since it needs self-confirmation from the other. For that 
reason, the question arises how and in which role we are acting within the world. To 
be sure, the centered ego is a Western concept. In other non-Western cultures, 
however, perceptions on identity, individual, self and personhood – even if not in 
these terms − have been developed as well. In social and cultural anthropology there 
are many problems within the perception of the other and related social acting: 
because within societies where dividual perceptions of personhood exist an opacity 
of mind prevails which negates an awareness of theory of mind which has a direct 
effect on empathy, care and agency. In contrast to the Western concept of 
individuality, dividuality highlights our porosity. We are not one single awareness 
with one single character, even we are not a single block. The perception of dividuality 
makes us observable in various situations within a variety of behavioral settings 
which all belong to us, even if it seems as though we were different persons: in that 
way, our relation to the situation and the surroundings is highlighted. Here occurs the 
dichotomy of the Western individuality and the concept of dividuality.The traditional 
Western individuality is a “view that society is constituted of autonomous, equal, 
units, namely separate indviduals, and that such inidividuals are more important, 
ultimately, than any larger constituent group” (Macfarlane 1978: 5). By this means, 
the human being is not only conceived as isolated individual “in highly non-natural 
(but carefully controlled) environments”, but she or he moves within a cultural 
framework and thus within a social community with all its permanent interactions 
(Wassmann and Bender 2015: 17). 
In reference to the elaborations and investigations of Maurice Leenhardt (1979), 
the Melanesian perception of personhood sets the focus on a cosmomorphic 
approach. The human is conceived as holistic relational. The human life-world does 
not enclose an ‘I’ in the middle of the world which perceives the life-world from a 
central ego. In a certain manner, the world around the pretended subject ‘gets human’. 
This understanding of the human in the world moves away from an a priori awareness 
of mind and cognition to an a priori experience through the body. The focus on 
personhood shifts from a view of a living subject that has consciousness surrounded 
by mere objects without consciousness and sociality and perception attached to avoid 
solipsism, to a view of a lively symbiosis of the human and the life-world. The 
dichotomy between subject and object does not exist anymore: vivant = vivant 
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(Clifford 1982: 174). While this makes the body of the human part of the environment, 
the environment as the human life-world becomes a part of the human as well.  
Life-world is a phenomenological term, taken from Husserl, that refers to the 
world where things appear as entities in their suchness: “the ‘merely subjective-
relative’ intuitive of prescientific world-life” (Husserl 1970: 125). Every scientific 
insight is founded on practical and sensual perception. Thus, the life-world is in 
opposition to “the ‘objective‘, ‘the true‘ world” of sciences (Husserl 1970: 127). 
Furthermore, life-world enables objectivism and focusing on facts, and thus builds a 
“forgotten meaning-fundament” (Husserl 1970: 48). The working scientist assumes 
“the one world of experience, […] [where] every other researcher knows he is in as a 
human being, even throughout all his activity of research” (Husserl 1970: 126). That 
makes life-world a “prescientific, intuitively given surrounding world” (Husserl 1970: 
27) which consists of personal relations to this world. It is not my intention to use the 
term in this strict classical phenomenological way. Rather it is used to describe the 
surroundings or environment in which we live as an everyday world. For that reason 
life-world has a performative character (Galuschek 2014: 347). It is the world within 
which we act and perform. It builds the room for social interaction and culture. Even 
in the eyes of Husserl life-world and scientific world are interdependent, since 
scientific insight itself on its part becomes a cultural product, and thus part of the life-
world (Husserl 1970: 128). In this work it is shown how life-world is a world where 
things are animated by human custom and arranged as a mirror of our self. This 
perception of the self demands self-reflectivity and, therefore, the self is narratively 
considered. 
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1. Introductory Reflections on 
Mutual Recognition 
Nowadays, it is well known in academia that the act of recognition does not only 
include two ‘players’ in relation to each other. In fact, at least three ‘players’ 
participate in the ‘game’, ‘struggle’, or ‘contest’ of mutual recognition. The structure 
of this act can be broken down to the formula 
 
x recognizes y for z. 
 
This formula describes in the usual adequate and concise way the incongruence of me 
‘y’ who wants to be recognized by another ‘x’, and the part of us ‘z’ which is recognized. 
If we take ‘z’ as particular context or as part of ‘y’ like an ability, characteristic or traits, 
we realize that it is impossible to be recognized in our entire identity ‘y’. To supply a 
practical example: Jane (y) is a so-called ‘completely normal’ human being3. Her 
profession is teaching math. Her students (x) appreciate her teaching style and her 
ability to make math understandable (z). Thus, Jane (x) receives recognition by her 
students (x) for her teaching (z). The part ‘z’ in this formula is important, since Jane 
as a human is not only a teacher. She also might be a friend, a mother, a wife, the girl 
in the red dress which always reads a book in the bus, and much more, but only her 
teaching ability is relevant for the student’s context. Thus, the act of recognition 
encompasses only a particular part of our personal identity, but never the entire one 
(Bedorf 2010: 122). Phenomenologically speaking, we are not recognized in the 
wholeness of our personal identity, rather in alterity regarded as part of our personal 
identity, which makes us to someone else as we are, since the recognized part differs 
from the personal identity regarded as a whole. By implication, the act of recognition 
does not necessarily include a congruence with the aspect within we want to be 
recognized, and the aspect actually recognized by the other. In consequence, there 
exists always the opportunity to create a complete new aspect of the own identity.  
                                            
3 I address the reader to forgive me using such a phrase. We all know that such a description of a human 
being is folk psychological. But, at the same time, we all have a diffuse understanding of what kind of 
human is meant. So, to ensure the simplicity of my example, this phrase suggested itself. 
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As Honneth (2012: 80) points out, in recent discourse about recognition, there 
is general agreement that recognition is an act as well as “a distinct phenomenon in 
the social world”. Recognition has become a slogan in proactive contexts like − to 
name just a few − ’struggle for recognition’, ‘need for recognition’, ‘interpersonal 
recognition’, ‘public recognition’, ‘recognition of difference’, ‘institutional 
recognition’, or ‘emotional recognition’ (Laitinen 2010: 319). Comparing recent 
approaches suggests that the notion of the act of recognizing each other or being 
recognized can be defined in several expressions, which all refer to each other or are 
replaceable by each other: like ‘political recognition’, ‘social recognition’, 
‘intersubjective recognition’, ‘reciprocal recognition’, and ‘mutual recognition’. It can 
be said that political and social recognition are similar terms, since they refer to the 
act of recognition from a group to a group. They are closely linked to each other, since, 
on a normative and moral level, the political recognition corresponds to social 
recognition, and vice versa. As ‘intersubjective recognition’, ‘reciprocal recognition’, 
and ‘mutual recognition’ can be classified as similar terms, it is clear that they refer to 
the act of recognition from an individual to a group, and vice versa. ‘Social recognition’ 
and ‘mutual recognition’ here have a special stand, since they can be interpreted in 
both ways as an act of recognition from an individual to a group, and vice versa, as well 
as an act of recognition from group to group.4 Thus, recognition is considered as 
always executed between at least two humans. For that reason, all these terms deal 
with a strong social aspect. In addition, since they do not, in first instance, deal with 
material goods or economy, they rather have in common that they are acts of 
‘symbolic recognition’. They can be summarized under this term, since the act of 
mutual recognition as such can be perceived as a social phenomenon: 
 
[t]he social world gives what is rarest, recognition, consideration, in other 
words, quite simply, reasons for being. It is capable of giving meaning to 
life, and to death itself, by consecrating it as the supreme sacrifice 
(Bourdieu 2000: 240).  
                                            
4 In the following work, I only talk about ‚mutual recognition‘, since for my purpose it is the most 
general term which covers both kinds of recognition: from individual to group, and vice versa, and from 
group to group. In addition, the term ‘mutual recognition’ fits more easily in an investigation into the 
selfhood and recognition which bypasses the subject than the term ‘intersubjective recognition’ which 
relies on the subject. 
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Regarded from this perspective, recognition appears as a form of symbolic capital. 
Symbolic capital is something non-material, but still socially valuable. For example, if 
we gain a particular social status, we receive an act of recognition by others. In 
addition, this symbolic evaluation makes recognition important for our development 
as social beings, but also for our self-confirmation. Without this confirmation on the 
level of sociality and on the level of the self, being oneself as well as being part of a 
social community is hard to realize. As parts of the social community we receive our 
confirmation from this community, the part we want to play in this community is 
dependent on our self-confirmation, since we seek self-confirmation in dependence 
of the way we perceive our self. For that reason, we have a particular way of self-
perception which we project on the social surroundings. Therefore, self can be 
understood as “an encompassing domain term that includes within it virtually all 
aspects of personhood […] [and] is constituted by acts of identification” (Mageo and 
Knauft 2002: 3). The self is totally interwoven with its own reflexive and experience 
related being and with the surrounding social world. By this means, if recognition is 
not conceived on a social or mutual level, it can be the act of recognizing oneself as an 
acting human. Here the distinction between ontic and ontological other is adequate: 
the ontic other is the physical other we meet in our daily interaction; the ontological 
other is a theoretical distinction between me in this moment and me one hour ago, to 
take an example. In this manner, we are able to realize ourselves as another, which 
enables the reflection about our acts and our self-being. Self-recognition is crucial for 
being aware of the act of mutual recognition, the self is constitutively related to 
“reciprocal intersubjectivity” (Forst 1994: 413). By implication, the “qualitative self-
conception” of the subject is developed by mutual recognition (Forst 1994: 413). This 
act, thus, enables self-confirmation and self-realization. By referring to the own self 
through the act of mutual recognition, self-confirmation is possible only through 
mutual recognition.  
Since it is the excellent goal of this investigation to elaborate an approach − with 
the following presented theoretical concepts − to mutual recognition based on the 
self, I focus on the position of the self. Due to their affiliation with the Western 
epistemic subject, all recent approaches to recognition struggle with the notion of the 
self. Within the numerous approaches and investigations of recognition, there are two 
fundamental approaches which deserve closer consideration: Honneth’s (1995) 
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approach to recognition as a struggle in the tradition of Hegel (1967, 1977, 1979) and 
Ricœur’s (2005) approach to recognition as a gift. Both offer a special account of the 
structure of recognition: for Honneth, recognition is a perpetual struggle, which every 
individual human has to fight. In other words, he aims to elaborate a state of 
 
undistorted relation-to-self, human subjects always need − over and above 
the experience of affectionate care and legal recognition − a form of social 
esteem that allows them to relate positively to their concrete traits and 
abilities (Honneth 1995: 121). 
 
Thus, in Honneth’s eyes (2003: 176), recognition should be an act of self-affirmation 
and should be regarded “as the good of personal identity-formation”, where the social 
dimension in which the other appears and claims for recognition is a necessary detour 
(Bedorf 2010: 69). For Ricœur, recognition is a gift which every individual human 
likes to give, and gives this recognition without expectation of return. Therefore, 
Ricœur does not focus on a struggle, but rather on the experience of otherness (Kämpf 
2012: 137). 
 
 
1.1 Struggling for Recognition 
Honneth’s elaborations on mutual recognition passed through a great turn. He 
founded his early approach to thoughts the young Hegel elaborated during his years 
in Jena  as the The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (1967), which subtitles his work 
about the Struggle for Recognition (1995). 
 
Within Hegel’s œuvre, of course, the programme thus outlined never made 
it beyond the level of mere sketches and proposals. Already in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, the completion of which brought to a close 
Hegel’s period in Jena, the conceptual model of a ‘struggle for recognition’ 
had lost its central position within Hegel’s theory (Honneth 1995: 5). 
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Honneth (1995) takes Hegel’s approach as initial point to develop a critical theory of 
social recognition. He deepens Hegel‘s approach to recognition to elaborate ‘an 
explication of the grammar of recognition’ (Berg et al. 2004: 47). To be more precise, 
Honneth’s approach deals with embedding recognition in a socio-pragmatic context. 
In this manner he aims to investigate social dynamics, since 
 
[t]he developmental logic of such collective movements can, however, only 
be discovered via an analysis that attempts to explain social struggles on 
the basis of the dynamics of moral experiences (Honneth 1995: 139). 
 
In consequence, the main question is how a normative model of society can be 
constituted as “moral infrastructure of interactions” (Honneth 1995: 143). 
The main concern of Honneth’s (1995: 176, cf. 2004: 112) approach to 
recognition is the idea of “post-traditional, democratic ethical life” as self-realization, 
which is closely linked to ‘personal integrity’ and ‘autonomy’, with ‘freedom’ being the 
center of all these concepts. Therefore, Honneth’s hypothesis states that ‘recognition 
is intersubjective and reciprocal’: 
 
the reproduction of social life is governed by the imperative of mutual 
recognition, because one can develop a practical relation-to-self only when 
one has learned to view oneself, from the normative perspective of one's 
partners in interaction, as their social addressee (Honneth 1995: 92). 
 
According to Honneth, subjectivity is essentially social. Traditionally, to be a subject 
means to be active, the center of the world, self-aware, and independent. Sociality as 
quality of being and acting within a group of other subjects, contradicts such a 
definition, since within a group individual and personal desires are not the main 
concern; rather the desires of the group as a social community. This inescapable 
situation (or aporia) is bypassed by the struggle for recognition. The struggle 
preserves the qualities of the subject, but at the same time, the struggle describes the 
subject’s movement to sociality, since the subject accepts the struggle. 
The young Hegel’s approach exactly begins at this point. Based on Fichte, the 
young Hegel (1967) focuses in his investigation on our self-dependence. Later, Hegel 
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uses this concept of recognition with his description of the relation of Lordship and 
Bondage in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1977). To reach the status of self-
dependence, on the one hand, we have to confirm our own self-awareness, while, by 
this means, we have to confirm our self-being as being us as ‘human’ and all other 
things we identify ourselves with; on the other, we have to deny the self-awareness of 
others. To confirm our own being and self-awareness, others are always needed, but 
the existence of others cannot be fully denied; rather there is a gray area between the 
confirmation and the negation of the other: “[t]hey recognize themselves as mutually 
recognizing one another” (Hegel 1977: 112). In conclusion, we only can recognize our 
self-awareness in being able to perceive the other’s different being. Here appears a 
certain mutual respect towards each other. It is about a particular acceptance of the 
existence of another, but not of another’s being as human. The other is perceived and 
recognized as a random entity being there (read: object). In contrast to Martin 
Heidegger’s conception of Dasein in Being and Time (1962), Hegel directs the focus on 
the ‘there’ as mere existence. To solve the occurring problem of solipsism, Hegel 
(1967: 201ff) uses the struggle for recognition between subjects to show that 
everyone of us comes to the own individual, concrete, and true existence through 
being and caring for others (Hegel 1967: 213).5 The foundation of this struggle for 
recognition is the hypothesis that ‘all humans have freedom in common’ − due to the 
freedom of their consciousness (Hegel 1967: 193).6 They lose their freedom by being 
with others and, naturally, by being in the world. In the context of being recognized 
by others, freedom is lost by being forced to succumb before the shape of recognition 
the other is giving. In the context of his theorem of Lordship and Bondage, Hegel later 
states “the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove 
themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle” (Hegel 1977: 113f). For 
Hegel, this struggle for recognition is so important as to emphasize it, since he aims to 
underline the fact that the value of independence exceeds our existence in the world.  
 
                                            
5 This paraphrase was loosely translated by the author: “Jeder dient dem Andern und leistet Hilfe, oder 
das Individuum hat hier erst als  e i n z e l n e s  Dasein; vorher ist es nur abstraktes oder unwahres“ 
(Hegel 1967: 213). 
6 “Diese Intelligenz ist  f r e i , aber ihre Freiheit ist umgekehrt ohne  I n h a l t , auf dessen Kosten, durch 
dessen Verlust eben sie sich befreit hat” (Hegel 1967: 193). Hegel understands intelligence as 
theoretical spirit, which has no content. It comes to content with activity in the world. However, the 
price the theoretical spirit pays for that activity in the world is freedom, since content is bounded to 
reality. 
 Introductory Reflections on Mutual Recognition 
25 
The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a 
person, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an 
independent self-consciousness. Similarly, just as each stakes his own life, 
so each must seek the other's death, for it values the other no more than 
itself; its essential being is present to it in the form of an ‘other’, it is outside 
of itself and must rid itself of its self-externality. The other is an immediate 
consciousness entangled in a variety of relationships, and it must regard 
its otherness as a pure being-for-self or as an absolute negation (Hegel 
1977: 114). 
 
Consequently, with independence, we overcome our own being-for-self and move into 
our own sociality. It can be derived that in case of self-confirmation Hegel founds his 
concept of self-consciousness in “recognitive relations” (Quante 2010: 100). It is 
double bind, since it is directed to the own self, but only in dependence of the other. 
“Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for 
another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” (Hegel 1977: 111). This process 
of recognition consists, therefore, of self-confirmation and self-sacrifice. 
 
Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out 
of itself. This has a twofold significance: first, it has lost itself, for it finds 
itself as an other being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, 
for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its 
own self (Hegel 1977: 111). 
 
This conceptualization binds our self to recognition, since a dynamic process is given 
in which we, considered as individuals, move within reciprocal relationships. These 
relationships enable as well the awareness of our recognition concerning the other. 
Therefore, the individual “ultimately becomes dependent on the other for his self-
consciousness” (Barresi and Martin 2011: 46). This aporia of self-confirmation and 
self-sacrifice directly results in our struggle for self-confirmation and against the 
dominance of the other. Though Hegel’s model of recognition is based on identity his 
approach is, in recent research, transferred “onto the cultural and political terrain” 
(Fraser 2010: 213). By this means, if a group A is discriminated by another dominant 
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group B, recognition becomes a struggle for A’s cultural identity. This struggle is 
portrayed as follows: 
 
[a]s a result of repeated encounters with the stigmatizing gaze of a 
culturally dominant other, the members of disesteemed groups internalize 
negative self-images and are prevented from developing a healthy cultural 
identity of their own. In this perspective, the politics of recognition aims to 
repair internal self-dislocation by contesting the dominant culture’s 
demeaning picture of the group. It proposes that members of 
misrecognized groups reject such images in favor of new self-
representations of their own making, jettisoning internalized, negative 
identities and joining collectively to produce a self-affirming culture of 
their own − which, publicly asserted, will gain the respect and esteem of 
society at large. The result, when successful, is ‘recognition’: an 
undistorted relation to oneself (Fraser 2010: 213). 
 
The objective of such a struggle of recognition is intersubjective – or mutual – 
recognition, which confirms our own self as our personal identity. In reference to 
Hegel’s original idea of recognition, intersubjective recognition can be understood as 
 
an obligation that requires but does not force subjects to recognize one 
another in a certain way: if I do not recognize my partner to interaction as 
a certain type of person, his reactions cannot give me the sense that I am 
recognized as the same type of person, since I thereby deny him precisely 
the characteristics and capacities with regard to which I want to feel 
myself affirmed by him (Honneth 1995: 37f). 
 
We have a particular and individual view of the other’s personality. Thus, in the mode 
of recognition the other is recognized only in the particular mode, by this means, the 
other is not recognized in the way as the other recognizes her or his own self. 
 
The line of thought entailed by Hegel's argument here represents a 
significant step beyond the mere claim, found in theories of socialization, 
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that the formation of the subject's identity is supposed to be necessarily 
tied to the experience of intersubjective recognition. This idea leads to the 
further conclusion that an individual that does not recognize its partner to 
interaction to be a certain type of person is also unable to experience itself 
completely or without restriction as that type of person. The implication 
of this for the relationship of recognition can only be that an obligation to 
reciprocity is, to a certain extent, built into such relations (Honneth 1995: 
37). 
 
The other is obligated, or forced, to divest her or his own self of being a subject, and 
to move into an objectivity in favor of being recognized. In this sense, 
 
Hegel thus faces the question of what these categorial tools must be like, if 
they are to make it possible to explain philosophically the development of 
an organization of society whose ethical cohesion would lie in a form of 
solidarity based on the recognition of the individual freedom of all citizens 
(Honneth 1995: 14). 
 
Thus, individual freedom is realized in the concept of solidarity, since in such a 
dimension of recognition the equality of the other is recognized. 
Nevertheless, we live in a culturally influenced life-world, therefore, within it 
objective values cannot exist, rather they are dependent on our subjective perception. 
According to Max Scheler’s (1973a) value realism, Honneth (2004: 107) does not 
emanate from a cognitive perception of the life-world, but rather from a sensual 
perception, which includes the perception of values through a cultural background. 
Simultaneously, we deepen our awareness of the surrounding life-world better and 
better, not only in a perceiving sense, but also in our awareness of life-wordly values 
and norms. Since values and norms exist independently from their carriers, they can 
be attributed to other human beings and found everywhere. Obviously, every object 
and every entity conveys values, since they are furnished with symbolic character. 
Embedded in the cultural framework, values constitute a symbolic system of their 
own. In this way, they lead our perception and recognition in accordance with the 
cultural framework. In consequence, the more we feel ourselves as a part of a 
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particular life-world, the more we internalize this life-world’s values and norms as 
our own; and with these values and norms, we claim to be recognized by others. 
Such an interpretation of Scheler’s value realism is considered as a moderate 
variant, which means “that different experiences, in a given subject or in different 
subjects, can have the same kinds of properties” (Engelsen 2011: 11). Values, 
therefore, can be related to and recognized in different things and entities at the same 
time. To reach this stage of recognition, we have to struggle for our own recognition. 
The young Hegel in the years of his Jenaer Realphilosophie (1967) found this 
struggle for recognition at the stage of the law. Honneth (1995) goes one step further 
by introducing three theoretical stages of recognition derived from Hegel’s System of 
Ethical Life (1979). “[T]he argumentation does suggest a distinction between three 
forms of recognition, differing from each other with regard to the ‘how’ as well as the 
‘what’ of practical confirmation” (Honneth 1995: 25), since the theoretical structure 
of intersubjective recognition is not well elaborated. He finds these stages: 
 
in the affective relationship of recognition found in the family, human 
individuals are recognized as concrete creatures of need; in the cognitive-
formal relationship of recognition found in law, they are recognized as 
abstract legal persons; and finally, in the emotionally enlightened 
relationship of recognition found in the State, they are recognized as 
concrete universals, that is, as subjects who are socialized in their 
particularity (Honneth 1995: 25). 
 
In conclusion, Honneth (1995: 25f) formulates three dimensions of recognition in 
reference to the lifeworldly social field in which they are performed: ‘love’ in the 
family, ‘law’ in the civil society, and ‘ethical life’ in the state. In order to enhance the 
transparency of this model of mutual recognition consider table 1: 
 
Mode of recognition Love Law Solidarity 
Personal Field Family Civil society State 
Personal Involvement Emotionality Cognitivity Affect has become rational 
Concept of Personhood Individual Person Subject 
 
Table 1: theoretical stages of recognition (according to Honneth 1995: 25).  
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 Table 1 shows the three theoretical stages of recognition in reference to a particular 
field within the personal life-world, and the personal involvement according to this 
stage of recognition. Depending on the personal field, the personal involvement as 
affectivity is developed. Within the stage of love the field of family and friends is 
dominant. Whereas within the stages of law, the perception of the other is on a 
cognitive level, since, at this stage, the awareness of our own values is virulent. At the 
stage of the state, affectivity has become rational, and by this means, personal 
involvement as a personal concern, as is the case in the field of the family, becomes 
congruent with the concern of the state. Additionally,  
Table 1 shows the concept of personhood to which each stage refers. At the stage 
of love, concrete individual needs are virulent, while the stage of law focuses on the 
autonomous acting human, at the stage of the state, regarded as solidarity, humans 
act as subjects, one equal to another, regardless of individual particularities. As to the 
relation of the self, it can be derived that self-confidence corresponds with love, self-
respect corresponds with law, and self-esteem corresponds with solidarity (Honneth 
1995: 129; Bedorf 2010: 48). 
Our individual interaction with others, thus, is the beginning of the struggle for 
recognition. Therefore, I want to focus in particular on the individual relationship of 
love, since the stage of love encompasses the part of symbolic recognition as 
expression of an intimate, mutuality-based stage of recognition, with which the entire 
further investigation deals. 
‘Love’ as the first mode of recognition links two humans by their love for each 
other. Here, Honneth takes as example the love between mother and infant. This 
particular love contains a strong emotional affection. For the infant, this relationship 
of love is the first experience of mutual recognition by receiving the full loving 
attention of the mother (Benjamin 1988: 25). Thus, already at an early age the infant 
is familiar with the process of being recognized and claiming for recognition. 
According to Honneth, this early stage of infant development already allows a struggle 
for emotional recognition. He points out that “human infants develop an active 
willingness to produce interpersonal proximity” (Honneth 1995: 97). By claiming 
recognition from each other, mother and child enter a symbiosis, even though they 
are not physically connected anymore, and, in this way, they come closer to each 
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other. On the one hand, the infant is obviously biologically dependent on the mother; 
on the other, the mother herself is not biologically dependent on the infant. On a 
psychological level, however, the mother struggles for her infant's recognition, and 
vice versa. Therefore, the infant claims for recognition by its mother, which establishes 
an unequal relationship. In the sense of Hegel, both mother and infant recognize each 
other as ontic other, whose act of recognition is directed to their existence as being. 
Thus, if the struggle for recognition proceeds successfully, they recognize each other 
as an autonomous and independent individual. Indeed, mother and infant 
permanently learn from each other that they are always one single self, and they have 
to recognize this fact to be able to be together. 
It is obvious that not every struggle for recognition is successful; for instance, if 
the infant does not comply with the mother's claim, a negative circle of recognition 
arises. The structure of such a process of recognition proves itself to be difficult. 
 
The mother who jiggles, pokes, looms, and shouts ‘look at me’ to her 
unresponsive baby creates a negative cycle of recognition out of her own 
despair at not being recognized. Here in the earliest social interaction we 
see how the search for recognition can become a power struggle: how 
assertion becomes aggression (Benjamin 1988: 28). 
 
To impose its will and to force the mother to recognize its will, the infant has to 
objectify its mother. Therefore, it has to negate her existence as a human being. 
However, by realizing that it cannot exist without mother, it has suddenly to affirm 
her existence as human being − it has to recognize that it is “dependent on the loving 
care of an independently existing person with claims of her own” (Honneth 1995: 
101). The mother is in the same situation: to perform her role as mother she has to 
realize that her infant is independent. Otherwise, by negating the independence of the 
infant’s own being, she would ‘destroy’ the infant’s existence. Paradoxically, at the 
same time, she would also destroy her own existence as mother. Thus, mother and 
infant have to learn to trust each other, as each one is part of the other’s life-world. 
They confirm their existence as far as they know that the other is there, even though 
the other addresses the own attention to something or somebody else (Honneth 1995: 
99). By this means, both mother and infant become self-aware by the certainty of the 
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other’s being. In sum, it can be finally said, according to Honneth (1995: 105), that 
love as dimension of recognition is not only an “intersubjective state so much as a 
communicative arc suspended between the experience of being able to be alone and 
the experience of being merged“. 
The second mode of recognition is the normative mode of law, which encloses 
‘scopes of autonomous subjects’ (Berg et al. 2004: 47) as a legal relationship between 
human beings. The objective of this recognition relationship is the development of 
self-respect as a result of the ability to act autonomously. From this perspective, it is 
obvious that we recognize another’s acting on an intersubjective level. To confirm that 
everyone knows the rules of interaction, a common normative pool is needed. 
Therefore, this stage of mutual recognition coins the recognition of law for all humans 
who participate in a normative community. In reference to Hegel, Honneth (1995: 
112) emphasizes the recognition of “’freedom of the will of the person’”. This freedom 
is ensured by normative rules of law, which enable scopes of action for independent 
acting. 
However, each normative order is founded by a moral order which is rooted in 
traditions and cultural heritage. Every one of us is a legal entity which is equipped 
with the ability of moral judgment. That enables us as legal entities to act 
autonomically. Both orders, the moral as well as the normative, restrict the freedom 
of the normative community’s members, but such a restriction is the only way to 
ensure a coexistence of all members of the normative community. Therefore, all 
members have to give up parts of their absolute freedom, to allow a peaceful living 
with each other. This withdrawal of absolute freedom is executed on the level of 
normative duties and on the level of social regard. 
For Honneth (1995: 111), both the level of normative law and the level of 
axeological law lead to two different readings of “’respect’”. Respect as a normative 
concept is bound to “a universally valid right” (Honneth 1995: 113), and encloses an 
essential respect for each other without any regard to these particular qualities. On 
the axeological level, respect as “’social regard’” is bound to values, “insofar it can be 
measured according to criteria of social relevance” (Honneth 1995: 111). This double-
structure of respect on the stage of law allows of regarding respect as recognition of 
law, which enables the full recognition of the human as a part of a social community. 
Thus perceived, social community bases on common law. In addition, the concept of 
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respect as social regard allows of evaluating each other’s qualities and character, our 
values consist of different qualities. Respect defined in this way, we receive 
recognition for our acting, and thus our self-respect rises. In conclusion, the stage of 
the recognition of law, allows to “recognize human beings as persons without having 
to esteem their achievements or their character” (Honneth 1995: 112). 
Finally, and here we come to the third of Honneth’s (1995: 207ff) stages of mutual 
recognition, recognition encloses expressive and contextual social practice by 
describing a particular concept of solidarity at the level of the state. Derived from the 
hypothesis that contextualized social practices are manifested in social regard, it has 
to be stated that social regard also needs an orientation frame in which “social ‘worth’ 
is measured by the degree to which [practices] they appear to be in a position to 
contribute to the realization of societal goals” (Honneth 1995: 122). Therefore, social 
regard is influenced by normativity and morality. But this makes relationships 
between “culturally typified members”7 asymmetrical (Honneth 1995: 123). For that 
reason, Honneth (1995) avoids the term ‘social regard’, and prefers the term 
‘solidarity’ to emphasize the equality of all humans (Honneth 1995: 127). The 
advantage of this account is that ‘solidarity’ still includes values like those defined 
within a social community. If all members of a social community believe in these 
values, the social community is suffesed with solidarity: the members of the 
community hold together, due to the role a member is playing within the social 
community, each member has a particular important value for the social community. 
Therefore, at the present time, and in the case of social regard, values are not parts of 
a collective identity; rather they are related to the individual human as an individual, 
but also as a fundamental and precious part of the social community (Honneth 1995: 
129). Notably, this shift from ‘social regard’ to ‘solidarity’ sketches Honneth’s efforts 
to conceptualize a sociality-founded concept of recognition, where the struggle is 
infinite in such an extent that everyone confirms and recognizes each other. 
Nevertheless, the consolidation of the group is still firm, since 
 
                                            
7 In the German original text, Honneth (1994: 206) writes of “lebensgeschichtlich individuierten 
Subjekten”, which shifts the meaning to ‘historical and cultural influence on a subject’s personal and 
individual development’. 
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[r]elationships of this sort can be said to be cases of ‘solidarity’, because 
they inspire not just passive tolerance but felt concern for what is 
individual and particular about the other person. For only to the degree to 
which I actively care about the development of the other’s characteristics 
(which seem foreign to me) can our shared goals be realized (Honneth 
1995: 129).  
 
On the individual level, a human’s self-esteem increases, since this human experiences 
her or his own value for the social community. According to Honneth, this concept of 
solidarity fits into the idea of a modern, individualized, and social system, in which 
social regard as a reciprocal form of recognition is based on individual 
“accomplishments and abilities” (Honneth 1995: 130); and which finally leads to 
individual self-realization. 
Considering the table above, it shifted to the extended table 2 which describes 
the stages of recognition with all their characteristics:  
 
Mode of Recognition Emotional Support Cognitive Respect Social Esteem 
Dimensions of 
Personality 
Needs and emotions Moral Responsibility Treats and Abilities 
Forms of Recognition 
Primary Relationships 
(Love, Friendship) 
Legal Relations (Rights) 
Community of Value 
(Solidarity) 
Developmental 
Potential 
― 
Generalization, De-
formalization 
Individualization, 
Equalization 
Practical Relation-to-
self 
Basic Self-confidence Self-respect Self-esteem 
Threatened 
Component of 
Personality 
Physical Integrity Social integrity ‘Honor’, Dignity 
 
Table 2: the structure of relations of recognition (according to Honneth 1995: 129). 
 
The reflexive supplements to the recognition concepts of ‘love’, ‘law’, and ‘solidarity’ 
are ‘self-confidence’, ‘self-respect’, and ‘self-esteem’, which highlight the personal 
reference to the self at every stage of recognition. This reference is essential to ensure 
personal relationships at every stage of mutual recognition. To be mutually 
recognized on a mutual level means to be recognized as individual human. Regarded 
from the perspective of the reflexivity of the self, it is obvious that each human wants 
to be recognized, since every aspect of recognition contains a self-reference. In this 
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respect, the attainment of self-affirmation is dependent on the valuation of the social 
community, 
 
since individuals must know that they are recognized for their particular 
abilities and traits in order to be capable of self-realization, they need a 
form of social esteem that they can only acquire on the basis of collectively 
shared goals (Honneth 1995: 177f). 
 
However, shared goals are more than mere sharing of common interests. Hence, from 
this structure of shared goals, group recognition and group affiliations can be derived. 
That implies that every one of us has special group-related abilities and traits which 
are particularly appreciated. According to Honneth, the struggle for recognition 
arises, if certain abilities and traits are more recognized than other abilities and traits.  
Nevertheless, in his recent research, Honneth (2007, 2008, 2012) dissociates 
himself from the assumption “that Hegel’s Jena lectures (1967) contained coherent 
elements of a theory of recognition” (Honneth 2012: vi), and shifts to the standpoint 
that social reality is “a set of layered relations of recognition” (Honneth 2012: vii), 
which Honneth finds in the Philosophy of Rights (1952), where Hegel expresses  
 
much more strongly than in his early writings […] the groundbreaking 
notion that social justice is to be defined in terms of the requirements of 
mutual recognition, and that we must take our point of departure in 
historically developed and already institutionalized relations of 
recognition (Honneth 2012: vii). 
 
Therefore, Honneth shifts from a focus on the formal and normative subject of mutual 
recognition to an existential position, where perception precedes recognition 
(Honneth 2008: 80). This existential turn is also related to the critique of Honneth’s 
early work, since not only recognized abilities and traits are important, but also the 
crucial point as from whom recognition is received. That includes particular forms of 
‘negative recognition’ or ‘lack of recognition’ (Kemper 2004: 90). The hippie 
movement of the 1960's and 1970's, for instance, claimed for negative recognition as 
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rejection or ‘misrecognition’ (Bedorf 2010)8. Within such a concept of recognition the 
claim is: “recognize that we renounce your recognition!” (Kemper 2004: 90). That 
makes a revolt against existing norms or the concept of misjudging recognition by 
particular social groups a form of recognition. In the case of misjudging recognition, a 
social group does not recognize another social group in its particular values, but 
judges this particular other group according to its own values. Within this process, the 
values can be either recognized or misrecognized, anyhow they are recognized in a 
certain way. Considering the act of recognition on a mutual level ex negativo, every act 
of recognition is a form of misrecognition (Bedorf 2010). Since, as already explained 
at the beginning of this chapter, recognition of the entire self cannot be accomplished, 
the act of recognition can only be executed in reference to the context of recognition. 
“In consequence, the authentic identity can never be recognized, but only an 
incoherent identity in its lack of permanence and relation to the context” (Bedorf 
2010: 144). In conclusion, the execution of the act of recognition is only possible by 
misjudging the authentic identity of the other (Bedorf 2010: 144). 
In his actualization of Hegel’s theory of the legal recognition, Honneth (1995: 
86f) explains the motivation of the act of recognition from the standpoint of the legal 
subject which struggles for self-realization by developing abilities and traits, and from 
which it can derive “unique value[s] for the surrounding social world”. However, this 
notion does not examine, whether the act of recognition is an act which leads to 
cognitive awareness, or it is an act which precedes cognitive awareness (Bedorf 2010: 
63). The answer is related to the necessary sociality of recognition, and given by 
Honneth in his later work The I in We (2012). Is this critique understood as question, 
then we should formulate this question as follows: are recognized abilities and traits 
attributed to us, or do these recognized abilities and traits already exist within us and 
are they ‘discovered’? To make the inherence of values in the human clear, Honneth 
(2012: 85) choose “a moderate value realism”. In reference to Scheler (1973a, 1979), 
value realism or value objectivism means that values already exist in the life-world, 
and they can be perceived affectively and intuitively by feeling them. Such a relation 
to values demands a close relationship to the life-world: the life-world becomes the 
second nature of the human, since as “we observe and notice on the basis of our 
                                            
8 I refer here to the title of Bedorf’s book “Verkennende Anerkennung”, which is explained below. The 
title is translated by the author following Bedorf’s suggestion (2014, private communication). 
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socialization” the life-worldy environment we live in, and “the normative level of our 
relations of recognition rises as well” (Honneth 2012: 83). Here, socialization seems 
to be used like a ‘plug-in’: since the human is born as a biological individual and as a 
cognitive and social ‘tabula rasa’, socialization happens afterwards through lifetime 
knowledge and experience. It appears as an attached ability. This thesis implies that 
we have to ‘learn’ sociality. In contrast, the hypothesis of this work is that we are 
already social beings from the moment we are born, just as the act of recognition is 
social. Honneth, however, ensures his learning thesis by only referring to the 
normative attribution of recognition. Thus, from his point of view, legal existence as 
well as normativity have to be learned. The grade of social recognition thus is directly 
dependent on adequate performance within norms and legal rights. Here, Honneth 
(2003: 186) consults the dimensions of ‘individualization’ and ‘social inclusion’:  
 
either new parts of the personality are opened up to mutual recognition, 
so that the extent of socially confirmed individuality rises; or more persons 
are included into existing recognition relations, so that the circle of 
subjects who recognize one another grows. 
 
The more abilities and traits are recognized, the more we are socially recognized as 
individuals; in this way social inclusion rises. In other words, by recognizing the 
individuality of someone, particular personal values are appreciated. Therefore, this 
individual becomes part of the social community, and has to fulfill a particular role 
according to the appreciated values. This perspective on the act of recognition shows 
that recognition is not an exclusive act; rather it is an act of everyday performance. 
Nearly every act can be interpreted as an act of recognition of particular values: 
whether because, the whole act itself is appreciated or particular aspects of this act 
receive our recognition. A value realism, however, in relation to the dimensions of 
individualization, self-confirmation, and social inclusion harbors the danger of 
reification (Fraser 2010: 213). In performing countless acts of recognition in our 
everyday life, we might forget that our act of recognition is always a reaction to a 
preceding act of recognition – or understood in a negative sense: “we lose our 
attentiveness to the fact that this cognition owes its existence to an antecedent act of 
recognition” (Honneth 2008: 59). Within the process of social appreciation, we, our 
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recognized identities, as well as group affiliations are treated like objects, which are 
attached to values. What is meant here, is the simple perception of another human “as 
a thing, instituted by the objectivizing stance of others, the world or the self” (Le Goff 
2012: 80). In this context, recognition should be understood as “antecedent self-
affirmation” by 
 
gaining access to our own feelings and intentions. To know what it means 
to have desires, feelings, and intentions at all, we must already have 
experienced these mental states as a part of our selves that is worthy of 
affirmation and should be made known to our partners in interaction 
(Honneth 2008: 74). 
 
It is exactly this state of losing the awareness or of the denial of antecedent 
recognition that Honneth (2008: 56ff) calls reification: “[w]e would then even 
experience our own desires and feelings as thing-like objects capable of being 
passively observed or actively engendered” (Honneth 2008: 74). Here, the context lies 
in the social structure, which creates communicative situations. In addition, these 
situations are structured by “institutionalized practices that are functionally tailored 
to the presentation of our own selves” (Honneth 2008: 82). Such structures invite to 
forget our self-affirmation and to expose us in self-reification. As a social 
phenomenon, recognition creates a contradiction within ourselves: we claim for being 
recognized within the social dimension, but at the same time we grasp at self-
realization. This contradiction results in a social and individual antagonism between 
our sociality and our self-preservation. Honneth (2008: 152) attempts to solve this 
problem by claiming 
 
elementary recognition […] [to] feel existential sympathy for the other, 
before we can learn to orient ourselves toward norms of recognition that 
compel us to express certain specific forms of concern or benevolence. 
 
Elementary recognition thus becomes “affective participation” in the tradition of 
Lukács (Le Goff 2012: 80). It precedes a rational act of recognition, since it is a 
sympathetically directedness to another. In this context, however, Honneth does not 
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explain how the primary experience of recognition as antecedent recognition is made 
(Ohlström et al. 2011: 208): is the subject recognized through the other, or is the other 
recognized through the subject (Bedorf 2010: 70)? This question is related to the 
status and the development of the self which still stand in the background, since 
Honneth’s elaborations remain on the level of the subject. Here, Honneth 
accomplishes an ‘existential turn’ (Bedorf 2010: 67). He now postulates that “it is 
possible to justify the hypothesis that a recognitional stance enjoys a genetic and 
categorical priority over all other attitudes toward the self and the world” (Honneth 
2008: 36). Considering Honneth’s existential transformation based on value realism, 
we are able to execute “emotional attachment to a ‘concrete other’” (Honneth 2008: 
45). In this way, a world is disclosed in which we have to be involved practically 
(Honneth 2008: 45). Within this perspective, the act of recognition is a primary 
ontogenetic human quality. In addition to considering the life-world as second nature 
(Honneth 2012: 82), which ensures our relationship to the world, the act of 
recognition possesses a phenomenological relation (Bedorf 2010: 67). 
 
 
1.2 Recognition as a Gift 
For Ricœur, recognition is not only understood in a political or social sense, rather it 
causes a fascination for him due to its polysemy and “its many overlapping uses” 
(Reagan 2013: 30). Besides its political and social meaning, it also refers to recognize 
something as this ‘particular something’; there is the recognition of particular 
personal and general rights, as well as the recognition of our self and another’s action. 
Therefore Ricœur (2005) does not follow Honneth, rather he even contradicts him by 
introducing a state of peace within the concept of mutual recognition, since the 
“struggle for recognition […] has most contributed to popularizing the theme of 
recognition, at the risk of turning it into something banal” (Ricœur 2005: 212). In 
doing so, Ricœur uses a hermeneutical and phenomenological method to investigate 
the act of recognition. Aiming to bypass the Hegelian struggle for recognition he 
introduces agape as key concept. As the ancient Greek word for love, later adopted by 
Christianity, agape has become synonymouse for God’s spontaneous and unmotivated 
love (Nygren 1954: 45). For that reason, he does not found his concept of recognition 
 Introductory Reflections on Mutual Recognition 
39 
on a basis of struggle, but rather on a peaceful giving of a gift, which accomplishes a 
state of peace between the participants of the mutual act of symbolic recognition. The 
concept of ‘struggle’ is limited in its notion, since ‘struggle’ involves striving for power 
and domination. 
 
At the very least, the experiences of actual recognition in the exchange of 
gifts, principally in their festive aspect, confer on this struggle for 
recognition the assurance that the motivation which distinguishes it from 
the lust for power and shelters it from the fascination of violence is neither 
illusory nor vain (Ricœur 2005: 246). 
 
‘Struggle’, therefore, means nothing more than ‘mutual respect’. Within the debate of 
recognition, this notion of struggle first emerged with Ricœur’s elaborations (Kämpf 
2012: 141). 
For Ricœur, recognition has a multi-faceted meaning. He initiates his approach 
“with the semantic status of the very term recognition on the plane of philosophical 
discourse” (Ricœur 2005: ix). Additionally, the semantic meaning of recognition 
comprises ‘knowing’ as well as ‘gratitude’ derived from the French ‘reconnaissance’. 
According to Ricœur (2005), the recognition can be understood as ‘recognition as 
identification’, ‘recognizing oneself’, and ‘mutual recognition’ as gratitude, which 
refers to “i) identity, ii) alterity and iii) dialectic of recognition and misrecognition” 
(Laitinen 2011: 37). All these of Ricœur's differentiations of recognition are closely 
linked. Recognition understood as epistemic identification captures the relationship 
to the world, whereas self-recognition captures self-reference, and mutual 
recognition concentrates on the relationship of the other (Bedorf 2010: 127). 
Recognition of the self and the act of mutual recognition are both acts of identification. 
Considered from the perspective of narrativity, the acting self as a part of the acting 
human has to be identified as the same human in every moment of this human’s 
lifetime. Therefore, identification is related to the recognition of the self, since both 
parts of this relation include the hermeneutical act of personal reflection. Thus, ‘the 
course of recognition’ is a journey which begins at 
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the promotion of recognition-identification, then over the transition from 
this identification of something in general to the recognition of those 
entities […], then from self-recognition to mutual recognition, and finally 
to the ultimate equating of recognition and gratitude, which French is one 
of the few languages to honor (Ricœur 2005: x). 
 
By examining recognition as identification, Ricœur paraphrases the famous saying of 
Diès (1932: 9f; Ricœur 2005: 27): “What posits itself opposes itself insofar as it 
distinguishes itself, and nothing is itself without being other than everything else”. 
Thus, Ricœur considers identification as “’relative to itself’” and “’relative to 
something other than itself’” (Ricœur 2005: 26). Here, ‘relative to itself’ and ‘relative 
to something other than itself’ means that identification always needs a ‘feeling of 
distinction’ to be able to recognize the ‘identification with something’. The distinction 
has to be made “between external identifications and self-identifications. External 
identifications are made by other persons (A and B are different), self-identifications 
by the person herself (A and B are the same)” (Ikäheimo and Laitinen 2007: 35). 
To illustrate the process of identification, Ricœur (2005: 27ff) relies on two 
philosophies of judgment, the approaches of Descartes and Kant. Whereas Descartes 
represents a notion of identification, which “goes hand in hand with distinguishing” 
(Ricœur 2005: 28) by recognizing something in its uniqueness, Kant actualizes the 
approach to identification by interpreting the term as “connecting together” (Ricœur 
2005: 28). Therefore, the notion of identification is understood as synthesis. Since 
once something is identified, one looks for commonalities which finally are 
summarized under one term. In both cases, something is identified as something.  
Recognition of the self involves the act of self-recognizing. This part of Ricœur’s 
approach deals with the relation of our selfhood as narration, acting as agency, and 
our ability to recount a story. The dogma of the recognition of the self thus says: to be 
able to recount a story is to be able to act, and vice versa. By implication, this means if 
we are able to recount our acting, our experiences and lifetime events, then we 
recognize our self in our own existence: ‘it is me, who acts! It is me, who did it!’. Thus, 
our identity in our acts is recognized. In consequence, we are placed in our own 
responsibility (Ricœur 2005: 106ff). Responsibility as an excellent human 
characteristic is founded on character (Ricœur 2005: 131f). The concept of character 
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is borrowed from Aristotle whose concept of character elaborated in Nicomachean 
Ethics (2009) involves good conduct, which implies an ethic dimension, which means 
if we have a good character, we act in an educated and sophisticated way by virtue 
and wisdom (Ricœur 2005: 82). Considering our ability to act which is emphasized by 
our own character, this relation of character and wisdom means: if we execute an act, 
then we are convinced of the necessity and the right placement of this particular act. 
Thus, we are convinced of our own good character as well as of the goodness of our 
acting. Furthermore, character is “the set of distinctive marks which permit the re-
identification of a human individual as being the same” (Ricœur 1992: 119). By 
implication, character represents continuity within our existence, but our individual 
character is also the quality that enables us to be our self. Thus, character makes us 
unique. It is nearly impossible to assume that there exist two individuals with the 
same character, because they do not have the same biography and did not make 
exactly the same experiences. This point is crucial within the development of self-
recognition, since  
 
habit gives a history to character, but this is a history in which 
sedimentation tends to cover over the innovation which preceded it, even 
to the point of abolishing the latter (Ricœur 1992: 121). 
 
Thus, referring to Aristotle’s Poetics (1999: 6.1450a15–1) Ricœur (1992: 152) states: 
“Character gives us qualities, but it is in our actions − what we do − that we are happy 
or the reverse”. In consequence, character depends on our actions and whether we 
agree with the character, since character is also the totality of distinctive 
characterizations in opposition to another’s actions (Ricœur 1992: fn. 5). Thus, in a 
first notion, character ensures our awareness of the own identity’s permanence 
(Ricœur 1992: 119); and in a second notion, character enables self-chosen loyalty, 
“and makes it turn toward fidelity, hence toward maintaining the self” (Ricœur 1992: 
121). Thus, “the character holds himself responsible for an action that he does not 
dissociate from himself” (Ricœur 2005: 71). Therefore, responsibility is recognized. 
For Ricœur (2005: 110), above all, this recognized responsibility is proved in a 
promise, since to keep a promise means to take on responsibility for this promise. 
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Through promising the own identity manifests itself in the permanence of time, since 
a promise is made to another to be redeemed in a future situation. 
The responsibility of acting and the ability to promise generate a bridge to 
mutual recognition. This third part of Ricœur’s investigation of mutual recognition 
(2005: 150ff), which is its main part, is the elaboration of mutual recognition 
considered as gratitude. To achieve this, Ricœur (2005: 171ff) begins his investigation 
with Hegel’s notion of mutual recognition as a permanent social struggle. He argues, 
however, for mutual recognition as a state of peace: 
 
[t]he alternative to the idea of struggle in the process of mutual recognition 
is to be sought in peaceful experiences of mutual recognition, based on 
symbolic mediations as exempt from the juridical as from the commercial 
order of exchange. The exceptional character of these experiences, far 
from disqualifying them, underscores their importance, and precisely in 
this way ensures their power to reach and affect the very heart of 
transactions stamped with the seal of struggle (Ricœur 2005: 219). 
 
According to Ricœur (2005: 218), the struggle for mutual recognition complies 
directly with the claim for justice within the acts of giving, taking, and responding. 
According to Marcel Mauss's investigations on gift exchange in archaic societies 
(1967), Ricœur wants to bypass the struggle for recognition by following the 
paradigm of agape as a state of peace. Thus, agape  
 
seems to refute in advance the idea of mutual recognition, inasmuch as the 
generous practice of gift giving, at least in its ‘pure’ form, neither requires 
nor expects a gift in return (Ricœur 2005: 219). 
 
Initially, the Ancient-Greek word agape means simply ‘love’. Since Christianity has 
claimed agape, nowadays, however, the term is understood as loving gift of God. 
By claiming mutual recognition on a phenomenological-existential level, Ricœur 
does not situate agape in God, but in the human being, since it is we who show 
generosity to the other by voluntarily giving recognition. In doing so, the other is 
recognized as independent self. Since agape does not oblige the other to return a gift, 
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agape complies with an inner constitution which recognizes the other’s equivalence 
in her or his difference. There does not exist a force or a struggle to return the gift, or 
to be placed in a situation of dependence. The gift of recognition is only visible, if both 
participants confirm each other within this act of mutual recognition (Kämpf 2012: 
138). 
Such a perspective makes agape an attitude of frugality out of itself within the 
acts of mutual recognition as is “to give, to receive, to give in return” (Ricœur 2005: 
225). This meaning of recognition can be understood as ‘selfless giving’. Thus, 
Ricoeur’s reflections encompass considerations about the act of recognition as a state 
of peace beyond struggling and fighting for recognition (Kämpf 2012: 137). Regarded 
as a state of peace, the act of recognition does not focus on a self-affirmative struggle 
for recognition, since this is ‘selfish’; rather it focuses on the experience of the other. 
Ricœur’s concept of mutual recognition (2005: 229) is founded on our own 
generosity. As a result, mutual recognition becomes a vis-à-vis relationship which is 
based on inner balance and generosity, and thus allows the other to be self-standing. 
In Ricœur’s eyes, this notion of agape should be the basis for symbolic mutual 
recognition. In doing so, Ricœur exempts recognition from the dimensions of law and 
general society, and concentrates on the phenomenology of recognition by 
investigating the symbolic act of recognition between giver and recipient. By choosing 
this approach, Ricœur moves to the edge of Lévinas’ philosophy. Through Ricœur 
dissociates himself from Lévinas’ approach on ethic and ontology in Totality and 
Infinity (1969), while preferring Lévinas’ elaborations on ethics and justice in 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1981), it cannot be denied that, in the context 
of mutual recognition, the concept of agape has an obvious proximity to Lévinas’ 
concept of recognition of the other. Based on Ricœur’s (2005: 157) thesis that “life 
together” is understood, on a phenomenological level, as mutuality, the other cannot 
be perceived in her or his totality; only in infinity, since the other evades. By this 
means, the perceiving ‘I’ is captured in its own necessary subjective total perception. 
It cannot shift to the subjective perception of the other, since this other’s perception 
is also subjective. Thus, this approach indicates that we cannot recognize the other in 
an entire manner; we cannot totally grasp and see through the other. For Lévinas 
(1969), this situation of ‘I’ and the other leads to the conclusion that the other is 
infinity. Nevertheless, due to the pursuit of eros we are permanently in the situation 
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to grasp at infinity. In the other’s face, however, we recognize our own self, but only 
as a part of the other. The other’s otherness stays infinite, as we realize our own 
totality. In conclusion, the other stays the other as infinity; there is no chance to take 
the other into us, as the other would lose her or his own identity (Lévinas 1969: 39). 
The experience of the infinity or transcendence of the other is our “exteriority” 
(Lévinas 1969: 24). Thus, we realize that we are caught in our own totality, and 
“rediscover[s] war in the tyrannical oppression it undergoes from the totality” 
(Lévinas 1969: 47). Consequently, by realizing this captivity we move to war. 
 
The force of the Other is already and henceforth moral. Freedom, be it that 
of war, can be manifested only outside totality, but this ‘outside totality’ 
opens with the transcendence of the face. To think of freedom as within 
totality is to reduce freedom to the status of an indetermination in being, 
and forthwith to integrate it into a totality by closing the totality over the 
‘holes’ of indetermination − and seeking with psychology the laws of a free 
being! (Lévinas 1969: 225). 
 
Since “[b]eing is exteriority, and exteriority is produced in its truth in a subjective 
field, for the separated being” (Lévinas 1969: 299), the other is perceived as same but 
still another. Our openness enables freedom, from which we learn to be for another 
as seen in the other’s face. We recognize ourselves within the being of the other. Our 
so-perceived freedom is regulated by responsibility for the other (Schaufelberger 
2008: 73). 
 
I expose myself to the questioning of the Other, and this urgency of the 
response − acuteness of the present − engenders me for responsibility; as 
responsible I am brought to my final reality. This extreme attention does 
not actualize what was in potency, for it is not conceivable without the 
other (Lévinas 1969: 178). 
 
The other “speaks” (Lévinas 1969: 66). In speaking, the other claims attention. The 
other’s face makes us attentive to the other. Thus, speaking is transitive by 
transmitting the face’s will to us (Schaufelberger 2008: 47). In the free openness for 
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the other, we learn responsibility. As we are, in the first instance,directed at ourselves, 
by opening ourselves for the other, we are going to forget ourselves (Schaufelberger 
2008: 69f).  
That concept can be applied to Ricœur’s approach to agape as state of peace 
within the act of mutual recognition. Through responsibility, we are bonded to the 
other. This bond based on mutuality creates equality. “It is in the ethical mode of 
interpellation that the ego is called to responsibility by the other's voice” (Ricœur 
2005: 262). Even Lévinas, however, could not solve the problem of agape’s generosity 
and personal related action motivation. As a mode of love, agape must involve 
characteristics “like affection, […] personal care and involvement (not mere 
commitment to procedural impartiality), and yet, like abstract rules and unlike 
contingent emotions, it must be able to be extended universally” (Davenport 1998: 
345). Although their motivation to find in agape a generous way of mutual recognition 
might be the same, Ricœur and Lévinas differ in their method. “Ricœur interprets 
agape as a universalizing attitude toward concrete others, while Lévinas makes it into 
a concrete and singular relation with a generalized Otherness” (Davenport 1998: 
345). This dichotomy between generosity without evaluation and particularity due to 
personal relationships remains in both approaches. Therefore, Ricœur seeks the 
solution within the state of peace, agape also offers. In consequence, Ricœur’s main 
purpose is to show an opportunity to execute recognition without moral obligation, 
for example, a moral dogma of struggling for justice. 
In consequence, the solution, which Ricœur offers, is the concept of gift exchange 
as chance of symbolic recognition. Following Mauss (1967), Ricœur (2005: 225ff) 
takes the gift exchange in archaic societies as an example of the paradox of mutual 
symbolic recognition. Mauss’ investigations focus on gift exchange as socially 
institutionalized phenomenon. Though, from this point of view, gift exchange seems 
to have an obligatory character, it is not related to external constraints. Mauss (1967: 
2) is able to conclude 
 
that the same morality and economy are at work, albeit less noticeably, in 
our own societies, and we believe that in them we have discovered one of 
the bases of social life and thus we may draw conclusions of a moral nature 
about some of the problems confronting us in our present economic crisis.  
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A special focus deserves the gift exchange of the Maori who maintain a structure of 
mutual recognition within the transcendence of hau. Within the hau a system of gift 
exchange is established which penetrates all dimensions of human society. It creates 
a bond between the members of a group. 
 
But for the moment it is clear that in Maori custom this bond created by 
things is in fact a bond between persons, since the thing itself is a person 
or pertains to a person. Hence it follows that to give something is to give a 
part of oneself (Mauss 1967: 10). 
 
Thus, the gift exchange refers to all individual members of a society as particular 
members of this particular society. Within the hau, the act of recognition in its three 
instances of giving, receiving, and giving in return becomes a ritual. Therewith, the 
execution of the gift exchange shifts into a transcendental dimension. The hau 
becomes a transcendental power which regulates the gift exchange. Formulated in 
pragmatic terms, it means that the rules of the gift exchange are concealed behind the 
notion of hau. On this transcendental meta-level, it is no longer sufficient to follow an 
obligation, but to complete the ritual of the gift exchange. In correspondence with the 
animated world view of the Maori, the exchanged gifts themselves are animated by 
having their own names and history (Mauss 1966: 225f). 
Here, Ricœur (2005: 262) has to face the problem of symmetry and asymmetry 
within the act of mutual recognition. His main issue is the asymmetry between the 
giver of recognition and the recipient of recognition. Through the concept of agape, 
both giver and recipient should give recognition out of their own generosity, but 
through the gift of the giver the recipient arrives in the situation of reaction. However, 
such a situation can be misinterpreted as justice, which leads to the notion of 
recognition as obligatory compensation. That is what Ricœur naturally wants to 
avoid. Nevertheless, at first sight, in the act of giving the generosity of agape and 
justice seem to be similar. Both agape and justice execute this act of giving. The 
difference, however, lies on the normative level. Justice is subjected to rules; 
therefore, justice is executed by calculation. Within the modern interpretation of 
justice, resonates a moral awareness, as it is used in the Kantian categorical 
imperative. But consider: a human who lives in her or his performance of recognition 
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in accordance with agape does not have an explanation at the point where justice uses 
a calculation. This situation makes this human unreliable. It seems as if this human 
who follows the concept of agape lacks seriousness, since this act is performed 
without specific expectations and specific means. To put it down to the point: in the 
West necessary action motivation and specific intentionality are in the way of agape. 
In addition, deontic ethics conforms to rules and norms, thus, justice is integrated into 
deontic ethics, which excludes categorically generosity acting. Furthermore, the hau 
incorporates a transcendental ritual far from Western society’s understanding, and 
which cannot easily be followed. To meet this challenge, Ricœur (2005: 243) offers 
the following solution: neither justice nor the unbounded and spontaneous generosity 
of agape want to fit in with the transcendence of the hau. Considering the French 
notion of reconnaissance as gratitude, Ricœur (2005: 243) tends to create a ‘back door’ 
for the meta level of gift exchange by introducing the concept of gratitude towards the 
giver. However, such a concept of gratitude includes an appeal for giving in return. 
Such an appeal can also be interpreted as demand or claim, but also as order. 
Considering giving in return as demand or claim, a voluntary giving is excluded. This 
kind of relationship between giver and recipient underlines the asymmetry between 
giver and recipient. 
In conclusion, the generosity of agape is given with the act of the giver, but the 
receiver experiences an obligation – an appeal – to give in return, which meets with 
the response as gift. Furthermore, an approach that consists of the inherence of 
agape's generosity within the human is speculative and ideal, because agape cannot 
come over us as divine knowledge. If every one of us has agape, it has to be positioned 
inside our self-being. Agape has to be an intrinsic part of the concept of recognition. 
Thus, it reaches a psychological depth level in our self. In our modern agetimes, due 
to the rules of justice there is no space for an attitude of agape with its voluntary and 
spontaneous generosity. The modern interpretation of mutual and symbolic 
recognition, including the three instances of giving, receiving and replying, is founded 
on an abstract form of justice by following countless rules and norms. Ricœur‘s (2005: 
227) idealistic conclusion, after all, is that “agape has then to be held in reserve for 
that moment when the phenomenology of mutuality will claim its rights in the face of 
a logic of reciprocity”. On an analytical level, a mere phenomenological investigation 
on mutual recognition is not sufficient, and with the integration of the concept of 
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agape, the risk goes along to arrive immediatly at an ideal religious mantra. The 
question that remains for further investigations is how personal and individual 
motivation of mutual pacifist recognition has to be constituted. Ricœur could not solve 
the problems that arise by linking agape with a concept of recognition, since, at this 
point, normative and reciprocal recognition have to be linked to Ricœur’s approach 
to mutual recognition. 
 
The experience of the gift, apart from its symbolic, indirect, rare, even 
exceptional character, is inseparable from its burden of potential conflicts, 
tied to the creative tension between generosity and obligation. These are 
the paradoxes and aporias arising from the analysis of the gift as an ideal 
type, which the experience of the gift carries in its pairing with the struggle 
for recognition (Ricœur 2005: 245f). 
 
An approach which is based solely on the generosity of agape within the human is 
speculative and idealistic. Hence, agape has to be introduced into the state of 
recognition of the self to establish recognition on a depth psychological level. Thus, 
Ricœur misses the step of the phenomenological recognition of the own personal 
acting in the world. The identification with the own acting on a phenomenological and 
hermeneutical level is an initial condition for the recognition of the self. To illustrate 
this, Greisch (2009: 149) offers an example to the phenomenology of recognition of 
the other: there is an old college friend whom we have not seen for years. Maybe, we 
remember the face of the college friend; she seems to be familiar. However, it might 
be hard to remember her name or the context her face has a relation to. This example 
shows very well, on how many phenomenological and hermeneutical dimensions the 
act of recognition can be performed. Even the act of recognition does not have to be 
executed at every stage of perception and knowledge. A mere diffuse remembrance is 
sufficient to have a flavor of recognition, which on an ideological level seems like a 
fully performed act of recognition. 
Since Ricœur’s structure of approach to recognition is very systematic and 
relational, it could be concluded that his approach would outline the founding 
relationship between self-recognition and mutual recognition. One has to consider 
that Ricœur’s approach, “takes seriously the fact that the semantic field of 
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‘recognition’ is broader than ‘intersubjectivity’” (Laitinen 2011: 47). But 
unfortunately, Ricœur’s investigation remains on a lexical level, from whence it 
expands the concept of recognition (Bedorf 2010: 127). Although Ricœur’s attempt is 
to honor, his approach demonstrates a lack of connection between recognition and 
perception, since the relationship between narrativity and responsibility of the self’s 
acting and mutual recognition is not clear (Bedorf 2010: 129f). The novelty of 
Ricœur’s perception of recognition is that recognition is not an effort of the giver (of 
recognition); rather the act of recognition is performed in dependence of the 
perception of the other. That makes recognition a gift that can only be perceived if 
both the giver and the recipient (of recognition) mutually witness the act (Kämpf 
2012: 138).  
 
 
1.3 Consequences for a Self-Based Concept of 
Mutual Recognition 
Both approaches, the struggle for recognition and recognition regarded as gift, lack in 
the inherent structure of recognition by ignoring the role of the self within the process 
of recognition. By approaching recognition from the subject, current approaches on 
mutual recognition alienate the act of recognition from our original being. The 
tradition Honneth and others are following alienates recognition by bounding 
recognition within the dimension of law and normativity. Ricœur, however, tried to 
solve the problem of alienation by introducing a transcendental dimension into the 
act of mutual recognition, but the problem of alienation persists. 
Considering recognition from the view of the giver, recognition is always 
connected to a particular power. The term ‘power’ “invokes politics, history, ideology, 
domination, resistance, appropriation, struggle, conflict, accommodation, subversion, 
and contestation” (Conquergood 1989: 84). However, these characteristics of power 
have not to be interpreted as negative ones. Our everyday performance seems to be 
built on these characteristics of power. Since performance understood as any kind of 
human behavior (Turner 1988) “is a site of struggle where competing interests 
intersect, and different viewpoints and voices get articulated” (Conquergood 1989: 
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84). Our self as the acting reflection of our being within the life-world can be exposed 
as the center of the act of recognition. 
To overcome the problems of power and asymmetry, Butler (1997, 2005) 
assumes a non-autonomous subject which is commited to a permanent reproduction 
of discursive praxis. 
 
The Foucaultian postulation of subjection as the simultaneous 
subordination and forming of the subject assumes a specific 
psychoanalytic valence when we consider that no subject emerges without 
a passionate attachment to those on whom he or she is fundamentally 
dependent (even if that passion is ‘negative’ in the psychoanalytic sense) 
(Butler 1997: 7). 
 
In consequence, a general virtue cannot exist; and the subject has to struggle with 
diverse orders of rationality, and, therefore, normative perceptions. 
Kämpf (2012: 135) argues in reference to Butler that the act of recognition 
highlights the other’s uniqueness. This uniqueness is confirmed by recognizing 
another’s uniqueness. Such a process can only be performed within social interaction. 
This means nothing else that the Western subject is normatively and morally bound. 
By implication, the subject is not sovereign; rather it is socially bounded in 
responsibility to the other. Butler (2005: 35) argues this relation of the subject by 
explaining that the temporal structure of our life does not conform to the temporal 
structure of norms. However, norms influence our life; therefore they continually lead 
to interruptions of our life. Contemplated in this light, Butler’s hypothesis has to be 
seen in the tradition of Lévinas’ infinity of the other (1969) which becomes visible 
through the other’s uniqueness. 
 
The uniqueness of the other is exposed to me, but mine is also exposed to 
her. This does not mean we are the same, but only that we are bound to 
one another by what differentiates us, namely, our singularity (Butler 
2005: 34). 
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Thus, recognition is not based on equality, but rather on inequality understood as 
recognized alterity and uniqueness. By standing face-to-face to each other, we 
recognize our being within the other’s alterity, since the other seems to be similar to 
our self, but at the same time the other is unique and different from our self. The other 
stays in her or his own alterity which makes her or him unique. In this perception of 
recognition judging and evaluating are excluded, in favor of respect for the other’s 
opacity (Kämpf 2012: 139f). Since the face of the other seizes our self in responsibility 
to act, the emerging responsibility of recognition of the other precedes acting. 
 
I am not primarily responsible by virtue of my actions, but by virtue of the 
relation to the Other that is established at the level of my primary and 
irreversible susceptibility, my passivity prior to any possibility of action or 
choice (Butler 2005: 88). 
 
This is the basis of a true recognizing relationship. Butler (2005: 41) suggests to 
”consider a certain post-Hegelian reading of the scene of recognition in which 
precisely my own opacity to myself occasions my capacity to confer a certain kind of 
recognition on others”. Butler picks up Lévinas’ approach to the appeal of the other 
and the own response to the other, and elaborates a narrative structure of 
responsibility. “The means by which subject constitution occurs is not the same as the 
narrative form the reconstruction of that constitution attempts to provide” (Butler 
2005: 69). The narrative form of the relationship to the other is a voluntary cherishing 
of the other. It is the look into the other’s face, listening to the other’s story and 
responding to the other. This developing ‘dialogue’ is a narrative, which creates an 
intimate and open relationship. A relationship based on normative and moral rules, 
conceived as the classical subject-structure, could not provide such a thick 
connection. By implication, in the appearance of the other’s face, in the other’s infinity, 
the social role as well as the other’s way of being cannot be seized. The subject stays 
within the struggle for its self-being, the other appears as helper to confirm its self, 
but also as menace for this self-confirmation. Thus, the narrative structure which 
comes into being through the intimate dialogue between this recognizing ‘I’ and the 
other does not include a consistence, rather it is permanently interrupted due to the 
presence and the address of the other (Butler 2005: 63). 
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The relationship of the recognizing ‘I’ and the other is not only based on 
communicative language, but also on bodily sensation as well as on non-verbal 
communication. 
 
In the moment in which I say ‘I,’ I am not only citing the pronomial place of 
the ‘I’ in language, but at once attesting to and taking distance from a 
primary impingement, a primary way in which I am, prior to acquiring an 
‘I’, a being who has been touched, moved, fed, changed, put to sleep, 
established as the subject, and object of speech. My infantile body has not 
only been touched, moved, and arranged, but those impingements 
operated as ‘tactile signs’ that registered in my formation. These signs 
communicate to me in ways that are not reducible to vocalization (Butler 
2005: 69f). 
 
By this means, the perception of the surroundings happens before this perception 
comes to mind. In other words, the unconscious perception of the surroundings 
precedes any form of mutual recognition. The sense of recognition and the feeling of 
being part of the surroundings precede any normative and moral form of recognition. 
Therefore Lévinas 
 
speaks of a passivity prior to passivity, and there he means to indicate the 
difference between a subject who undergoes passivity, who relates to that 
passivity through a certain act of reflexivity, and a passivity that is prior to 
the subject, the condition of its own subjectivation, its primary 
impressionability (Butler 2005: 77). 
 
It seems to be true that the subject is prepared to experience the expression of the 
surroundings by its ‘primary impressionability’. However, it is the philosophical 
distinction of the subject as opposed to the object, which fosters the alienation of 
recognition. Although Butler’s approach in reference to Lévinas and the concept of 
narrativity seems to be very fruitful to elaborate a concept of recognition whose 
advantage is its inherence within us as constitutional subjects, it remains within the 
subject-object-structure. Thus, the focus shifts from a general level of group 
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recognition to a level where the ideological act of recognition is focused. This step 
draws nearer to the role of the self within the act of recognition, but such an approach 
still cannot grasp the point of the self within this act of recognition. By putting the self 
in the center of an approach of recognition, personal identity is nothing already 
existing nor is it anything that is preserved, or can be secured for the future (Bedorf 
2010: 102); rather it is a process and the permanent and floating result of social 
action.  
Despite his critique on the previously introduced approaches to recognition, 
even Bedorf (2010: 103f) claims the perception of ‘identity as a whole‘. In contrast, 
there also exist perceptions of identity as ‘divided’, ‘broken’ or ‘split’. But even these 
fragmentary identity structures refer to a person, whose identity presents itself as a 
whole, at least on a biological level. At this point, the question arises, how such a 
perception of identity is able to secure the personal unity of our identity. Thus, the 
notion of self becomes virulent. A phenomenological, fully self-conscious view of the 
human enables an integration of conscious and unconscious reflexivity, which is able 
to substitute the classical subjective perception (Zahavi 2007; Gallagher and Zahavi 
2012). Nevertheless, a reflexive personal identity perceived as self-based remains the 
individual identity of an acting human. Considering the context of a self-based model 
of identity and recognition and recognition as dynamic process, identity becomes not 
the basis of recognition, rather recognition constitutes identity (Bedorf 2010: 104f). 
Thus, in conclusion, it can be asked if “perhaps any feedback from others which is 
relevant for one’s relations-to-self in the readily intelligible way will count as 
recognition” (Laitinen 2010: 321). 
Butler’s approach shows that there is a stage of considering recognition not as 
monolithic concept, but rather as social dynamic, which can be various in its 
existential expressions (Allen 2006). 
Considering the previously introduced approaches and especially taking into 
account Ricœur’s approach, the new move in my account is to put the self, with all its 
phenomenological and hermeneutical abilities, in the center of the analysis of the act 
of mutual recognition. Regarded from this point of view, Ricœur’s first step, the 
identification of others as other entities in their own existence within the life-world is 
still plausible. In reference to Ricœur’s second step, the identification of others as 
equivalent to ourselves without the recognition of our self is impossible, since the 
 Introductory Reflections on Mutual Recognition 
54 
identification of the other on an equivalent level means to recognize the other as a 
equal to ourselves. If the recognition of our own self is not occuring, others cannot be 
recognized, not as selves, and further not in their achievements and efforts by 
evaluating them. Nietzsche (2007: 20) called this feeling of grudging ‘resentment’. The 
feeling of resentment is experienced, if we are in a powerlessness of action. This 
means that having suffered shame cannot be solved immediately or at any other 
moment. Through resentment, we re-experience repeatedly a humiliating situation. 
Therewith, the feeling of resentment contiguous to feelings of inferiority and envy. 
Such a feeling does not allow to recognize the equivalence of others, it enables only 
the underlining of our own inferiority and the (false) awareness of never reaching the 
other selves.  
Considering all these approaches to recognition, whether refused or not, they 
have one thing in common: they all refer to a subject of recognition. Despite this fact, 
Honneth (1995) follows Hegel and his way of self-realization, and other authors in his 
wake (like Butler 2005 and Ricœur 2005 exemplarily discussed here), they all end up 
in the Western subject problematic of mutual or intersubjective recognition. In the 
following work, I will show a way of recognition taking up selfhood which does not 
set the act of recognition ‘outside’ the human in an external social milieu, but rather 
sets the act of recognition within the human. This concrete aspect of the personal and 
intimate self within the act recognition is not available on the normative and moral 
level to which Honneth (1995, 2007, 2008, 2012), Butler (2005), and Ricœur (2005), 
refer. 
Roughly, I follow Laitinen’s (2010: 337) definition of recognition which I modify 
at specified positions: 
 
[r]ecognizing is a matter of (more or less adequate) responsiveness to the 
other as a possessor of normatively and evaluatively significant features, 
that is, responsiveness to the other which is sensitive to the other’s 
normative standing. 
 
Within this ambit recognition is necessarily related to another, might it be an ontic or 
ontological other. Since we are social beings, we always move between another’s 
actions and expectations. When necessary processes of mutual recognition of the self 
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and personhood have been encompassed the evaluative level emerges. Only after 
recognizing our own self, our own social role, and the social structure we are moving 
through, can we recognize norms and values, and appreciate these in another. 
 
 
1.4 Summary 
The thinking on freedom and autonomy is very strong in Hegel’s elaboration of mutual 
recognition. In his actualization, Honneth tries to recover this thought from idealism 
for our modern age. But such an approach misses the fundamental social being of the 
human. Even Ricœur’s approach which aims at the generosity of agape misses the 
human inherence of sociality, since agape stands for transcendence. 
As Butler shows, a way has to be gone which forces the subject to give up some 
autonomous attributes to find its sociality. Even Butler’s way is not sufficient: if 
sociality is a fundamental and inherent human quality, we do not have to give up 
another quality to be social. But, let me ask in other words, do we feel that we have lost 
something when we are social? 
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2. Anthropological Approach 
to Personhood and Motivation 
For a long time personhood was thought to be a Western construct and therefore a 
Western singularity. Nowadays, it may be argued, notions and concepts of the person 
and personhood are not universal. With a rethinking of personhood and a broader 
look at other societies over recent decades, it has been shown that a concept of the 
person and personhood also exists in non-Western societies. These developments 
give a broader access to already existing concepts of personhood, and enable a more 
pragmatic access to the notion of the person. Therefore, let me begin this approach to 
personhood and motivation with some central questions and reflections about the 
essence of the term ‘person’ and its motivations: 
 
[w]hat actually defines a person? Does he/she have an inner life? What are 
the relationships with others like? How are these constituted in the 
perspective of the personal self? Is a person able to grasp feelings and 
thoughts of others, is the person I am facing therefore ‘transparent’? Or 
would this violate the person’s privacy? (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 
233). 
 
These very pragmatic anthropological questions about the meaning of being a person 
are closely related to the question of what does it mean to be human. Such an 
approach regards a very practical-oriented notion of the person, which, although it is 
a scientific theoretical concept, is not lost in theory by setting the focus on human 
behavior in everyday life. 
According to Grace Harris (1989) and Brian Morris (1994) the term ,person’ as 
a philosophical concept has various aspects, definitions, and, of course, it is strongly 
related to the terms ‘individual’, ‘self’ and ‘I’. Whereas Harris makes a strict distinction 
between these terms, Morris highlights the term ‘person’ as a foundation of identity, 
which covers all notions and derivations of personhood. 
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In her essay Conceptions of Individual, Self, and Person in Descriptions and 
Analysis (1989), Harris distinguishes three different concepts. She concludes, 
however, that the terms individual (the biological human), self (the psychological 
human) and person (the social human) are not in a hierarchical order; they refer to 
and depend on each other (Harris 1989: 608). In doing so, they theoretically compose 
the human being. Whereas the self is outlined in a psychological context as reflective 
and self-recognizing, the person can be defined as “acting within cultural norms” 
(Wassmann and Funke 2013: 236). Since culture is a human ‘invention’, in other 
words, a disposition, and human sociality is given by a simple living together, Harris’ 
(1989) definition is tautological. At this point Pamela J. Stewart and Andrew Strathern 
(2000a: 9) criticize Harris because her understanding of the individual can be easily 
and simply replaced by the term human: 
 
[s]he [Harris] points out that individual seen in this light is not the same as 
the ‘Western’ concept of individual [...]. Indeed, she at least partly dissolves 
the idea of separateness associated with this term when she goes to the 
cross-cultural record and notes that boundaries differ, by way of notions 
of shape shifting, gender differences, and connections with the nonhuman 
world. 
 
In consequence, identity is a process, which obviously never ends, and the same holds 
true for individuality which hardly cannot be reduced to mere biological issues. 
Additionally, to define personhood just within cultural norms enables to define 
animals as well as ancestors as persons. By implication, for a living human without 
social abilities the predicate of being a person can be denied (Poser and Wassmann 
2012: 17). Moreover, Harris contrasts her concepts of individual, self and person to 
the Western terminology without describing their meaning individually and in 
relation to other cultures. Not only the term ‘human’ can be divided into several parts 
as individual, self and person, but also these parts themselves. 
According to Morris (1994), the term ‘personhood’ cannot be understood in only 
one way. He derives three different concepts of personhood: first, a person is a human; 
second, a person is a cultural category; and third, a person is an individual self. In this 
case, one may notice that Morris (1994) uses the term ‘person’ as foundation of a 
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concept of identity which includes all three terms of personhood. The human as 
person is both physical body and mind as well as a social being that has developed 
language and morality. In this definition, the ‘person’ includes both the individual and 
the self. Furthermore, the person is a cultural category and relates to cultural 
expressions and community through the self. The person as an individual self is a 
universal category situated in opposition to social contexts. In this way, Morris (1994: 
15) abstracts the self as a reflexive category which enables the human to be perceived 
as an acting and conscious person. However, Morris’ distinction of person, human, 
identity, self and individual is very theoretical, without taking into consideration the 
floating process and influences between all these concepts. 
Each of these approaches builds upon the concept of personhood from a 
Western point of view. The authors assume a conscious being which ‘possesses’ 
sociality, ‘possesses’ individuality, and ‘possesses’ the ability to reflect. These theories 
understand personhood and all its related skills as attributes and categories that can 
be gained; by this means, both approaches fail to embed personhood – or the practical, 
everyday performed ‘being a person’ in the true sense – in the human, or our 
existence. 
 
 
2.1 An Anthropology of Being a Person 
Founded on the Cartesian cogito, which is understood in the formula “[e]go sum, ego 
existo” (Descartes 1990: 100), Western ideas of personhood are rooted in a subject 
which can only be sure about its own consciousness, but it cannot proof the existence 
of other beings and the consciousness of others (Descartes 1990). Others, so 
perceived, can only be perceived as objects. There is no assumption that these other 
‘objects’ could have consciousness. Thus, the Western idea of personhood can be 
broadly defined as egocentric. With such an egocentric perspective comes along the 
attribution of personhood as “the self-made, self-conscious, right-bearing individual” 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2002: 67). Every person is the center of this particular 
person’s corresponding life-world, and every person possesses consciousness of the 
surrounding world. This perception is enforced by viewing the individual through the 
body. The body is the particular part of ourselves that makes us an individual distinct 
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from others on a physically-perceived level. In this conceptual frame, the surrounding 
world appears as a dead, unanimated sphere. Every subject assumes it lives alone in 
the world being surrounded by objects. The Western idea of personhood is  
 
a modernist fantasy about society and selfhood according to which 
everyone is, potentially, in control of his or her destiny in a world made by 
the actions of autonomous ‘agents’. It is this fantasy that leads historians 
to seek social causes in individual actions and social action in individual 
causes (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 26). 
 
In consequence, only the perceiving subject maintains autonomous acting and is 
supposed to have a free will (Poser and Wassmann 2012; Wassmann and Funke 
2013). The ordinary inner perception of the own self as well as of the surrounding 
world  
 
is that of a bounded subject that is a personal owner of experiences and a 
controlling agent of actions, but in reality there is no self that possesses 
these attributes of ownership and executive control (Henry and Thompson 
2011: 229). 
 
Therefore, a dichotomy accrues between the so-called subject and so-called objects. 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1993) summarized this conflict in his discussion of the look. For 
Sartre it is precisely the look with which a subject objectifies others. The objectified 
other, however, struggles against that objectification like in Honneth’s struggle for 
recognition. In everyday situations – in every encounter –subjects try to overcome the 
subject-object dichotomy. Subject and object struggle in a battle that cannot be won, 
since the subject as a conscious entity can only think by itself, and not by another’s 
mind, whereas the pretended object does nothing else, since it is also a subject for 
itself. In this respect, egocentric approaches to personhood might seem to be anti-
social, which makes this particular plug-in of social encounter necessary. 
Mauss (1985) shows that persons are considered as role players or actors. He 
elaborated an historical overview of the usage and interpretation of personhood 
beginning in ancient times. He chooses an alternative way of describing the notion of 
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a person derived from the Etruscan word próswpon. That means as much as ‘mask’ 
(Mauss 1985: 15). According to this elaboration, to be a person means to wear a mask 
and play a particular role. This is an alternative approach to the main thinking on 
persona derived from the Latin words per and sonare taken as “through which (per) 
resounds the voice” (Mauss 1985: 14). According to Mauss's investigations (1985: 
14), this understanding of the term ‘persona’ is a “derivation invented afterwards”. 
Through morality and law, over the ages, the notion of the person has changed 
from a mask-wearing actor or role player into a representation of the human's real 
nature. Referring to law, Mauss (1985) describes the notion of personhood in ancient 
Roman society. The Roman citizen as a legal member of Roman society was a ‘persona’ 
(Mauss 1985: 16f). By implication, legal identity was created, since qualities and 
capacities are rendered by names. Through a name tasks and roles which are played 
in the social ‘game’ can be expressed as well as cultural origin and kinship (Fortes 
1973: 287). In accordance with Mauss, personhood can be understood in three stages: 
the mask-wearing actor and role player, the human’s real nature and the legal identity. 
But, therein lies the difference to the Melanesian perception of the person. The 
Melanesian person is not defined through the name; rather the Melanesian person is 
defined through action. Agency is linked to personhood, thus, the “personal name is 
fully bound up in a system of relations” (LiPuma 1998: 64). Personal names are even 
never used (Meinerzag 2006: 140). Related to the tribe, there exist several ways like 
names are used to describe ‘life-worldy relations’ in social life. So-called ‘totemic 
names’ are used to highlight and formulate a “separate context, a special interest” 
(Bateson 1936: 227). “The naming system is indeed a theoretical image of the whole 
culture and in it every formulated aspect of the culture is reflected” (Bateson 1936: 
228). Today, these traditions sustain, but are also mixed with colonial influences: 
 
[i]n Melanesia, each person usually has several names, which may include 
any or all of the following: names given at birth; names by which a person 
is called; nicknames […]; the aforementioned teknonyms, taboo names, 
family position names and toponyms; also necronyms (a name of or a 
reference to a deceased person) or today’s Christian names (Wassmann in 
preparation). 
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Furthermore, Mauss (1985) describes the moral development of the notion of the 
person. From the ancient Greeks the term ‘person’ becomes a personage or character 
and thus can be interpreted signifying “the true face” (Mauss 1985: 18). One person's 
true face should be both good and responsible for others. In this tradition, Christianity 
further transforms the notion of the person. Through Divine Trinity, which means that 
the human consists of three parts: Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the concept of 
personhood becomes rational, individual, and indivisible. This construct becomes the 
corner stone for the current notion of the person as an individual personality. Mauss 
(1985), however, describes the person as a social concept, as Jean Sybil La Fontaine 
(1985: 124) outlines: 
 
[t]he social concept, the idea of the person, is a compound of jural rights, 
and moral responsibility; it also includes what Mauss attributes to the 
Greek roots of our civilisation, a notion of the actor behind the mask, the 
unique and transient human being. This is translated by Christianity into 
the idea of the soul to arrive finally at the notion of a unity, of body and 
soul, mind and conscience, thought and action which is summed up in the 
concept of the individual which Mauss labeled ,the person‘, ,la personne 
morale‘. 
 
In this context, Meyer Fortes (1973: 288) points out that the person as ‘la personne 
morale’ becomes an abstract category through morality. Personality receives an 
intentional character that is not filled with concrete intentions, but with the quality of 
purpose towards acting and being good. Exactly this point can be interpreted as a 
personal quality, which then can be applied to every culture as “common to all 
societies” (La Fontaine 1985: 125). Therefore, personhood cannot be defined as a 
status, because it is a distinctive quality. The social context a person is acting in counts 
for more than the particular social role a person plays. 
Despite his extraordinary view and historical elaborations about the notions of 
‘person’ and personhood, Mauss’s view is evolutionary, with a very strong Western 
influence, in that he relates each of his steps to a particular historical epoch (La 
Fontaine 1985: 123). Furthermore, Mauss determines the person as a moral actor 
within the domains of law, morality, and sociality (La Fontaine 1985: 124). By this 
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means, Mauss's approach cannot be taken as universal, but as a fruitful foundation to 
perceive the theory of person as social actor. In Western classic thought, La Fontaine 
(1985: 124) sums up Mauss’s approach: “[i]f the self is an individual's awareness of a 
unique identity, the 'person' is society’s confirmation of that identity as of social 
significance. Person and individual are identified in contrast to the self”. 
Leenhardt's approach (1979) to the Melanesian perception of personhood, in 
comparison to contemporary approaches to personhood, is even nowadays 
innovative, since it highlights the perception of the person as totally interwoven with 
the environment. “The Melanesian knows the being we glimpse in the word only in its 
human form. He calls it kamo, ‘the living one’” (Leenhardt 1979: 153). Every person 
only exists within a network consisting of other persons and the environment 
(Clifford 1982: 185). This concept of personhood leads to a “fully interlinking of the 
person” (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 14). Leenhardt presents the idea that there does 
not exist an individual without a network of other individuals – or a “dynamic 
interweaving of nature, society, myth, and technology” (Clifford 1982: 40). This moves 
Leenhardt’s concept of personhood to Mauss’ notion of the person as social acting, 
since ‘every member of society plays a particular role’ (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 
14), but without an epochal connection. Such an approach arises from an awareness 
of mind and cognition and focuses on bodily sensations since the human does not 
acquire primary experiences through cognitive activities, but through the body 
(Clifford 1982: 185). That point can be perceived as a second distinction between 
Western philosophy and the Melanesian perception of personhood. Descartes’s 
Rationalism or Husserl’s Phenomenology does not rely on the body. These approaches 
only focus on human consciousness and conscious perception alone, a way of thinking 
that can be attributed to Ancient Greek philosophy where Plato glorified the 
metaphysical world of the intelligible ideas and the human pursuit of recognizing 
them. 
Melanesian people do not have a word for the Western term ‘myth’. They do not 
write down their history; rather they live, they practice, they do their history. If they 
did, they would externalize their past and their cultural heritage, and, thus, their 
culture would not be a part of them. As a part, it is meant a real part of a real human. 
Myth is not a personal or autobiographic narrative; it is lived in every community-
participating being as a part of identity. Therefore, one cannot speak of a Melanesian 
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‘concept’, rather of a ‘perception’ of personhood. The Melanesian worldview, 
however, is not anthropomorphic ‘from the human’s point of view’, it is 
cosmomorphic ‘from the nature’s point of view’, wherein Melanesians accept their 
surroundings as “mythic representation of a whole genetic ensemble which includes 
men and the world” (Leenhardt 1979: 66f); they live in a “world of relationality” 
(Weiner 1994: 24). To put it in simpler words: the world is not perceived from a 
subjective point of view, it is perceived by taking on the view of the surroundings. In 
this context appears the word kamo: 
 
[w]e translate it by ‘personage’ and the term is as applicable to mythic 
beings as to human beings. The two are always situated in a social or 
socioreligious ensemble where they play their roles. For example, a lizard 
sits on the head of the chief of Koné The chief's wife, seeing her husband 
bent under the burden of the totemic monster, exclaims, Ne pa kamo, that 
is, ‘ensemble of personages’ (Leenhardt 1979: 153). 
 
The life-world and the single human becomes ‘one’. This cosmomorphic view of 
personhood sets back the human perception from a focus on rationality to an 
awareness of the surroundings. It is a symbolic and mythical awareness that enables 
a particular body perception of the human: we become sensible not only for conscious 
perceptions, but also for bodily sensations, smells and other stimuli. 
 
Nor is the kamo himself better delineated in his own eyes. He is unaware 
of his body, which is only his support. He knows himself only by the 
relationships he maintains with others. He exists only insofar as he acts his 
role in the course of his relationships. He is situated only with respect to 
them. If we try to draw this, we cannot use a dot marked ‘self’ (ego), but 
must make a number of lines to mark relationships (Leenhardt 1979: 153). 
 
Two consequences can be derived from such an awareness. We have unconscious 
perception, which indeed is perceived, but this perception does not find its way in our 
mind. It stays in the body and enforces reactions like laughter, aching, etc. But we also 
live in a strong symbiosis with the surrounding life-world. Since we as persons, as 
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personages are social actors, the Melanesian perception of the person is not only 
cosmomorphic, but also sociomorphic. The surrounding social community is an 
instrument of great impact for our development; even more, a person so perceived 
cannot be imagined without the surrounding community. 
 
 
Figure 2: location of the person by means of relationships (according to Leenhardt 1979: 154). 
 
Figure 2 shows quite well that a person is in direct interaction with the surroundings. 
However, since every arrow has its own ‘a’, the person is divided in each relation (b-
e). This does not mean that a person is as divided as a pie. Rather, this figure shows 
exemplarily how personhood is divided. This includes that two parts of a person (a, 
a) can refer to b, or b and c can refer to one a, etc. By this means, persons are not a 
firm and central core within the life-world, but instead merge with their 
surroundings. The cycle which relates parts (a) of a person with each other highlights 
the relationality. This cycle also represents our dependence on society. We are in such 
a way thickly related that it is impossible to imagine an existence external to these 
relations (Leenhardt 1979: 155f). 
It would be wrong to position the body at the center of personhood, since the 
body is and stays part of our environment. There is no center in the relationship 
between us and the environment (Clifford 1982: 184). In accordance with Western 
thinking this means, there is a difference between the subject of the life-world and the 
environment as contrasted with the object, which is a necessary condition for 
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subjectivism. Rather, the so-called subject is part of the environment: “[a] person‘s 
flesh is the same flesh as that of yam“ (Clifford 1982: 173). Thus, the focus shifts from 
a view of a living subject that has consciousness and which is surrounded by mere 
objects subjectively imagined without consciousness to a view of symbiosis between 
human and surroundings, which is experienced as animated life-world: “vivant = 
vivant“ (Clifford 1982: 174). In consequence, a cosmomorphic worldview is described 
as 
 
[p]eople begin to project their attributes into the cosmos, enlarging their 
perceptual space in the process. The world begins to be named with parts 
of the body. The subject-object distance increases; participation gives way 
to symbolism and representation (Clifford 1982: 174). 
 
The world of mere objects turns into a world of animated entities, which become parts 
of the human. One might say the life-world is a human’s ‘home’ or “Lebenshaus” 
(Galuschek 2014: 377). Other people are part of our life, so by this means, they are 
taking part in the life-world − and thus in life. In consequence, the life-world as the 
place where humans are getting in touch with each other builds up the social 
community: others have a particular role, just as we take part in their lives. Our 
relationship with others is related to certain tasks in the social community and 
characteristics of personality and character. Other humans are part of our life-world. 
Hence, the notion of person is defined through the concept of relationality between 
us and sociality (LiPuma 2000: 136). To better illustrate this special view, I took the 
descriptions given by Leenhardt (1979) and James Clifford (1982) to sketch the 
following figure 3: 
 
 
 
Figure 3: comparison of Western and Melanesian worldview. 
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As shown in figure 3, the perception of personhood and life-world differs within the 
egocentric and the sociocentric worldview. Apart from the egocentric world view 
where there is a sharp difference between person and world, such a distinction is 
missing from the sociocentric worldview. A human lives not in an individual world, 
but in a dividual one (Strathern 1988). The Melanesian perception of personhood 
assumes that we are ‘dividuals’ and thus holistically relational. This perception has 
become very popular in contemporary ethnographies (e.g. Strathern 1988; Wagner 
1991; LiPuma 2000; Stewart and Strathern 2000b; Strathern and Stewart 2000; 
Rumsey and Weiner 2001; Stewart and Strathern 2002; Mosko 2010). All these 
attempts to capture non-Western concepts of personhood just stand as an example 
for a plurality of concepts, which are neither universal nor homogeneous (Poser and 
Wassmann 2012: 19). Just as these concepts differ in their constitution, the 
underlined and highlighted aspects and scientific perspectives differ.  
 
In recent times more facets are attributed, like age and aging of the person, 
the idea of space and time, wherein the person situates her- or himself, the 
person’s relationship to the surrounding topography and to particular 
places, and finally the question about the ‘transparency’ of the human, or 
his or her inspection through others (opacity of minds) (Poser and 
Wassmann 2012: 19).9 
 
Like Mauss’ approach (1985), Leenhardt’s (1979) and his followers’ approaches have 
been criticized for their social and cultural evolutionary roots. All these approaches 
are lost in focusing on dichotomies between ‘us’, the Western perception, and ‘the 
others’, other cultural concepts of personhood. Nevertheless, with the introduction of 
this Melanesian perception, these approaches have been offering chances to think 
through the Western perception of the world. By introducing the Melanesian 
perception of personhood into the Western anthropological discourse, the 
cornerstone was laid for a sociocentric and cosmomorphic constitution of 
                                            
9 This entire passage is translated by the author from the German original: “In jüngster Zeit wurden 
noch weitere Facetten beigesteuert, etwa das Alter und das Älterwerden der Person, Vorstellungen von 
Raum und Zeit, in denen sich die Person positioniert, ihre Beziehungen zur umgebenden Topographie 
und zu bestimmten Orten, schließlich die Frage nach der ,Durchsichtigkeit’ des einzelnen Menschen 
bzw. seiner ,Einsehbarkeit‘ durch andere (opacity of minds)“ (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 19). 
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personhood within Western thinking. This approach, however, remained within 
anthropology. It is still unknown in philosophical discourses. 
Considered from a Western point of view, this perception of personhood seems 
‘unstable’ (Hess 2006: 288) and “fractal” (Wagner 1991: 163), which does not 
necessarily have to be a disadvantage. “A fractal person is never a unit standing in 
relation to an aggregate, or an aggregate standing in relation to a unit, but always an 
entity with relationship integrally implied“ (Wagner 1991: 163). Thus, the world 
around the person becomes human in a particular way. There is no center to the 
human’s world. The space where Western philosophy places the subject as a 
conscious entity seems to remain empty. Indeed, this place is filled up with life-worldy 
experiences and memories, which make us porous for the life-world. In consequence, 
we constitute the life-world. For that reason, personhood can be understood as 
cosmomorphic or sociomorphic. 
Perceiving us as dividuals who take part in our life-world necessitates that the 
perceptual center of our life-world is empty. This is a very sharp distinction between 
both the Western concept and the Melanesian perception. However, to smooth this 
exaggerated distinction, it should be concluded that personhood as well as “selfhood 
is a composite, the constituents of which vary in public and private modes” (Cohen 
1994: 2). In this regard, the door can be opened to an adequate investigation of 
similarities between the Western concept and the Melanesian perception of 
personhood. 
 
 
2.2 The Idea of the Sociomorphic Dividual 
To perceive the Western-preceived subject of the life-world as dividual, relational and 
fractal does not introduce a novelty into anthropology. Anthropological approaches 
since the 1980’s deal with attempts to synthesize of the Melanesian word view on 
personhood and Western views on the concept of the person (Poser and Wassmann 
2012: 15). In other words, anthropological approaches started attempts to capture 
the mythic worldview of the Melanesians in Western terminologies. In recent 
research, for instance, Edward LiPuma (2000) assumes the differences between the 
Melanesian and the Western concepts of personhood to be not as big as believed, but 
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they differ in their premises. The Melanesian perception of personhood is 
fundamentally social and dividual, whereas the Western concept is fundamentally 
egocentric and individual; so far the superficial and oversimplified considerations. 
Indeed, dividual and individual perceptions of personhood exist in every culture, but 
they differ in grade and reception. For the people in Oceania, for example, there does 
not exist a subjective consciousness. Derived from their emphasis on dividuality, 
every part of the surrounding life-world is part of us as well. 
In Western concepts of personhood, two approaches can be differentiated: first, 
“the person is composed, historically and culturally, of dividual and individual 
aspects” (LiPuma 2000: 134). Second, in an ontological way, as described above, “the 
person appears as the natural and transhistorical individual” (LiPuma 2000: 134). 
Fortes (1973: 287) divides these two approaches to personhood into an 
 
objective side, the distinctive qualities, capacities and roles with which 
society endows a person enable the person to be known to be, […] [and a] 
subjective side, it is a question of how the individual [...] knows himself to 
be – or not to be – the person he is expected to be in a given situation and 
status. 
 
The Western view over-emphasizes the individuality of a person. "[T]he true 
ontological form is not, as the West would imagine it, the individual; it is the dual 
person delineated by both dividual and individual facets” (LiPuma 2000: 135). 
Furthermore, LiPuma (2000: 131) points out that "the difference between persons in 
Western and Melanesian societies is a function of the content given this category". It 
seems rather that personhood emerges precisely from that tension between dividual 
and individual categorical aspects of the environment of our life-world. As a dividual, 
we are embedded culturally and historically, since every one of us embodies not only 
different cultural aspects, but different temporal and historical aspects as well. 
Therefore, the condition of this tension's terms, and thus the nature (or range) of 
persons that are created, will vary historically (LiPuma 2000: 132). 
Assuming a person – phenomenologically considered – as an individual with 
own body, own life-world and own thinking, it has to be approved that personhood is 
culturally and historically constructed. Personhood consists of patterns of cultural 
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customs and rules. Since the concepts of personhood all over the world are temporally 
and spatially in co-existence, universal categories of personhood cannot be assumed. 
Therefore, in anthropological writings exaggerated representations have been very 
common. In Western scientific thinking the dichotomies like ‘we – the others‘, 
‘individual – dividual’, and ‘substance – relation to societies‘ are still with us (Poser 
and Wassmann 2012: 18). They are stereotyping, oversimplified, and often 
ideological (Strathern 1988; LiPuma 2000) or essentialist, and dismiss social changes 
(Mosko 2010). But, in recent anthropological research, “[t]he juxtaposition of the 
Western (assumed) autonomous individual and the (imagined) relational or 
sociocentric person in the Pacific region developed gradually” (Wassmann and Funke 
2013: 234). John Kirkpatrick and Geoffrey M. White (1985: 9) affirm that “[p]ersons 
are points of intersection between the subjective and the social“. Therefore, persons 
are necessary “cultural bases for formulating and exploring subjective experience” 
(Kirkpatrick and White 1985: 9). From that point of view, the concept of personhood 
appears in its relationship to the social community (Poser and Poser 2012: 37). From 
the Western point of view, subjective experience is not that hard to investigate 
through the traditional focus on subjectivity and consciousness. Our individuality has 
been for very long time a key issue in social and cultural anthropological field studies. 
In her book The Gender of the Gift (1988), reffering to Leenhardt (1979) and 
Clifford (1982), Marilyn Strathern describes the Melanesian perception of the dividual 
in contrast to the Western concept of personhood (Hess 2006). Through Strathern’s 
approach (1988) is “a milestone in Melanesian studies” (LiPuma 1998: 74), hers and 
other related studies on personhood in Melanesia have to be criticized for postulating 
a full incommensurability with Western concepts of personhood (LiPuma 1998: 75; 
Hess 2006). LiPuma (1998: 75) argues that “they compare Melanesian notions of the 
person not to the Western reality of personhood but to Western ideology”. The 
dichotomy, which occurs here, is one of theory and praxis. Whereas Western 
approaches to human personhood are derived from “Western written philosophical 
traditions and not from analyses of experiences of people in the West” (Sökefeld 1999: 
418 fn.3), the Melanesian perception of personhood is derived from personal 
experiences of the Melanesian people (LiPuma 1998: 58). In consequence, the 
Melanesian perception of personhood is conceived as the complete opposite of the 
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Western concept of personhood. This view reject the anthropological view on the 
possibilities and opportunities of commensurability (LiPuma 1998: 75). 
 
Melanesian persons are as dividually as they are individually conceived. 
They […] are frequently constructed as the plural and composite site of the 
relationships that produced them. The singular person can be imagined as 
a social microcosm (Strathern 1988: 13). 
 
With this approach, Strathern (1988) reuses a concept already developed by McKim 
Marriott (1976), and where she stated that the human is not an individual entity, but 
rather she or her is in a perpetual exchange of social interaction (Poser and 
Wassmann 2012: 15). Marriott (1976: 111) examines a South Asian–Western 
dichotomy read as “’dividual’ or divisible” in contrast to “’individual’, that is, 
indivisible, bounded units” (cf. Macfarlane 1978: 5). 
 
To exist, dividual persons absorb heterogeneous material influences. They 
must also give out from themselves particles of their own coded 
substances – essences, residues, or other active influences – that may then 
reproduce in others something of the nature of the persons in whom they 
have originated (Marriott 1976: 111). 
 
Besides giving here an explanation for the system of tradition as dynamic process of 
social interaction over time, Marriott shows our deep interwovenness with the 
surrounding society, for example, a ‘child is always a personification of relationships’ 
(Leenhardt 1979: 153–155; Strathern 1988: 268–270; Poser and Wassmann 2012: 
15).  
To illustrate the relational character of the Melanesian notion of personhood, 
Andrew Strathern and Pamela J. Stewart (1998) refer to the Melpa’s perception of 
noman, which simply can be translated as ‘mind’. The noman is 
 
variously glossed as mind, consciousness, intention, will, social sentiment, 
and understanding. The idea of the noman [sic!] is thus an ontology in and 
of action that engages personhood with history and biography in 
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contemporary lives among the Hagen or Melpa people. The noman is seen 
as in a continuous process of differentiation and change over a lifetime, 
and it encompasses ideas of process, incompletion/completion, 
relationality, individuality, character, creativity, and identity. Two 
different life-history narratives are used to show how people seek their 
personhood over time. We interpret their narratives as stories of how they 
attempt to achieve ‘a strong noman’ (Strathern and Stewart 1998: 170). 
 
Every human possesses noman, but shape and content can differ, even during our 
lifetime (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 16). However, within the mentality of the Melpa, 
“[c]hildren are not born with noman. It develops in them from the time they begin to 
understand and use language” (Strathern and Stewart 1998: 175). In consequence, 
noman is a social attitude, which refers to social situations and social relationships. 
The own personal development is influenced by noman which becomes more clearly 
and differentiated the more understanding is accessible. That makes language “the 
most powerful indicator of the state of the noman” (Strathern and Stewart 1998: 175). 
Language should be understood, here, as the most accessible possibility for social 
interaction. However, what language really is within the context of noman is not 
defined. I suggest language as way of agency or broad interpretation of social acting. 
 
The means by which the noman develops from an undifferentiated, 
unfocused state to a more fully differentiated, clearly defined state is 
through the process of interacting with other persons, the environment, 
and the ancestral/spiritual world. A person’s noman is constantly 
intertwining with those of others through a myriad of relationships 
(Strathern and Stewart 1998: 175). 
 
Over lifetime, we make a journey through many different noman. “Throughout a 
lifetime a person will experience many different noman, or states of mind, but the aim 
is to achieve a strong and unified state of the noman” (Strathern and Stewart 1998: 
175). Since the noman is developed and further developed through social 
relationships and social interaction, it is basis of our being human and therefore 
personhood. We thus are fully integrated members of society. If our noman does not 
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fit in a particular situation, or if we are not able to maintain social relationships, we 
are, in the first case, considered to be insane, and, in the second case, we are denied 
to be a human being and thus a person belonging to society (Strathern and Stewart 
1998: 176; Poser and Wassmann 2012: 16). Thus, noman means “’the achievement of 
personhood’ by means of relationality“ (Strathern and Stewart 1998: 175), since a 
particular cognitive effort is needed to find and perform a role within the social 
community. Within the concept of noman, the ‘relational individual’ appears to be 
permeable, since the social community has a direct effect on the development of the 
noman. Precisely through this permeability, the partibility as dividuality of the human 
becomes visible (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 16). Thus, surroundings like “others, 
places, and things” influences the own being, and vice versa (Hess 2009: 61).  
 
Through this permeability someone’s actions, thoughts, motivations, well-
being and emotions can be altered. The understanding that one’s own 
action could be influenced by possible external material causes affects how 
people explain their own and other’s actions (Hess 2009: 61). 
 
As Sabine Hess shows here, the relationship to the body regarded as embeddedness 
or embodiment in the surrounding life-world (Poser and Poser 2012) is essential to 
understand our relational individuality. We are in steady interaction with our 
environment, as well as our environment with its things, places, animals and other 
humans, influences us. Consequently and logically taken one step further, the just 
cited description concerning the social relationality of the ‘relational individual’ does 
not appear only social, since we are formed by relational individualities like the 
interplay of the different organs the human consists of and composes a unity on 
almost every stage of being (Strathern 1988: 15). Being human and thus having 
personal identity can be conceived as personal microcosm. In conclusion, “noman is a 
complex concept, spanning ideas of process, incompletion/completion, 
differentiation, relationality, creativity and identity” (Strathern and Stewart 1998: 
177). 
Stewart and Strathern (2000: 63) supplement the current discourse on the 
concept of the “relational-individual” with “a form of personhood in which elements 
of relationality and elements of individuality coexist“. By this means, dividuality is 
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interpreted as life-worldly relationality, and, at the same time, all parts of the self are 
themselves individuals, as well as the person her- or himself is an individual. 
Elsewhere, Stewart and Strathern (2000a) offer a holistic theory of the reflexive, self-
understanding individual human with a strong focus on the self. First, they make a 
distinction “between a personal and a social sense of the self” (Stewart and Strathern 
2000a: 8). Such a distinction is theoretical, but in reality, both senses of the self are 
correlative. Their main premise is that the individual cannot be social, since the 
egocentric world view prevents a social approach (Stewart and Strathern 2000a: 11). 
Nevertheless, an individual is able to act socially. A cosmomorphic concept of the 
person, however, is essentially social, because every human possesses a world, and, 
thus to this world belongs a societas. On this premise, ontological pressures arise. 
 
By the term ontological pressures we mean to combine two ideas. The first 
is that cultural categories imply ontologies of being […]. Although there 
may be variable representations of such ontologies, they nevertheless 
form a framework for people’s thinking that is relatively unquestioned. 
Second, these frameworks are employed by people in their interactions in 
such a way that they enter into social action and perception itself, thereby 
exerting pressure on forms of behavior (Stewart and Strathern 2000a: 12). 
 
In other words, the nature of every one of us is to stay in existence; by this means, as 
entities we have ontic nature. Ideally speaking, individuals can physically exist 
without bothering each other, there would not be any ontic pressure. Through 
interaction, however, individuals encounter ontological pressure, because each 
individual has her or his own language of interaction and an own way of interpreting 
events. This interaction, in fact, involves a certain lack of knowledge about the other. 
We can know another as well as reasonably possible, but there will always be certain 
parts – even of our own very personality – that we do not and cannot know. 
As ontic entities and acting persons, we are individuals in relation to other ontic 
entities. As a part of our life-world, however, we are conceived as dividuals, because 
every part of our life-world is a part of us.  
The interpretation of behavior leads to an analysis of our own lifetime 
experience as our own biography. By this means, we stand in the background and 
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both, the self and the individuality, stand in the foreground, where they act “and 
enrich each other in an interlocking manner” (Stewart and Strathern 2000a: 13). 
Furthermore, perceived as a microcosm, we are not differentiated, indivisible 
individuals, but rather fractal dividuals, which are connected in permanent exchanges 
with particles of ourselves and others.  
Within the Melanesian world such a thing like subjectivity is hard to find, since 
within a personal unique individuality, we are perceived as ‘relational’ or ‘whole 
dividuals’. By this means, within a personal uniqueness, we consist of many parts 
which we unify; this unity of parts marks the wholeness in personhood. It highlights 
the strong relationship, and even more: the dependency between the surrounding 
world and us as living entities. The concept of dividuality enables a holistic view on 
us and the animated life-world. As Mark Mosko (2010: 219) points out, it 
“presupposes the absence of the rigid distinction between ‘persons’ and ‘things’, or 
‘subjects’ and ‘objects’, which is definitive of the bounded, possessive individual of 
Western ideology”. In this passage a reference to Mauss’ (1967) reciprocity of the gift 
can be found, since Mosko (2010: 219) describes the Melanesian perception of our 
relationship to the life-world in relation to ‘the West’: 
 
if the items transacted are not construed as parts of the transactors as 
persons, relationalist perspectives tacitly recapitulate the subject/object 
distinction on which possessive individualism in the West is premised. 
Similarly […] the denial of possible identifications between persons and 
things in certain contexts has greatly distorted the scope of ‘individualism’ 
in the West. 
 
The notion of personhood as a relational dividual offers a way of understanding the 
relationship between us regarded as social microcosm and the individual as personal 
microcosm. The problem that appears here is that such a comparison still stays in 
Western interpretative tradition. Such comparisons continue to ‘make’ us over life 
time into persons as social beings (Strathern 1988: 13). Within the Melanesian notion 
of personhood, however, such a logical and attributive detour does not exist. We are 
a social microcosm and thus cosmomorphic (Strathern 1988: 268). As Mauss (1985: 
3) already pointed out, “the 'self' (moi) is everywhere present, but is not expressed by 
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‘me’ (moi) or ‘I’ (je)”. The self, thus, is relational to everything in the life-world, and to 
the life-world itself. LiPuma (2000: 131) argues “[i]n all cultures [...] there exist both 
individual and dividual modalities or aspects of personhood”. Everywhere the words 
“’you' as well as an ‘I’” exist, and “identity and self-construction are the result of 
socially created relations (ethnicity, ritual, etc.)”. Either can be emphasized depending 
on the context, within the same culture. Thus, it is not a matter of the structural 
difference between different conceptions of personhood, like individuality or 
dividuality. 
All the presented notions and other relations of personhood, give an insight to 
the possibilities and opportunities of a broader concept of personhood as Western 
thinking in general has been used to so far. Through there are several universal 
categories in human characteristics like desires, beliefs, and judgments (LiPuma 
1998: 75), Jürg Wassmann and Joachim Funke (2013: 237) point out that from point 
of view presented here, the concept of personhood is not universal; and this is only 
derived from the great amount of possible approaches to the concept of personhood. 
Though the thinking within these approaches circles within contrasting dichotomies, 
it has to be said that every concept of personhood highlights specific characteristics 
of individuals within society. In doing so, these approaches fail to take account of the 
spiritual as well as the physical dimension of personhood, because in most of the 
“human social societies ideas about personhood are understood as psychosomatic 
unities and embedded within a network of social relationships” (Poser and 
Wassmann 2012: 19). In addition, as mentioned elsewhere also Wassmann and Funke 
(2013: 237) stress other possible indices constituting concepts of personhood, like “a 
person’s age and aging, perceptions of space and time where the person positions 
himself, and his relations to the surrounding topography and to certain places”. All 
these perspectives on personhood already mentioned, can function as variants, 
aspects, perspectives and perceptions of personhood, which enrich and expand all 
notions of personhood explained above.  
Here, it could be shown that we cannot consider ourselves as closed individuals, 
since we permanently move within social relationships (Poser and Poser 2012: 50). 
This last sentence can only lead to one conclusion: there cannot be one single concept 
of personhood which works as universal theory. Concepts and notions of personhood 
cannot be stereotyped. Furthermore, a clear identification of ‘Western’ or ‘Non-
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Western’ concepts and notions of personhood is hard to realize, even a contrast 
between ‘individual’ and ‘relational’ concepts (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 35). As it 
is the thesis of this work just as well, personhood depends on the context. Thus, I do 
not pursue the aim to elaborate a universal theory of personhood; rather, in the 
context of narrative identity and agency, I will elaborate a new perspective on the 
Western concept of personhood. 
 
 
2.3 Performance of Acting 
In the 1970’s Victor W. Turner (1986; 1988) founded the anthropology of 
performance which has roots in ritual theory as well as theater theory. His approach 
is still very influential in recent approaches to performance theory, and still has a 
great impact on anthropology, especially in considering motivation to acting from the 
perspective of social community and reflected acting. 
According to Turner, every one of us has always been a homo performans. Our 
“performances are, in a way, reflexive” and we reveal ourselves (Turner 1988: 81). 
From this point of view, we are a reflecting performing self. Turner deals with two key 
terms which are crucial for the motivation of acting: “performance” and its manifold 
and enhanced definition, and “social drama” in which performance is embedded. 
Emerging in the “early to mid-1970s” (Bauman and Briggs 1990: 78), the term 
‘performance’ itself has a young history. “[D]eveloped in linguistic anthropology, 
performance is seen as a specially marked, artful way of speaking that sets up or 
represents a special interpretive frame within which the act of speaking is to be 
understood” (Bauman and Briggs 1990: 73). By this means, in every act a particular 
motivation is inherent, which results from reflection. Reflection here means a certain 
consciousness and awareness of our suchness if we are acting, a particular purpose 
can be reached, or a particular intention can be fulfilled. This consciousness and 
awareness lead to a permanent state of action motivation. Conversely, in every act 
exists a part our reflections and a part of our individual characteristics. Since we are 
totally entangled in social (inter-)action, that state turns our sociality itself into 
performance: we perform for the audience or the ambience, and from this it can be 
 Anthropological Approach to Personhood and Motivation 
77 
derived that every act is a ‘message to the surroundings’. We want the act to be heard, 
seen, and want that it urges a reaction. 
For Turner, performance is “interconnectedness” with the social community: it 
“always intends an audience, and in ritual this might include supernaturals as well as 
those from the mundane world – performers, ritual subjects, and spectators, among 
others” (Kapferer 1986: 192). The audience realizes our performance and shows 
expressions due to the recently made experience. Thus, performance as social 
interaction has a direct impact on the social community to enforce a sharing of 
knowledge and understanding (St John 2008: 7). That implies, we are everlasting 
actors within the surrounding world, since through acting we perform on a stage 
which informally can be called ‘life’. This ‘life stage’ is per definitionem the 
surrounding world with all its inhabitants as ‘audience’. Furthermore, our 
performance is directly related to particular roles within the social community: we 
have to fulfill a ‘script’ according to our role to perform the role within the social 
community. The performance is accomplished by our acting within the social 
community. By this means, we convey our purposes by performing a particular role. 
It is almost unnecessary to say that these purposes and intentions are strongly related 
to the social role the human is performing. 
Depending on which theoretical approach is consulted, there exist uncountable 
types and classifications of acting. In general, it is not essential to communicate by 
verbal talking. Communication in a broader, performative sense is more than that: it 
can also be performed by acting. To push on this issue a bit more: the described 
interaction with others includes communicative performative acts with others. Here 
are not only meant verbal communicative acts in the wake of the speech act theory of 
John L. Austin (1962) and John Searle (1969), as every act is a communicative act, 
even if an act is omitted. Communication, in fact, is performed in every moment we 
are acting within the surrounding world. Considering that we are homo performans, 
we are ‘communicating’ by acting all along. Within a notion of acting as broadly 
conceived, communicative acts can be divided into several sub-categories like 
emotions, facial expressions, gestures, postures of the body, or mere physical 
presence. These types of communication including verbal utterances are always 
direct expressions to the surrounding world. In turn, through all these performative, 
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communicative expressions acting is communicated to the surroundings. This leads 
to the conclusion communication is acting.  
Another key term of Turner’s approach is “’social drama’”. To explain his notion 
of “social dramas” Turner uses theater terms. In a certain way, Turner, also, goes along 
with the concept of “thick description”: a concept developed by Clifford Geertz (1973), 
who uses the method of “thick description” to analyze the behavior and role-play in 
social communities. “[P]articipants not only do things they try to show others what 
they are doing or have done; actions take on a 'performed for an audience' aspect” 
(Schechner 1977: 120). Like a theater actor who receives applause from the audience, 
we expect particular reactions for our conduct in everyday life. By performing, we 
create a social plot. In addition, while we are wearing a particular mask – in fact or 
metaphoric − we play a particular role. Considered as social actors, we follow a 
culturally encrypted ‘script’. We have to know the cultural code that consists of 
symbols with particular, manifold and, at the same time, paradox meanings. 
To perform on a cultural stage is to know the particular culture, and, as 
understood in the anthropology of performance, it is broken down to the often cited 
imagination of ‘culture as performance’. This leads to the well-known main 
hypothesis of Turner’s work within which performance is conceived “as paradigm for 
meaningful action” (Conquergood 1989: 82). For us, who are both an individual actor 
and a social performer, it is important to be recognized by the community: we act in 
a particular way to receive an adequate or probably an inadequate reaction by others. 
Once more, this interpretation of Turner’s approach corresponds with the 
speech act theory. Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) point out that speech acts also 
accomplish acting. Speech acts explain, comment, or are performative acts 
themselves. Since the surrounding world can only be perceived and described 
through language, speech act utterances constitute and provide the personally 
experienced cultural and social life. If we perform adequately, we are able to ‘speak’ 
in the cultural and social code of a particular social community. From that it can be 
derived that “performance as a mode of spoken verbal communication consists in the 
assumption of responsibility to an audience for a display of communicative 
competence” (Bauman 1977: 11). Besides, communicative competences are not only 
consciously performed: according to Erving Goffman (1974), performance in social 
communities is mostly unconscious experience and knowledge in particular 
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situations, which are arranged in unconscious scripts or schemes. These schemes 
Goffman calls “frames”. 
 
I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with 
principles of organization which govern events – at least social ones − and 
our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such 
of these basic elements as I am able to identify (Goffman 1974: 10f). 
 
These cultural scripts, schemes of behavior, or frames “key” performance in social 
actions (Bauman 1977: 15). By this means, we possess behavioral frames which 
provide acting orientation. Since most of these frames are unconscious, this kind of 
performance happens automatically. However, for every situation a particular frame 
is necessary, which is learned and structured by experience and knowledge. Without 
this frame, a situation cannot be adequately classified. Such frames “carry instructions 
on how to interpret the other message(s) being communicated” (Bauman 1977: 15). 
Only, if a frame does not fit anymore in a particular situation, this frame becomes 
conscious. By applying such a frame, we become confused and begin to question this 
particular frame. Through such a situation, a new experience is made and thus further 
knowledge is gained which can be applied in future within a new frame. In doing so, 
performance constructs sociality and culture. But, it is not only this construction, 
which is gained by performance. From the individual’s point of view, performance as 
a type of social acting is experience making par excellence. 
 
Mere experience is simply the passive endurance and acceptance of events. 
An experience, like a rock in a Zen sand garden, stands out from the 
evenness of passing hours and years and forms what Dilthey called a 
‘structure of experience’ (Turner 1986: 35). 
 
The structure of experience becomes as own biography self-reflexive. Thus, we are 
conscious about our past and are able to reflect our actions and experiences. Within 
our personal identity, our self is defined through experiences and lifetime events. In 
turn, these events and experiences are constitutive for our personal identity. In this 
sense, meaningful action is understood as “marrying present problems to a rich ethnic 
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past, which is then infused into the ‘doings and undergoings’ […] of the local 
community” (Turner 1986: 40). Our present self is nourished on previous experiences 
and lifetime events to benefit from these in the present and future. Thus, experiences 
can be considered as social dramas, and thus as “sources of aesthetic forms […] where 
the structures of group experience (Erlebnis) are replicated, dismembered, re-
membered, refashioned, and mutely and vocally made meaningful” (Turner 1986: 
43). That corresponds with the performance theory developed by Goffman (1984). He 
defines performance as each everyday interaction in social life (“continuous 
presence”, Goffman 1984: 32), since in everyday interactions the participants play 
their roles and behave theater-like: “all social interaction is staged – people prepare 
backstage, confront others while wearing masks and playing roles, use the main stage 
area for the performance of routines and so on” (Schechner 1977: 120). Crucial for 
the definition of performance is that it has to happen in front of “a particular set of 
observers and […] has some influence on the observers” (Goffman 1984: 32). 
Performer and audience (observer) influence each other, and every acting has 
particular consequences for the surrounding others. Thus, performance plays a 
crucial role in the construction of personal identity.  
In a social community, the development of personal identity is fulfilled over 
years, or more precisely, over the entire lifetime. From the performative point of view, 
experiences as past events must be reflected in the present and future. That can be 
called the ‘paradigm of reflected perception’. Action motivations, thus, are founded on 
the contextualization and reflection of experiences. According to theater theory, we 
as performing and experience-gaining humans follow this paradigm of reflected 
perception by recounting stories. The stories belong to us, so, in a reflexive way, they 
are part of our biography. That makes telling a story the fundamental performative 
act which shows parts of our personal identity (Bruner 1986: 145). Through 
storytelling we confer meaning on our experiences. In every present situation, the 
same past experience can be reflected and interpreted in a new and different way. 
Through recently made experiences the perception of another past experience 
changes and radiates ‘in a new light’. “Narrative structures organize and give meaning 
to experience, but there are always feelings and lived experience not fully 
encompassed by the dominant story” (Bruner 1986: 143). Indeed, our perception of 
the ‘present’ always is situated “in a time sequence” (Bruner 1986: 141), the 
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consciously realized – dominant – time structure is strictly subjective, and can never 
be perceived from a so-called ,objective point of view’. This does not mean that the 
past is reconstructed and the future is constructed from the present. Within our own 
biographical perception, past, present, and future are “connected in a lineal sequence 
that is defined by systematic if not casual relations” (Bruner 1986: 141). That implies, 
every recounted story has a particular relevance in relation to new experiences and 
current life situation (Bruner 1986: 153). 
Acting and performance flow through every corner of our everyday life. Social 
life is enacted, and, thus, a continuous process. Through that, different kinds of 
processes are initiated. Thus, “[p]erformance is a paradigm of process” (Schechner 
1988: 8). Movements and processes of experience and knowledge in everyday life are 
conveyed by interaction with others. In social communities, through individual 
performance, parts of the personal biography are recounted: they are shared with 
others (Kapferer 1986: 188f). This leads to common experiences which can be 
recounted together with others. “Individuals experience themselves – they 
experience their experience and reflect on it – both from their own standpoint and 
from the standpoint of others within their culture” (Kapferer 1986: 189). This ability 
allows reflections about our own “action through the perspective of another person – 
by taking the attitude of the Other” (Kapferer 1986: 190). 
Turner’s approach in performance theory smoothens the way for further 
investigations in performance theory, acting and practice (Bachmann-Medick 2010). 
From these researches, recent approaches to praxeology10 were ultimately developed 
(Reckwitz 2000, 2002, 2003; Spiegel 2005a; Winker and Degele 2010; Blažević 2011). 
Praxeology is “a considerable shift in our perspective on body, mind, things, 
knowledge, discourse, structure/process and the agent” (Reckwitz 2002: 250). The 
center of praxeological and performative theory is the body. It is not an “instrument” 
anymore, rather it is “the place where mental, emotional and behavioural routines are 
inscribed” (Spiegel 2005b: 19; Blažević 2011). Thus, practice, performance and acting 
                                            
10 Reckwitz, here, uses the plural form to underline the focus on culture as cultural technique. In this 
work, the term ‘praxeology’ is not related to the Austrian School with its roots in Economics, rather the 
term ‘praxeology’ used here follows the traditions of Bourdieu, Giddens, and especially in a recent 
context Reckwitz (see for further reading: Spiegel 2005a; Blažević 2011). Regarded from that point of 
view, ‘praxeology describes practices as “the smallest unit of cultural analysis” (Reckwitz 2010: 189).  
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are always embodied. Acting as “practice can be understood as the regular, skilful 
‘performance’ of (human) bodies” (Reckwitz 2002: 251); even more, 
 
[a]t the core of practice theory lies a different way of seeing the body. 
Practices are routinized bodily activities; as interconnected complexes of 
behavioral acts they are movements of the body. A social practice is the 
product of training the body in a certain way: when we learn a practice, we 
learn to be bodies in a certain way (and this means more than to ‘use our 
bodies’) (Reckwitz 2002: 251). 
 
Praxeological theories include and link unconscious behavior and routines as 
performances (Spiegel 2005b: 19). A special focus is directed to material objects, 
 
which are conceived not only as carriers of meanings and objects of 
interpretation but also as indispensable and constitutive elements of 
social practices simply thanks to their inherent materiality and 
(non)usability (Blažević 2011: 56). 
 
Practice, performance and acting thus become thickly interwoven with social 
structures, symbolic representations, and identity constructions. In doing so, practice, 
performance, and acting constitue individual behavior. 
 
 
2.4 Summary 
Anthropological concepts of personhood do not only deal with Western concepts and 
approaches to personhood. They also call in concepts and perceptions from non-
Western cultures which enrich the anthropological research. Actually, non-Western 
approaches do not remain in their context. For example, ‘the Melanesian perception 
of personhood’ is transformed into the Western context, considering that Western 
discourses dominate the scientific discourse. It is an idealized concept which does not 
exist in reality. However, on a theoretical level, it creates a counterpart to the Western 
subject-theory. Therefore, the dichotomy between dividuality and individuality 
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seems insurmountable. In fact, it can be said that dividuality is also present in Western 
cultures – otherwise sociality would not be possible. In this context, life-worldy 
performance is executed. 
In our dividuality or partibility, we are role players on a stage which is 
constituted by our social community. As anthropological research has been shown, 
personhood is more than just a perceiving ‘Ego’: it is the human in her or his social 
being as part of the social community. To be honest, we are always already born 
within a social context of our family, later kindergarten, friendships, schools, and our 
own family. 
For the following investigation, the question is how a fundamentally social 
concept of personhood fits into the Western egocentric theoretical contructs. I solve 
this question by taking into account several approaches to personhood: as shaping 
concept (Scheler), self and narrativity (Ricœur), and the structure of the life-world 
(Schütz and Luckmann).
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3. Philosophical Approach 
to Personhood and Motivation 
To understand personhood within the context of action motivation, the function of the 
concept of personhood and the notion of identity have to be investigated in both a 
phenomenological – the ‘that!’ of acting – and a hermeneutical – the ‘why?’ of acting – 
approach. For this reason, I have chosen two philosophical thinkers: first, to describe 
personal actions on a phenomenological level with Scheler, and second, to describe 
the constitution of personal identity on a hermeneutical level with Ricœur. Both 
Scheler and Ricœur work with a phenomenological foundation. On a 
phenomenological Scheler considers that personhood shapes a unity, and tries to link 
phenomenology with value realism; for him, phenomenology is not a philosophical 
method but a natural human attitude. 
 
[P]henomenology is neither the name of a new science nor a substitute for 
the word ‘philosophy’; it is the name of an attitude of spiritual seeing in 
which one can see [er-schauen] or experience [er-leben] something which 
otherwise remains hidden, namely, a realm of facts of a particular kind 
(Scheler 1973b: 137). 
 
We move actively perceiving through the world. The surrounding world is enclosed 
intuitively and immediately through our personal presence. Therefore, the 
phenomenological view excludes a primary cognitive account of the world, and shifts 
to a primary intuitive account. It is a particular kind of trust which is claimed by 
Scheler. This phenomenological trust in the life-world provides a particular openness 
for the world, and enables making experiences.  
Perceiving personhood within time and narrative means to perceive our own 
temporality. The own temporality can only be perceived from a reflective – or let us 
say hermeneutical – attitude. Ricœur’s understanding of hermeneutics does not only 
include the mode of reflection, but also the mode of – active – interpretation. The 
emphasis on the word ‘active’ refers to the cognitive effort of the reader of a text to 
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perceive and contextualize an entity. To illustrate that, Ricœur deals with the 
threefold concept of mimesis referring to the three dimensions of time – past, present 
and future. To comprehend the threefold concept of mimesis, a particular method has 
to be applied: first, the phenomenological method has to be exercised. Interpretative 
understanding of meaning is only possible with an a priori perception of phenomena 
as entities. By this means, phenomena are perceived in their suchness [Sosein]. 
Secondly, a hermeneutical step back is needed to distance oneself from the 
phenomenologically perceived phenomena. Through this distance, a hermeneutical 
context can be created. Without this step a hermeneutical – contextualized – 
understanding is impossible (Galuschek 2014). This method of hermeneutical 
interpretation is an approximation, “thus genuinely making one’s own what was 
initially alien” (Ricœur 1991a: 119). Through his extended method of 
phenomenological hermeneutics Ricœur can draw on a “concrete reflection, that is, the 
cogito mediated by the entire universe of signs” (Ricœur 1974: 265). For this reason, 
symbols do not have an objective truth-value, rather they have a subjective value 
(Simms 2003: 32). In other words: to conceive a phenomenon without context is 
fundamentally senseless – not to say impossible (Ricœur 1991b: 32). Thus, 
hermeneutical interpretation is always followed by approximation to or assimilation 
in an already existing context. Ricœur stresses the execution of understanding by 
following the paradigm of language and speech acts. Speech understood as symbolic 
capital (Bourdieu 1990: 115) can be conceived as an act as well. Therefore, acting 
itself as a particular cultural and social habitus can be perceived as a symbolic act. By 
executing an act, however, the human coalesces in a perfect symbiosis with this act. 
Derived from the thesis that ”[t]he person is, rather, the immediately coexperienced 
unity of experiencing”(Scheler 1973a: 371), “[t]he being of the person is therefore the 
‘foundation’ of all essentially different acts”(Scheler 1973a: 383). The human becomes 
the particular act for the moment of execution. Following Scheler (1973a) and Ricœur 
(1992), the involvement of the existence of personhood with action, time and 
narrativity is determined. The reasons for a performed act are located within lifetime 
experiences – which I simply call ‘biography’. By this means, we are in a particular 
manner conscious of the ability to reflect the existential narrativity in time. 
 
 
Philosophical Approach to Personhood and Motivation 
86 
3.1 The Person as a Shaping Concept 
Our shape conceived as acting person is what the other perceives and recognizes. 
Thus we can be conceived as an act center in which we live and are able to experience 
our self (Schütz 1942: 326). According to Scheler’s approach to personhood (1973a), 
the notion of the person is not a category that defines a certain group of characteristics 
of entities. We cannot just be mind, neither can we be perceived without mind. 
 
Neither the being nor the problem of the ‘person’ would exist if there were 
beings (whose natural organization we set aside in the reduction) 
endowed only with knowing (as thought and intuition) and those acts 
belonging to this (specifically theoretical) sphere. (Let us call such beings 
purely rational beings). Of course these beings would still be (logical) 
subjects that execute rational acts: but they would not be ‘persons’. Nor 
would they be persons if they had both inner and outer perception and 
often dealt with knowledge of the soul and nature, that is, even if they 
found an object ‘ego’ in themselves and others and could perfectly observe, 
describe, and explicate experiences of ‘the ego’ as well as all individual 
egos. The same would hold for beings whose entire contents were given 
only as projects of willing. They would be (logical) subjects of a willing, but 
not persons (Scheler 1973a: 382). 
 
Scheler’s statement makes clear that the notion of the person is not to be “purely 
rational beings”, but that this notion is also part of us. Consequently, such a notion of 
personhood belongs to “all men − in the same way and as something identical in all 
men” (Scheler 1973a: 371). Nothing individual is to be found inside such a definition, 
rather it seems to seek to be universal. The objective of Scheler’s notion of 
personhood, therefore, is to define a concrete being which is not lost in an abstract 
dimension. In other words, the person has to be settled close to the individual. 
Individuality has, in this context, a specific meaning: it is the particular “essence” − or 
nature − of a person (Scheler 1973a: 489). Actually, this personal essence belongs to 
every person, but it is precisely not universal, since it “cannot be repeated again in 
any other person” (Crosby 1998: 24). “The unrepeatable essence of a person forms a 
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contrast to every general or universal essence, and it serves to distinguish one person 
from all other persons” (Crosby 1998: 26). That makes acting both a personal 
universality as well as a personal individuality, since it is unique in its personal 
appearance. Considering social communities as cultivating a particular culture, it has 
to be added that even such communities are individuals in their particularity and 
uniqueness. Thus, a social community can be considered as “collective person” 
(Scheler 1973a: 502) which consists of individual persons by itself (Scheler 1973a: 
520). 
Considering person as the act center, Scheler's notion of the person illustrates 
the unity of our acting. A person never can be an object of an act, since personhood 
always exists only within the act (Schütz 1942: 327; Scheler 1973a: 393). Scheler’s 
concept of the person can be perceived as a shape, which puts the personal acting in 
an individual figure. We incorporate the act, and thus become a unity with this act. 
Therefore, personhood is the shape of our unity, which by means of our characteristic 
qualities is ‘filled up’ with our personality. Personhood as ‘shaping concept’11 involves 
the unity of particular qualities which are characteristic for us. These characteristic 
entities are achieved over lifetime by making experiences and gaining knowledge. In 
consequence, we can concurre with the thesis that personhood is the “immediately 
coexperienced unity of experiencing” (Scheler 1973a: 371). That defines person not 
only as a noumenon but also as a living being that lives through experience. What 
concisely derives from this is that making experiences and being aware of them is a 
fundamental human quality. Considering action, the person does not act for causal 
reasons but due to meaning (Ferrer 2000: 76). This statement says something about 
our value. Since personhood belongs to ‘all men in the same way’ as an ontological 
entity, every person has, in the first instance, the same value. 
Unless they have a direct effect on the environment, acts, in Scheler's (1973a) 
sense, are not fundamentally social. Rather, they exist in a social dimension as 
perceived by others and in their reaction, but they belong to us as act-executing 
humans and depend directly on us. In consequence, acts cannot be objectified. They 
can only be given, perceived and analyzed in the act of reflection – and only according 
to us. Through acting, we make personal parts of us visible. We do not show those 
                                            
11 This term is an individual translation by the author of the term ‘Formbegriff’, which Christian Bermes 
(2013) used to describe Scheler’s notion of the person. 
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parts directly to the world, but by acting we correlate to the world. One might say that 
parts of the world belong to us and we belong to the world, to be precise, they are 
interdependent. Thus, there is a strong relationship between us and the surrounding 
world. 
Gaining knowledge through lifetime experience includes consciousness and the 
awareness of time as past, present and future. This definition of personhood, 
however, is broadly conceived. Such a definition levels down the notion of the person 
to a human entity. Thus, Scheler aims to enclose his notion of the person as a shaping 
concept which belongs to every human being. In turn, other specific definitions of 
personhood, which focus on particular qualities a person has to have, depersonalize 
humans because they lack particular individual qualities. Taking all specific 
definitions of personhood in sum, they are thus individualized that there only would 
be one common trait: consciousness. A person, however, cannot only be reduced to 
mere “rational acts of a certain lawfulness” (Scheler 1973a: 372)12. In turn, 
considering every thinking entity could become a person this would include children 
and animals. Being defined this way any notion of the person would be unnecessary. 
After all, we should not forget: personhood is a specific human quality. Thus, Scheler 
aims to enclose his definition of personhood as follows: 
 
[f]or the person is precisely that unity which exists for acts of all possible 
essential differences insofar as these acts are thought to be executed. 
Hence, by saying that it belongs to the nature of the differences of acts to 
be in a person and only in a person, we imply that the different logical 
subjects of essentially different acts (which are different only as otherwise 
identical subjects of such act-differences) can only be in a form of unity 
insofar as we reflect on the possible ‘being’ of these subjects and not 
merely on their nature (Scheler 1973a: 382f). 
 
                                            
12 German original: “Denn die Vernunftakte sind ja − selbst nur definiert als die einer gewissen 
Sachgesetzlichkeit entsprechenden Akte – also auch eo ipso außerindividuell, oder, wie manche 
Anhänger des Kritizismus sagen, ‘überindividuell’“ (Scheler 1954: 382). Scheler uses here the term 
“Sachgesetzlichkeit” (objective necessities), which is translated as ‘lawfulness’. He underlines with this 
term that ‘Sachgesetzlichkeit’ is situated outside of our rational being.  
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Here it becomes visible that Scheler goes a step further by defining personhood as an 
acting entity, which has to be recognized as unity. By this means, personhood does 
not only mean consciousness and world awareness, but it encloses consciousness of 
acting as well as taking responsibility for action. Thus, the difference between a 
person and an animal is made by our consciousness about our own acting. Through 
acting, we have individuality and specificity in life. With the term specificity Scheler 
(1973a, 1979) even implies our individuality, because our acting expresses selfhood. 
That makes us the center of acting. Our entire essentiality is defined through acting. 
That takes place in an active life-experience as coming of age: “a man is not of age as 
long as he simply coexecutes the experiential intentions of his environment without 
first understanding them” (Scheler 1973a: 479)13. Generally speaking, if we do not 
have “’the genuine being-able-to-understand’” concerning our own acting, but do it 
anyway, we are not coming of age (Scheler 1973a: 479). Since acting is related to 
consciousness, acting is not − for Scheler − a behavior or mere conduct which 
influences accidently the environment. 
We know about the personality of others, through we would not think 
consciously about that fact. It is obvious that in consequence we also know about the 
life and existence of other acting humans and, of course that all perceived actors – 
even the own being – are alive. Thus, we have a conscious certainty about our very 
own quality as a personal being. From this point of view, personhood is not a feature 
that can be given or taken. Rather, as mentioned above, it is a characteristic of our life. 
The notion of the person shapes us as acting entity. Acts do not mean that 
something has to be done; they cannot be understood as a kind of work or labor. In 
the moment we act, we recognize our own action. This includes “also acts of the moral 
tenor, potential moral tenors, intentions, things done on purpose, wishes, etc.” 
(Scheler 1973a: 487). This underlines the relation between character and the human. 
It enables us 
 
to measure a factual person and his life-expressions and actions by the 
value-intentions immanent to the person himself, i.e., by his own ideal value-
                                            
13 German original: “Der Mensch ist unmündig, solange er die Erlebnisintentionen seiner Umwelt nur 
nachmacht, ohne sie primär zu verstehen“ (Scheler 1954: 484). The phrase “primär zu verstehen“ does 
not mean a ‘first understanding’, rather a phenomenological understood ‘primary’ or ‘genuine’ 
understanding of the environment. 
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essence (both in the case of oneself and in that of another), and not merely 
by general moral norms  (Scheler 1973a: 487). 
 
Scheler’s (1973a) notion of the person is autonomous as well as axeological 
normative. To be a person means to be an entity that owns its proper values. Each 
personal moral assessment is not only measured by universal norms but also by an 
ideal image that every one of us possesses by herself or by himself. For instance, we 
have a certain phenotype. According to that phenotype, there exist certain 
expectations of our character and behavior. We are able to make the character visible 
in particular behavior by evaluating the phenotype. In turn, we are able to make 
assumptions about another’s character by evaluating her or his actions. We are even 
able to infer to a particular phenotype by hearing another talking, etc. Every one of us 
experiences the own being in the “execution of an act of inner perception” (Scheler 
1973a: 375). This perception is our ‘I’ – or in a reflexive mode ‘Me’– as the acting self. 
That I, however, is only one single form of perception. This makes ‘I’ “only an object 
among objects. Its identity exists only insofar as identity is an essential characteristic 
of the object” (Scheler 1973a: 375). It is Scheler's consideration that it is neither ‘I’ 
nor the essence of ‘I’ that gives account of the world; rather it is our unity, understood 
as the unity of acting, consciousness and knowledge that enables experiencing the 
world. This is still a phenomenological and – according to Scheler’s usage of the term 
‘I’ – an epistemological approach to personhood. It lacks an approach of 
hermeneutical, life-worldly understanding. 
For his time, the outstanding issue in Scheler's (1973a: 480) approach is that he 
takes into account the perception of the world through the body as a “being-able-to-
do ‘through’ the lived body”. Therefore, acting is not only an ability of consciousness, 
but an act through physical presence as well. Scheler calls it the “domination over the 
lived body” (Scheler 1973a: 479): we are aware of our lived body by having our own 
perceptions of the world (Scheler 1973a: 479). We own the lived body and are aware 
of it, since 
 
there can be no doubt that the lived body does not belong to the sphere of 
the person or the sphere of acts. It belongs to the object sphere of any 
‘consciousness of something’ and its kind and ways of being. The lived 
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body's phenomenal mode of givenness, with its foundations, is essentially 
different from that of the ego, with its states and experiences (Scheler 
1973a: 398). 
 
We as bodily presences can be perceived and recognized by others. But the body − 
and this is a novelty in phenomenology – does not only provide that by sensual 
perception, the body is the primary way of perception and recognition, and, by this 
means, of the life-world and other humans (Scheler 1979: 254). The lived body 
manifests this perception by giving physical presence in the world and thus a 
particular point of view. We make use of the lived body to move, act and perform, but 
our cognitive content surpasses the lived body (Scheler 1973a: 398). Thus, we never 
can be reduced to a mere lived body. Both kinds of perception, through consciousness 
and through the lived body, are an important fact for the further investigation into the 
notion of the person: it is in particular the phenomenal perception through the lived 
body within a ‘shaping concept’ of personhood that enables the reflection and 
deepens the investigation of a cosmomorphic and sociocentric notion of personhood.  
 
 
3.2 Narrative Identity and Personal Narration 
An individual person is identical with the own self. This sentence summarizes the 
function of identity. It presupposes the difference between a temporal and 
biographical diachronic identity and a context- and role-dependent synchronic 
identity (Straub and Chakkarath 2010: 5). An approach to personal identity always 
tries to find the answers to ‘who am I?’, ‘who became I?’, and ‘who I want to become?’ 
(Straub and Chakkarath 2010: 6). Neither a satisfactory reply has been given yet, nor 
is the claim of this work to give a satisfactory reply. These questions are very personal 
questions, which can only be answered by our own personal self. Considering the 
complex structure of identity within a diachronic and a synchronic dimension, it is 
incumbent upon the self-realization, which timeline of the own biography is 
highlighted, since “stories constitute who I am” (Zahavi 2007: 179). However, 
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[w]ho I am is not something given, but something evolving, something that 
is realized through my projects. There is no such thing as who (in contrast 
to what) I am independently of how I understand and interpret myself. To 
put it differently, no account of who one is can afford to ignore the issue of 
one’s self-interpretation, since the former is (at least partially) constituted 
by the latte (Zahavi 2007: 179). 
 
For this purpose, I introduce Ricœur’s approach on narrative identity as possibility to 
construct our own personality as personal identity. As Daniel D. Hutto (2007b: 1) 
summarizes tersly and succinctly our ability to narrate: 
 
[o]ur world is replete with narratives − narratives of our making that are 
uniquely appreciated by us. […] Our capacity to create, enjoy and benefit 
from narratives […] surely sets us apart from other creatures. Some, 
impressed by the prominence of this phenomenon in the traffic of human 
life, have been tempted to deploy that famous Aristotelian formula, 
holding that we are, inter alia, not just social or rational or political animals 
but that we are also rightly distinguished as narrative or story-telling 
animals. 
 
Narrative identity is thus understood as mediation between personal lifetime events 
and personal identity. Every event and every experience have influence on our 
personal development. Seen this way, narrative identity allows contextualizing these 
events and experiences within the personal identity. 
Ricœur structures his concept of narrative identity on a philosophical as well as 
cultural foundation: it includes a “practical category” (Ricœur 1988: 246), thus, a 
reference to the acting ‘who’ is given: namely the ‘I’. This ‘I’, however, can only 
recognize itself through an indirect self-reflection. The reply to the ‘who’ of acting is 
always ‘me’. Therefore, our life has to be comprehended as a lifetime story: everyone 
of us is the biographer of her or his own story: “history always proceeds from history” 
(Ricœur 1988: 247). By this means, narrativity rises to a sequenced composition of 
performances and is able to construct identity (Ricœur 1988: 260). Identity, 
therefore, is thickly interwoven with time and narrative. 
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The trilogy Time and Narrative (1984-1988) deals with the commonality of the 
temporality of history and poetics. The primary point is the threefold concept of 
mimesis as prefiguration, configuration and refiguration. Originally, Aristotle 
elaborated the concept of mimesis in his Poetics (1999). Through splitting up the 
concept of mimesis in three parts, Ricœur infers the coherence between the aspects 
of time and narrativity and human existence through acting. 
Mimesis as “imitation or representation of action” is an act by itself (Ricœur 
1984: 35). If an act is performed, it is not similar to the original act; rather it turns into 
a reinterpreted – newly created – act. By this means, mimesis overcomes the idea of a 
mere copy recreating an original act (Ricœur 1984: 45). Mimesis has a specific 
character as “creative imitation” (Ricœur 1984: 31) by being developed as a newly 
created self-standing act. Furthermore, it can be interpreted as a mode of 
representation which opens a “space for fiction” (Ricœur 1984: 45). This unique 
creative moment Ricœur calls mimesis2 (configuration). Mimesis1 (prefiguration) 
refers to the pre-mimetic world, which already has been existed, for instance, as 
culture, traditions, etc. Since mimesis1 is entirely history as prefiguration, it can only 
be captured when it is narrated as mimesis2. By narrating, we give already an 
interpretation of the world we try to capture within a narrative: with the choice of 
words and narrative style we use, we narrow down the other’s interpretative field. 
Thus, mimesis2 as mode of configuration is located within a “kingdom of fiction” as “as 
if” (Ricœur 1984: 64). Last but not least, mimesis3 (refiguration) is the moment in 
which mimesis is performed on the level of the interpreting other. This is “another 
side of poetic composition” within the creative imitation and develops a character of 
efficiency in which the other reconstructs and re-experiences the story as her or his 
very own experience (Ricœur 1984: 46). The crucial point here is, mimesis constructs 
“the mediation between time and narrative” (Ricœur 1984: 52f). Hence, the threefold 
concept of mimesis could be regarded as a mirror of human time that connects time 
and narrative within our life. 
The narrative in particular “occupies a middle place between description and 
prescription” (Reagan 2002: 15). Thus, understanding is not answered in a single 
dimension with the hermeneutical ‘why’ of our existence context, but with a 
phenomenological ‘that’ of our setting in the three temporal dimensions – past, 
present and future. This leads to Ricœur's main idea: the elaboration of a connection 
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between the hermeneutical world of reflexivity and interpretation and our self-
understanding as acting and performing persons. We are not thrown in a world of 
copies in which we only perform our existence, rather in a world of “as if” in which we 
are creative (Ricœur 1984: 64). This world of creativity stands out against a world of 
mere copy, since it has a particular and permanent creative moment while we are 
acting in there. 
Within mimesis1 the handiness [Zuhandenheit] of entities (Heidegger 1962) has 
“an actual [effective] signification” in setting them in relation to ourselves (Ricœur 
1984: 57). Therefore, mimesis1 as a historic context is a complete – seemingly 
unaccessable − whole. By this means, not only actually existing entities become 
related to each other but symbolic entities by abstracting them as well; for instance, 
the symbolic structures in the concept of culture. The production of these contexts is 
not limited. “To understand a ritual act is to situate it within a ritual […], and by 
degrees within the whole set of conventions, beliefs, and institutions that make up the 
symbolic framework of culture” (Ricœur 1984: 58). A symbolic system delivers the 
“descriptive context for particular actions” (Ricœur 1984: 58). Through a concrete 
descriptive context, a symbolic system isolates itself from another. By this means, 
mimesis1 is a mode of abstract present because the world is understood as a place 
where something happens “spontaneously” (Ricœur 1984: 60) without passing any 
stage of composition. Practically, without composition the world cannot be 
understood. It would be similar to a phenomenological life-world in which all is 
represented without a context, just in its suchness. Since to be in a context means to 
be interpreted, this means further that an entity is set in context by composition. 
Mimesis2 is classified by Ricœur in an “amplitude between the 
preunderstanding and […] the postunderstanding” or a “mediating function” between 
the prefiguration of mimesis1 and the refiguration of mimesis3: between “individual 
events and incidents [mimesis3] and a story taken as a whole [mimesis1]” (Ricœur 
1984: 65). If within mimesis1 past and present as a given life-world have already 
happened, mimesis2 opens up the possibility to understand the very same, but this 
does not mean that it is perceived as a complete whole. Regarding the life-world as 
past and present is at the same time to perceive the life-world as a world of history 
full of past and present events. Only certain parts of the pre-narrated historic context 
are comprehended and, in this way, can be narrated.   
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To follow a story is to move forward in the midst of contingencies and 
peripeteia under the guidance of an expectation that finds its fulfilment in 
the ‛conclusion‘ of the story. This conclusion is not logically implied by 
some previous premises (Ricœur 1984: 66). 
 
Through the mediation of mimesis2 the past transforms into a story. Within the 
concept of culture, mimesis2 configures tradition by composing the past events of our 
own narrated culture into stories and contexts. Through the practice of traditions and 
rituals, we perform mimesis3 by transforming the given sedimentations as traditions 
and rituals (or cultural heritage) as our own. 
Mimesis3 is understood as “intersection of the world” and the world of the 
interpreter, it refigures the recounted story in “real action” (Ricœur 1984: 71). That 
seems similar to the concept Hans-Georg Gadamer (2003) called application (Ricœur 
1984: 70). It is performed as the final stage in the triad understanding – interpretation 
– application. Based on the hypothesis that understanding includes a whole (Gadamer 
2003: 291), application is already included in understanding (Gadamer 2003: 308): 
“[u]nderstanding here is always application” (Gadamer 2003: 309). Through the 
interpreter’s understanding an application of the understood event is performed 
(Gadamer 2003: 309). Actually, understanding of an event is performed as very own 
experience. Considering the relation of understanding and application to the very own 
experience, understanding and, thus, application should be interpreted 
metaphorically, since “[m]etaphoric meaning […] has the character of resemblance” 
(Taylor 2011: 113). “In other words, metaphor displays the work of resemblance 
because the literal contradiction preserves difference within the metaphorical 
statement; ‘same’ and ‘different’ are not just mixed together, they also remain 
opposed” (Ricœur 1978: 232). From that base, Ricœur (1984: 76) derives the formula: 
“[t]o follow a story is to actualize it by reading it”. The new experience is 
contextualized through the interpreter because resemblance enables finding 
metaphors in the interpreter’s own history. Thus, Ricœur can conclude that 
Gadamer’s concept of application can be understood as “appropriation” (Ricœur 
1988: 158). New contexts are created and new symbolic structures are located. 
Through this process over time, mimesis3 becomes mimesis1 again. This structure of 
mimesis in time can be imagined as a helix where any overlaps are an enduring change 
Philosophical Approach to Personhood and Motivation 
96 
from mimesis1 to mimesis2 to mimesis3, which becomes mimesis1 again. If our 
narrating and acting are regarded through the concept and structure of mimesis, our 
existence is understood as being in narrative processes. Through the cultural context 
and background, narration is always situated in a process of practical imitation. As 
Ricœur (1992: 157) points out, “[t]his is not to say that practices as such contain 
ready-made narrative scenarios, but their organization gives them a prenarrative 
quality which in the past I placed under the heading of mimesis1”. Ricœur (1992: 114f) 
utilizes the triad “describe, narrate, prescribe” to explain a “specific relation between 
the constitution of action and the constitution of the self”. Narration recounts our 
action and supports our understanding as acting humans in time. The term 
‘coherence’ becomes virulent, since habits, customs and identifications are situated in 
a relationship of coherence, without being framed in a constant and stringent lifetime 
story (Römer 2012: 249f). Both, description and prescription are given, if “ethical 
considerations are implied in the very structure of the act of narrating” (Ricœur 1992: 
115). Thus, the “self seeks its identity on the scale of an entire life” (Ricœur 1992: 
115). Nevertheless, coherence is only punctually given. It is possible that the narrative 
self is coherent or incoherent; it can transform itself completely, or even be lost. But, 
the narrative self never transforms so much not to be able to recognize itself (Römer 
2012: 252) – a different case is mental disease, which I do not focus on here. 
The reflexive ‘me’ as self is the direct object of the ‘I’. Through setting ‘me’ in the 
accusative, the self is able to reflect, to imagine and to transcend. If our existence is so 
deeply interwoven with time as Ricœur suggests, the classical philosophical notion of 
identity has to be reconsidered. First of all, the assumption is indefensible that our 
identity considered as the same being over time is always the same. Merely a certain 
part of it stays the same, because our character, behavior, conduct, and even certain 
parts of the phenotype change. Ricœur calls that the self. With the changing self, two 
kinds of personal identity have to be defined: one part within which we identify our 
very own being – this also includes the physis and the other parts of us within which 
life-experience might introduce changes. 
Since, from the phenomenological perspective, the major problem in the 
narrative constitution of personal identity occurs in the “permanence in time” (Ricœur 
1992: 116), the question arises how the own identity can be the same over lifetime, 
under the reservation that identity changes can be guaranteed due to experiences and 
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lifetime knowledge. This question leads Ricœur (1992: 1ff) to the philosophical roots 
of the term ‘identity’ read as ‘to be identical’: the Latin words idem (sameness) and 
ipse (selfness). To assemble both concepts of identity, Ricœur (1992: 116) intents a 
theoretical discussion between the “two versions of identity”, idem and ipse. Within 
narrative identity, “every narrative combines two dimensions in various proportions, 
one chronological and the other nonchronological” (Ricœur 1980: 178). Therefore, 
narrative identity includes our existence as a whole possessing an unchangeable core, 
but within selfness, the possibility to induct changes is given. By this means, the 
demand on totality is eluded. With idem, our sameness and our constancy over time 
is described. Idem describes a numeric identity, which consists of “permanence in 
time” (Ricœur 1992: 116), since “[t]he search for permanence in time [is] attached to 
the notion of identity” (Ricœur 1992: 148).  
 
Here, identity denotes oneness: the contrary is plurality (not one but two 
or several). To this first component of the notion of identity corresponds 
the notion of identification, understood in the sense of reidentification of 
the same, which makes cognition recognition: the same thing twice, n 
times (Ricœur 1992: 116). 
 
Sameness guarantees a permanence in time, through a chance to change has to be 
given as well. Thus, Ricœur brings in a qualitative identity, in other words, extreme 
resemblance. With ipse, our unique dynamic selfness in making experiences is 
emphasized. Both concepts of identity idem and ipse overlap each other within the 
human and build up a perspective of the human’s personal identity. By this means, 
every personal identity implies an unchangeable core (idem) and the possibility to 
change (ipse). On that basis, this polarity belongs to our person. 
This account is the very description of the two steps of narrative identity. First, 
the phenomenological ‘I’ means resistance in time and certain sameness over time. 
Second, in keeping with acting, we are performers, and the narrative self is 
comprehended as the reflexive me which directs and, at the same time, reflects in an 
unconscious and conscious way the object of its action. In consequence, it is always 
me who is in her or his own time with a stable I. We always confirm our self in every 
time of experiencing our identity, as with ‘It was me who was acting’. This makes clear, 
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Ricœur does not deal with a theoretical notion of identity that is used in philosophical 
logic; rather, it has to be pointed out that he approaches a cultural definition of 
identity as personality, or personal identity by stressing identity, concretely as our 
ability to recount our existence. 
Narrative identity seeks in the own biography for reasons of the personal 
development, and, thus, one could say, narrative identity seeks in the own biography 
for personal identity. Alternatively, it can be concluded that personal identity, in this 
particular case, regarded as narrative identity, is constituted by the recognition of our 
own lifetime story. To consolidate future acts, past acts have to be recognized as our 
own acts. These are the cornerstones of narrative identity. 
The interwovenness of idem and ipse summarizes our action in recognition of 
our own narrative identity. In fact, this is Ricœur's intention: recognition of our action 
in our own identity as the own lifetime story. Identity “can be described in dynamic 
terms by the competition between a demand for concordance and the admission of 
discordances” (Ricœur 1992: 141). By this means, we contextualize our lifetime-story. 
Seemingly, not context related events – discordant events – are set in concordance. 
For this, Ricœur (1992: 141) uses the expression “synthesis of the heterogeneous”. In 
this way, a so-called lifetime story recounts a lifetime plot. Here, plot is understood as 
“the intelligible whole that governs a succession of events in any story” (Ricœur 1980: 
171). Thus, a lifetime event that happens during our life and the “sequence of the 
story” perform successive mediations (Ricœur 1992: 141). This “narrative event is 
defined by its relation” to the story operation of configuration of the “discordant 
concordance” (Ricœur 1992: 142).; “it participates in the unstable structure of 
discordant concordance characteristic [sic!] of the plot itself” (Ricœur 1992: 142). 
Thus, every event changes particular parts of the story; it changes the course of life 
and story by contributing new aspects and practical parts in an already existing and 
established process or situation. 
The theoretical opportunity to apply Ricœur’s concept of narrative identity in 
practical contexts raises his approach to a level that can be applied in every culture 
(Mattern 2008). This requires the assumption that the mimetic relaying of our life by 
storytelling acts like an update of our past. Considered in this way, narratives have to 
fit within the reality context. By this means, the recounted story must have elements 
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which can be applied to reality, “it probably cannot e.g. involve being able to get from 
Paris to Chicago in one minute” (Schechtman 2011: 405). 
Traditions are based on redundancy. They are narrated and performed. By 
handing them down, they will not be forgotten (Assmann 2011). Storytelling becomes 
cross-cultural and is raised to a universal level, since “[n]arrative thus comes from the 
community and serves as the vehicle through which an individual can interact with 
it” (Schechtman 2011: 405). It has to be kept in mind that no storytelling is ever 
finished or complete. Every interpreter in every age and time has her or his own 
interpretation of a text. Or, in cultural thinking: every age has its own interpretation 
of culture and traditions. Theoretically, interpretation has no limits. By this means, 
the text is never finished, since the world of the text is semantic, thus, the signs have 
to be construed time after time. “Practices are based on actions in which an agent 
takes into account, as a matter of principle, the actions of others” (Ricœur 1992: 155). 
Thus, acting always includes an ethical stance. By acting, we are always 
confronted with another who suffers our action. The term ‘to suffer’ is not used here 
in its daily significance, rather in the sense of someone being confronted with 
another’s action, which has a direct effect on her or his action. This makes us as 
narrative identities to initiators of action. In acting, we are able to create and perform 
a plot.  
Ricœur’s approach to the philosophical problem of human identity provides a 
kind of solution, as the Cartesian ego only secures a permanence in time, and the 
Nietzschean notion of the self denies the existence of a human identity. The occurring 
dilemma can be avoided by the concept of narrative identity, since narrative identity 
enables configurations, changes, “and mutations within the cohesion of a lifetime” 
(Zahavi 2007: 182). And this exactly is the correlation between narrative identity and 
personal identity. 
Even if Ricœur’s approach to identity with its narrative as well as cultural 
anchorage is more connected to the level of human perception of time and 
biographical existence than philosophical approaches to identity have ever been 
before, he argues that his concept rather names the problem than offering a solution 
(Ricœur 1988: 271). In context of this tradition of self-development, there exist 
several philosophical and psychological accounts. To mention a few: 
“[a]utobiographical self, cognitive self, contextualized self, core self, dialogical self, 
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embodied self, empirical self, fictional self, minimal self, neural self […]” (Gallagher 
and Zahavi 2012: 197). Considering the existence of much more concepts of the self 
in academia, the self can be considered within a “pattern theory” which assumes that 
“a self is constituted by a number of characteristic features or aspects” (Gallagher 
2013: 1). In such a theory the above mentioned accounts of the self can be included 
and the self can be conceived in particular componentes or aspects. But, even in this 
work it is only possible to refer to a few, like narrative self, diachronic self, core self, 
and autobiographical self. 
 
 
3.3 Life-wordly Actions 
Obviously, life-world is a social world. “The everyday life-world is the region of reality 
in which man can engage himself and which he can change while he operates in it by 
means of his animate organism”14 (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 1). Therefore, one can 
say even more, “[t]he world15 of everyday life is consequently man’s fundamental and 
paramount reality” (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 1), since we act and as we think 
within the life-world itself as ‘human’. 
The life-world is a physical and present world which is directly influenced even 
by our mere physis. Due to this direct relation between life-world and us, our life-
world is full of ‘lebensraum’. Regarded in this way, life-world is “the province of reality 
in which man continuously participates in ways which are at once inevitable and 
patterned” (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 1), thus life-world becomes an inside world 
and an outside world, in which acting is performed. Life-world is not just a world of 
nature, rather it is a world with plenty of sociality and culture (Schütz and Luckmann 
1974: 5). Since life-world is taken for granted as unquestionable world, ”every state 
of affairs is for us unproblematic until further notice” (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 
                                            
14 This translation is misleading, since the orginal German version says here “animated body” 
(‚Vermittlung des Leibes‘) instead of “animate organism”, which highlights the symbiosis of body and 
soul: “Die alltägliche Lebenswelt ist die Wirklichkeitsregion, in die der Mensch eingreifen und die er 
verändern kann, indem er in ihr durch die Vermittlung seines Leibes wirkt“ (Schütz and Luckmann 
2003: 29). 
15 This translation is misleading, since the orginal German version says here “life-world” instead of 
“world”: “Die Lebenswelt des Alltags ist folglich die vornehmliche und ausgezeichnete Wirklichkeit des 
Menschen” (Schütz and Luckmann 2003: 29). 
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2). That makes life-world not a scientific, artificial and constructed world, but a world 
of everyday life, which can be enriched with knowledge and experience. 
Starting from the hypothesis that “[b]ehavior, while it is actually taking place, is 
a prephenomenal experience” (Schütz 1967: 56), Alfred Schütz elaborates in 
cooperation with Thomas Luckmann (1974) a layering model of the 
phenomenological life-world. They aim at showing that there is not only one life-
world, but rather there exist many life-worlds. Everyone is related to us through a 
specific and subjective province of meaning, which is situated in relevance systems. 
That converts the system of relevances into a lifetime biography where meaning is 
figured by experiences and knowledge, and finally evaluated (Muzzetto 2006: 16). 
Therefore, “meaning is the relationship, born from the act of turning the attention, 
between one lived experience and the whole life-experience of the individual, an 
experience configured into the system of relevances” (Muzzetto 2006: 16). The 
structures of meaning are founded in stocks of knowledge, which are gained through 
lifetime experience. Schütz is able to show that acting motivation is individually 
structured by a complex entanglement of experience, life-world, meaning, and 
relevance. 
Considering life-world in this way, three dimensions of investigation emerge for 
Schütz: knowledge, horizon, and experience. These three dimensions are closely linked 
to each other. For instance, to recount stories from our life, we must have particular 
knowledge about our surroundings. This knowledge can broadly be divided into 
knowledge about the life-world and knowledge about our acting. Attending to this 
classification, Schütz and Luckmann (1974) distinguish three stocks of knowledge 
within the life-world. 
General knowledge of the life-world: that kind of knowledge encompasses all the 
unquestionably and undoubtedly given in the life-world. For us, this implies that 
general knowledge is the source for life experience. Evidently, we do not have access 
to the entire knowledge of the life-world. By way of consciousness, access is limited 
to only certain parts. These parts are related to the personal structure of our life-
world. By this means, general knowledge includes only the parts of the life-world, 
which concern us, since the entire stock of knowledge would surmount our horizon. 
Therefore, the horizon of the personal life-world is a “determinable indeterminacy” 
(Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 9). The personal life-world is always within an 
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impenetrable and all-embracing life-world. That is related to the Heideggerian term 
‘handiness’ or ‘readiness-to-hand’, “[t]he kind of Being which equipment possesses – 
in which it manifests itself in its own right – we call ‘readiness-to-hand’ 
[Zuhandenheit]” (Heidegger 1962: 98). Thus, the personal life-world belongs to us, in 
contrast to the all-embracing life-world which is impenetrable for us. However, every 
personal life-world belongs to the impenetrable and all-embracing life-world. Thus, 
the life-worldly stock of knowledge includes the entire knowledge of the world to 
which we have access as needed. In consequence, the stock of knowledge is related to 
our personal life-world. We deduce the life-world by its individual ways neither 
structured nor fully haphazardly. By this means, the stock of knowledge is not 
coherent, rather its parts may contradict each other because we make experiences in 
several ‘fields’ of the life-world.  
Routine knowledge: routine knowledge includes skills, useful knowledge and 
knowledge of recipes (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 105ff). That kind of knowledge 
participates in both individual knowledge and the general stock of life-world 
knowledge. Therefore, all kinds of applied knowledge are useful knowledge (Schütz 
and Luckmann 1974: 135). Here, useful knowledge means “certain goals of acts and 
‘means to the end’ that belong to it” (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 107). It is 
unnecessary to have a certain conscious intention to use that knowledge. Customary 
knowledge, for instance, includes only routinely exercised customs, for example, to 
satisfy hunger. Schütz and Luckmann place skills in the field of the body. They involve 
the “fundamental elements of the usual functioning of the body“ (Schütz and 
Luckmann 1974: 107), for instance, playing the piano, or skating. Skills are close to 
knowledge of recipes, which includes experience-based familiar assumptions about 
the world and operational processes like ordering a menu. 
These stocks of knowledge encompass the whole horizon of the personal life-
world. However, somehow knowledge has to be gained, and experiences have to be 
made. Schütz and Luckmann (1974: 119ff) did not construct something like a ‘stock 
of experience’, nevertheless experience provides the acquisition of knowledge. By this 
means, experiences are stocked, but “the ‘same’ experiences deposited in different 
sequences form different stocks of knowledge” (Muzzetto 2006: 16). In the context of 
the sedimentation of experience, Schütz and Luckmann list stocks of knowledge that 
can be complemented by a stock of experience. On a personal level, the concrete 
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subjective stock of experience finds expression as stocks of knowledge. Experiences 
are biographical events. These experiences are not objective, but previous 
experiences and a socially and culturally mediated relevance system affect them. With 
the term ‘relevance system’ Schütz and Luckmann (1974: 47) refer to “the manifold, 
mutually interwoven systems of hope and fear, wants and satisfactions, chances and 
risks that induce men to master their life-world, to overcome obstacles, to project 
plans, and to carry them out”. 
These three stocks of knowledge provide help to act adequately in the life-world. 
With general knowledge, we have a sense for the surroundings and are able to make 
assumptions about the world. Additionally, general knowledge prevents the problem 
of solipsism by ensuring our recognition of others, and thus not to be alone in the life-
world. Routine knowledge provides the ability to routinize our acting. We manage our 
awareness and attention resources by acting unconsciously, since certain routines 
like breathing, walking or opening our door do not need conscious attention to be 
performed. Thus, we can direct our consciousness towards other things. Hence, the 
human can focus on other things and make experiences – accumulate the stock of 
experiences and the stock of general knowledge – and, thus, further develop her or 
his personal life. Our cognition performs a mnemotechnical abbreviation which 
allows acting economically. 
We are constantly situated in an infinite variety of situations. There are concrete 
situations in which we are situated in such a moment “as the ‘product’ of all prior 
situations“ (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 100). By implication, we have the possibility, 
according to the individual standard of knowledge, to manage the situation 
individually. Thus, the life-world does not remain the same over lifetime. Through 
knowledge and experience, shifts of horizon [Horizontverschiebungen] occur. 
 
It has turned out that the previous explications stored in my stock of 
experience (determined by earlier situations and regarded as adequate 
solutions for these previous situations) do not suffice for the solution of 
that which is problematic in the current situation. I am now motivated to 
proceed with the explication until the solution appears to be sufficient as 
well [sic!] for the actual problem under consideration (Schütz and 
Luckmann 1974: 14).  
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Thus, knowledge leads to experience, which leads to further experience, which leads 
to further knowledge (Galuschek 2014: 357). Even if Schütz and Luckmann are not 
that interested in this process, because they set the focus on the structure of the life-
world, one can conclude from the passage above that we as residents of the life-world 
are hermeneutists who constantly interpret the phenomenological ‘readiness-to-
hand’ of the life-world, because every act has an internal consistent, contextual 
reason. A particular and previous knowledge-like experience has to be given to come 
to the decision for or against an act. Life-world, therefore, is fundamentally pragmatic, 
and a world of interaction. Due to our own experience and experience’s reflection, the 
life-world meets further development by being filled up with our experiences and the 
experiences of others. Thus, life-world is a constantly evolving environment. Meaning 
and schemes of interpretation are ensured in the social world (Schütz 1945: 543). 
This means that “[a]ll interpretation of this world is based upon a stock of previous 
experiences of it, our own experiences and those handed down to us by our parents 
and teachers, which in the form of ‘knowledge at hand’ function as a scheme of 
reference” (Schütz 1945: 534). 
Schütz postulates two basic axioms which define the life-world as social world: 
“first, the existence of intelligent (endowed with consciousness) fellow-men and, 
second, the experienceability (in principle similar to mine) by my fellow-men of the 
objects in the life-world“ (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 59), since in the life-world 
naturally are fellow-men which phenotypically seem to be like oneself. These fellow-
men are considered as “like me“ (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 17), their acting seems 
to be “like mine” (Galuschek 2014: 355). Thus, their acting is as subjective as our own 
acting, and it has to be concluded that the life-world is fundamentally intersubjective 
(Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 17). Intersubjectivity requires an immediate perception 
of the fellow-man. But, a sharp distinction has to be made between the immediate 
perception of the other (the “fellow-man”) and the mediated perception of the entire 
social world (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 59). Immediate perception is performed in 
direct encounters as face-to-face situations, wherein the other has to be perceived in 
the other’s own existence. Schütz and Luckmann (1974: 61ff) call this perception the 
“thou-orientation”. 
Thou-orientation is not related to the experience of the other, rather it describes 
the mere perception of the other from a subjective point of view. In turn, the other 
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perceives also from her or his own subjective point of view. The mutual thou-
orientation is a we-orientation (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 64). The we-orientation 
is the basis for each social acting, since it provides the perception of the other. 
However, the “’pure’ we-relation […] consists of the bare consciousness of the 
existence of an Other. It does not necessarily include the apprehension of his specific 
characteristics” (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 64). As a result, we-perception builds 
the basis for knowledge about the other and other particular elements of social 
relationships: business calls as well as sexual acts are fundamentally we-
relationships, since between all participants exists an immediate relationship. The 
phenomenal existence of we-relations tells us nothing about the duration of we-
relations, which lies in the very hands of the immediate participants. In consequence, 
the development of we-relations traces back to individual experiences and individual 
knowledge, and thus to individual horizons. Nevertheless, due to permanent 
interaction with others, we are permanently situated in we-relations. “The life-world 
is not my private world nor your private world, nor yours and mine added together, 
but rather the world of our common experience” (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 68). 
If we-relations have been developed, and have become deeper, then ‘foreign-
experience’ is performed. Foreign-experience can be defined as feedback-function. 
The own behavior causes the other’s reactions which can be evaluated as positive or 
negative by oneself. 
 
In the we-relation our experiences are not only coordinated with one 
another, but are also reciprocally determined and related to one another. 
I experience myself through my consociate, and he experiences himself 
through me. The mirroring of self in the experience of the stranger (more 
exactly, in my grasp of the Other’s experience of me) is a constitutive 
element of the we-relation (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 67). 
 
In doing so, we modify our behavior, which has direct consequences for the further 
development of we-relations. “[I]t is thus in the we-relation that the intersubjectivity 
of the life-world is developed and continually confirmed” (Schütz and Luckmann 
1974: 68). Such relations of operation and interaction result from the dimension of 
‘we-relation’ which can be certainly understood as ‘foreign understanding’. In this 
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way the other is perceived as ‘a foreign’, but at the same time equally as a ‘thou’ which 
possesses a constitution similar to our own personal identity. That ‘thou’ is the pure 
perception of the other’s existence, this stage of perception does not yet include the 
perception of individual characteristics (Grinnell 1983: 188). “The Thou-orientation 
can thus be defined as the intentionality of those Acts whereby the Ego grasps the 
existence of the other person in the mode of the original self” (Schütz 1967: 164). 
Considering that we are social beings, it is not possible to make experiences in 
isolation. Thus, social relations obtain projects of action. By this means 
“intersubjectivity is tied to the lived presence of the self with the other (i.e., sharing of 
time in the stream of duration), and […] the ‘content’ of this ‘experience’ is related to 
the being of the other” (Grinnell 1983: 185). At this point, it becomes clear that mutual 
understanding is relational to the contexts of relevance to which every one of us refers 
to. For the further investigation, it can be derived that one single theory of mind is not 
sufficient to surround all existing concepts of minds (Zahavi 2010: 302). 
Within the life-world, there are not only fellow-men who know each other. It is 
hard to imagine, but it is even harder to realize. Most of the people who live on earth 
are unknown “contemporaries” (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 69). Thus, the structure 
of the life-worldly inhabitants does not end here. Since we cannot maintain thou- and 
we-relations with the entire world, there is another group category which does not 
presuppose spatial and temporal immediacy. 
 
Spatial and temporal immediacy, a presupposition for the thou-orientation 
and the we-relation, is absent in my experience of contemporaries. 
Contemporaries are not bodily present; therefore they are not given to me 
in prepredicative experience as this particular unique person (Schütz and 
Luckmann 1974: 73). 
 
From the own point of view contemporaries are people, who do not belong to we-
relations. It is common knowledge that these people exist, because by means of the 
“synthesis of my explication of the stock of knowledge concerning the social world” 
(Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 76), the number of people living on earth is well known. 
Since a face-to-face situation is not given, and honestly impossible, the knowledge 
about the contemporaries’ existence is mediated. Thus, contemporaries are 
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anonymous people who walk through the social world. They are perceived within the 
“they-orientation” (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 73). Since contemporaries are 
conceived from they-orientations, they are anonymous. Although a group consists of 
individuals, such a group has no individual characteristics. They incorporate a 
generalized other with specific group characteristics. Groups in they-orientation are 
important parts of the social world, because they fulfill important roles in social life, 
like police officers, judges and cashiers. They are also “certain types of 
contemporaries“ with whom we are anonymously in contact (Schütz and Luckmann 
1974: 76). Each of these groups expects a particular behavior. 
 
When I conduct myself in a certain way and fashion, or omit the 
performance of certain acts, to introduce another example used by Weber, 
I do so in order to avoid the typically established conduct of typical 
contemporaries (policemen, judges) (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 73). 
 
These expectations are related to particular purposes: money has to be given to the 
cashier to be allowed to take the purchase home. A particular kind of knowledge is 
necessary to be able to perform an adequate behavior towards people from the 
groups of they-relations: the knowledge of the social world. Additionally, it is possible 
that fellow-men become contemporaries, and vice versa. For instance, an old school 
friend can move away because of her job situation, or she has married, whereas my 
own lifestyle is bachelor-like. In such cases we-relations break up and the old school 
friend becomes a contemporary. In turn, due to common interests, a workmate who 
is also a bachelor steps into the we-relation. 
In special cases, typifications are not applied to contemporaries but to fellow-
people. Since a particular basis of knowledge and experience is always given, 
typifications are transferred to fellow-men in thou- and we-orientation. This kind of 
typifications is a mnemotechnique to categorize knowledge in an economic way. Thus, 
fellow-people can be ‘people like …’, but they remain individual in favor of the thou-
orientation (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 81). In a strict sense, people are aligned 
according to a coordinate system where on of the x-axis the value of proximity to 
oneself is decreasing proximity to oneself, while the decreasing value of the y-axis is 
the position to a particular other. 
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Figure 4: the proximity-position-scheme. 
 
Figure 4 shows the proximity-position-scheme in the shape of a coordinate system. 
The blue smiley is our own self. Proximity as well as position is higher, the nearer they 
are to the blue smiley. Thus, the yellow smiley could be a parent or a sister or a 
brother, since the yellow smiley has a high value in both proximity and position. The 
green smiley has a high value in proximity, but a lower value in position, it could be a 
distant relative or a neighbor. The red smiley has a high value in position, but a low 
value in proximity. This smiley could be a colleague or supervisor who is held in 
respect, but has no proximity to the blue smiley. Other people do not just set 
themselves in these positions, but mostly, are set by others. The decision to set 
particular people in a particular way is led by acting motivations. 
To understand the acting of others and the contexts of meaning, it is necessary 
to understand our acting motivation. Acts are ‘projects’ which imply particular 
intentions. They can be either conscious or unconscious. Since Schütz and Luckmann 
(1974) do not focus on the execution of the project of action, they highlight the 
importance of the action intention. They point out two reasons of motivational 
relevance: in-order-to-motives and because-motives, which are responsible for acting 
motives. 
In-order-to-motives turn to the future. They are motivated by purpose, condition 
and the object of an act. Action motivation is founded in contexts of meaning. That 
correlates with a “modo futuri exacti” (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 197), since the act 
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is related to particular expectations, and in the future the act is regarded as completed 
(Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 213): thus, acting requires an already existing stock of 
knowledge (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 212). 
Because-motives refer to past events and experiences. Hence, the motivated or 
induced experience as well as the motivating experience is situated in the past. The 
‘because’ in the because-motive is an explanation ex eventu of the acting human. 
Human acting, thus, is contingent on two time perspectives. It is motivated by 
the past, and of course, it is directed to the future. How to classify an act that is 
dependent on the act’s because-motives (Why I am acting?) and the other that relates 
to the act’s in-order-to-motives (What I want to achieve?). It was Ricœur (1984: 152) 
who said “[e]very story […] explains itself. In other words, narrative answers the 
question ‘Why?’ at the same time that it answers the question ‘What?’”. For the in-
order-to-motives as well as for the because-motives of an act it is, once again, the 
sedimentations and the context of meaning that are important, and regarded as 
“history (‘biography’) and the conditions for the acquisition of knowledge” (Schütz 
and Luckmann 1974: 207). 
 
 
3.4 Summary 
With the philosophical concepts introduced here an excellent fundament is 
established for a link between philosophy and anthropology. Scheler’s perception of 
personhood as shaping concept unifies the multifarious being of the human in one 
single phenomenon: the person. Acting, thus, does not stand for itself; rather it is 
always tied to the human as the author of the act. In this sense, Ricœur’s approach has 
to be understood. Like an author, we recount our life to ourselves and to others. In 
every moment, we try to create a contingency, even if it lasts only for the moment. Our 
life is structured in synchronic and diachronic episodes and storylines, we spin red 
threads, or try to forget some experiences. Nethertheless, through such a treatement 
of our identity, we confirm our past self as actual self in every moment. 
In this regard, from a philosophical point of view, we involve the life-world in 
our life, and, thus, in our action and interaction with others. This involvement leads to 
a thick interwovenness with others and the whole surroundings. We gain a certain 
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‘sense’ for our action as well as for the action of others, since we are aware of our 
action and of our role in society. Such a sense for action can be understood as 
empathic consciousness, which provides understanding of social interaction and our 
own role in society. Therefore, the next step we have to go is to investigate the aspects 
and problems of this human ability – empathy −, since empathic consciousness may 
be a human universal, but in every culture it is treated and interpreted differently.
 111 
4. Aspects and Problems of Empathy 
Empathy and related concepts are a crucial factor in the humanities and social 
sciences to understand human motives of acting. Due to the heterogeneous fields of 
psychology, anthropology, sociology and the various fields of philosophy, there exist 
many approaches and concepts trying to describe empathy. The problem of the notion 
and concept of ‘empathy’ begins with its translation. Whereas, empathy is usually 
translated as German ‘Einfühlung’ (Wispé 1986: 315), nowadays, even in recent 
publications, the notion of empathy remains diffuse: it means “’feeling what we would 
feel in another’s stead’” or ‘the ability to understand others’ (Keysers and Gazzola 
2014: 1). As Hollan and Troop (2008: 391f), for instance, point out: 
 
empathy is a first-person-like perspective on another that involves an 
emotional, embodied, or experiential aspect. The emotional aspect is one 
of the things that distinguish it from other ways of knowing about people 
[…]. It is one of the ways we know how and why people are thinking and 
feeling what they are, not just that they are. 
 
This broad and general notion of empathy does not seem to have the ability to define 
the concept of empathy in a scientifically sufficient and adequate way. From a 
scientific point of view, ‘empathy’ has become an empty set. It can mean just all or 
nothing. In other words: “things remain murky” (Hollan and Throop 2008: 292). This 
statement is more fact than criticism because from such a definition it does not 
become clear, what distinguishes the concept of empathy from concepts like 
understanding, sympathy, and care. From the classical phenomenological point of 
view, empathy is a “distinctive mode of consciousness” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 
183). 
 
Empathy is defined as a form of intentionality in which one is directed 
towards the other’s lived experiences. Any intentional act that discloses or 
presents the other’s subjectivity from the second-person perspective 
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counts as empathy. Although empathy, so understood, is based on 
perception (of the other’s bodily presence) and can involve inference in 
difficult or problematic situations (where one has to work out how another 
person feels about something), it is not reducible to some additive 
combination of perception and inference (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 
183). 
 
Approaches to the cultural sciences try to define empathy as a concept which fits 
every one of us, since they assume that every one of us has the ability to feel empathy. 
However, we handle our ability to be empathic in an individual way which depends 
on either our individual preferences or cultural framing. It is not easy to investigate 
in what degree each of these influences the ability to empathy. That makes it difficult 
to encompass such a diffuse field. Other recent researches claim that “our primary 
mode of understanding others is by perceiving their bodily behaviour and then 
inferring or hypothesizing that their behaviour is caused by experiences or inner 
mental states similar to those that apparently cause similar behaviour in us” 
(Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 183). Thus, empathy is brought into a context with bodily 
behavior and gestures, as well as (intentional) actions, and other diffuse expressions, 
which are based on experiences and states of mind (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 183). 
It cannot be disputed that empathy, in prior and in some recent research in 
philosophy as well as cultural sciences, was brought into relation to intentionality, 
intersubjectivity, capacity to act as well as moral sensations of care and sympathy 
(Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 183). In interaction theories, for instance, empathy has 
not been investigated up to a level where it plays that kind of central role it is 
supposed to do. Moreover, they are premised on, but not directly and consciously 
related to interaction. As Julia Thiesbonenkamp-Maag (2014: 119) point out, in social 
anthropology, the concept of care has hardly been considered. Especially for care, this 
means that care is understood as ‘self-care’ and – in the meaning of caritas – ‘care for 
others’. Thus, care has an individual as well as an institutional meaning. 
Considering all these fields to which empathy is related, it can be defined as “an 
essentially affective mode of understanding. Empathy involves being moved by 
another's experiences” (Halpern 2003: 670), and, in the context of care, empathy can 
“mean ‘feeling with’ another person or putting yourself in someone else’s shoes. The 
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assumption is that emotional resonance with another clues you in to how they feel” 
(Halpern 2014: 301), “to see as others see […], to simulate oneness” (Mageo 2011: 
69), even if it is for a short moment. In addition, there exist empathy concepts which 
highlight the opacity of the other’s mind. This doctrine of the opacity of the other’s 
mind is common in Melanesia; it stands for the respect for the other’s thoughts and 
opaqueness. However, the problem of opaque minds also exists in Western societies, 
for instance, if emotional expressions of others are recognized but are not understood, 
as the motives for that emotional expression are not clear (Niedenthal and Maringer 
2009: 122). 
With no doubt, empathy is in relation to all these terms and concepts, but in 
particular empathy is exactly not one of this terms or concepts (Thiesbonenkamp-
Maag 2014: 122f). In trying to explain empathy in a rational way, empathy can be 
understood as “dialogic process, which tends to be precise in the evaluation of 
another” (Thiesbonenkamp-Maag 2014: 123). In reference to Halpern (2001), Hollan 
and Throop (2011: 2) describe “empathy as a first person-like, experiential 
understanding of another person’s perspective”. Halpern (2001: 85) herself defines 
empathy as ability “to resonate emotionally with” another. This approach includes a 
certain imagination of the other’s feelings (Halpern 2001: 92). Such a dialogical 
process cannot proceed with a particular evaluation of the other’s feelings, since we 
have to understand the feelings of the other and find something inside ourselves, 
which seems similar to the other’s feelings. 
Since social relationships as a common kind of social phenomena are founded in 
empathy and related concepts like – to mention the most important − understanding, 
sympathy, care, ethos and theories of mind, it is not possible to avoid them. In social 
relations like families, friendships, partnerships, even in business and other 
professional fields, empathy helps to give understanding of the acting motivations of 
others and of ourselves, and helps to give a floating sense of interaction with others. 
Thus, empathy is directed to both the other and ourselves, which includes 
understanding, particular feelings, caring, but also a certain concept of a theory of 
mind, which allows making assumptions about the other’s mind, thoughts and acts. 
Thus, empathy involves emotional components which, however, are founded on a 
basis of understanding as the cognitive component of empathy. Considering ourselves 
as inhabitants and participants of the life-world, understanding as a mode of 
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perception of the other, feelings of sympathy and care as modes of empathic 
directedness to another, and the ability of making assumptions about another’s mind 
− or not, as the case may be − are relevant for establishing social relationships. 
 
 
4.1 Understanding 
Understanding as well as concepts of mind reading, regarded as an attempt to 
understand the other’s behavior and thinking, are closely linked. “Understanding 
(Verstehen) is regarded as the primordial mode of being in the world. Thus, 
understanding becomes inseparable from human life” (Kämpf 2013: 90f). 
Traditionally, hermeneutics is the excellent classical philosophical method to take a 
very close look into understanding. However, hermeneutical understanding beares 
potentialities as well as problems (Angehrn 2008). In hermeneutics the ability to 
understand is given “only when we have understood the question to which it is an 
answer” (Gadamer 2003: 370). Understanding requires a deep-going personal as well 
as historical understanding of ourselves and our vital context. These are assumed to 
be human characteristics, or a specific human “mode of being” [Seinsweise] (Joisten 
2009: 141); or in the idiom Gadamer (2003: 259) referring to Heidegger: 
“[u]nderstanding is […] the original form of the realization of Dasein, which is being-
in-the-world”. Or, in other − non-Heideggerian, easier – words: the human constantly 
wants to understand and thus pursues understanding. The human pursues this 
understanding not only of the world, but also of oneself’s motives of acting and of 
one’s own self. The world can be understood as a “web of meanings in which man is 
always already interwoven” (Kämpf 2013: 91). Therefore, Gadamer (2003) considers 
understanding as human disposition. This includes our attempt or willingness to 
understand, even if we only possess a limited account in terms of understanding. That 
implies that even wrong understanding is real human understanding. There is no 
‘mere’ or ‘vague’ understanding; rather we are situated within a permanent dialectic 
of self-understanding and general understanding of the world. In other words: we are 
permanently situated between self-description and world-description (Angehrn 
2008: 33). This mediation of understanding is not a direct process coming close  
to full general unterstanding, rather it is a permanent “intermediate stage” 
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[Zwischenstadium] (Angehrn 2008: 33). We are not able to understand the world in 
general. Like our life-wordly horizons, our understanding is limited. The intermediate 
stage keeps us on a level of permanent will to understand, since we pursue general 
understanding. Every time we understand, we are led to a new level of general 
understanding of the world, which, once again, leads to a new level of seeking general 
understanding. Thus, we become perpetual hermeneutists who permanently evaluate 
the world. 
To ensure mutual understanding, the own perspectives and the perspectives of 
the other have to be mirrored in each other’s view. From the perspective of the other, 
we must realize that the other is constituted similarly to us in the life-world. The 
purpose of understanding, however, is not to unmask or see through the other; rather 
the purpose of understanding is attempting to understand the meaning of the other’s 
communication, and, by this means, the meaning of the other’s acting (Angehrn 2008: 
37). If we talk to another, it is not necessary to know this other. If we ask the way, we 
might ask a complete stranger. It is unnecessary to know the name, the age, or the 
living conditions of this stranger. The only thing which matters is to understand the 
stranger explaining the way. This refers to Gadamer's (2003) concept of ‘fusion of 
horizons’ [Horizontverschmelzung]. It means the symbiosis of biographical narratives 
between humans. If we meet, then, at the same time, cultural backgrounds and 
knowledge systems as horizons of personal/individual knowledge coalesce. Actually, 
it is exactly this moment Gadamer calls ‘fusion of horizons’. Our understanding of the 
stranger’s explanation of the way depends on the stranger’s and our knowledge of a 
common language and most likely on the stranger’s and our understanding of ‘left’ 
and ‘right’. It might be even in the scenario that we question or even disagree with the 
stranger’s explanation, but our understanding shall not be affected, since 
misunderstanding is also a mode of understanding. On this condition, we might 
understand each other, but we do not have to agree on the subject we talk about. 
Agreement is definitively excluded; rather Gadamer’s purpose is to show that 
communication is nothing more than mere understanding. In doing this, fusion of 
horizons approximates the closest point of understanding between humans. 
Obviously, Jane is not Peter, thus, Jane and Peter can only understand each other about 
the subject of their conversation. The maximum level of understanding is reached and 
limited by the phrase ‘I understand Peter’s opinion according to ...’. It is impossible for 
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Jane (even in an idealistic sense) to entirely understand Peter. Therefore, Jane has to 
use the human-inherent empathic ability of understanding to be able to communicate 
with Peter. 
It has to be determined that, in each instance, understanding is bounded by the 
degree of communication between humans. We are considered as constantly situated 
in a dialectic process of understanding, but also in constant interaction with the 
surrounding world. We always gain new knowledge about the world, about our own 
being, and our history. Therefore, understanding has a meaning-founding quality by 
filling up the world and its entities with meaning in regard to our self: “there is no self-
understanding that is not mediated by signs, symbols, and texts; in the last resort 
understanding coincides with the interpretation given to these mediating terms” 
(Ricœur 1991c: 15). Such a sign can be the reaction on our action by others, since a 
reaction is a clear sign for another’s evaluation of our action. This evaluation mirrors 
another’s understanding of our action. 
A closer look is now required at the performance of understanding. Approaching 
performance of understanding by linguistics, Ricœur considers that even a single 
word actually has potential meaning, but it cannot have concrete attributed meaning. 
Meaning is found in discourses which consist of sentences, and thus means language 
(Ricœur 1991d: 78). By implication, it can be derived that meaning is constituted by 
context. Depending on the context, a single word can have different meanings, like 
‘statistical table’ or ‘dining table’. Thus, only by understanding the context, words and, 
thus, sentences achieve clear and specific meaning. 
Within the situation of everyday communication this might be true, the speaker 
is present to correct misunderstanding. On the communicative level of the text, 
however, a problem emerges:. “[t]he reader is absent from the act of writing; the 
writer is absent from the act of reading” (Ricœur 1991a: 107). Thus, the reader has 
no communicative channel with the author; she or he is thrown back upon her- or 
himself. Here, another form of understanding occurs. The text as subject of 
communication can be interpreted always in a new context and so in a completely 
different way. This strong context-relatedness makes the contextualization of our life 
and individual lifetime experience possible. In a philosophical context, our ability to 
reflect can be called hermeneutical reflection. This kind of reflection enables 
understanding of the heard or read, and putting it in another context. On this highly 
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abstract philosophical level, hermeneutical reflection can be regarded as mode of 
empathic understanding. The reader has to understand the text of the author. But the 
reader cannot understand the text in the genuine meaning of the author’s intention, 
rather it is an understanding of the context which is set in a new context of the reader’s 
life. This means ‘empathic understanding’: the attempt of understanding another from 
the perspective of our biography. Since from prior experiences only can we imagine 
the experiences of others. 
 
 
4.2 Feelings of Sympathy 
To give the most general access to the theories of sympathy, I adopt with Scheler a 
philosophical approach to fellow-feeling. In this manner, narrow psychological 
definitions are excluded, and a broader access to sympathetic comprehension is given. 
Social communities require a deep understanding of the other and a deep 
consciousness of being part of the community as well as a deep consciousness of 
responsibility for our social role and for taking care of the other. These necessities 
lead not only to consciousand logical understanding, or to its negation − but also to 
emotional understanding. Unlike rational understanding which can be, as I show, 
emotional as well, sympathy and care possess a strong emotional part in a unique way 
because it is closely interwoven with consciousness and rationality. To be performed, 
sympathy as well as care must necessarily have a rational part, since they have to be 
anchored in our unconscious or conscious awareness.  
In phenomenological philosophy, Scheler (1923, 1973c, 1979) elaborates a 
theory of feelings of sympathy wherein he distinguishes between several phenomena, 
which in common language have been mistaken for fellow-feeling. This confusion 
leads Scheler (1979) to a precise concept of “fellow-feeling”16 which is an authentic 
sympathetic feeling with another. However, it does not enclose a so-called 
spontaneous act, a reaction, or a mere reproduction of feeling of the intention of 
another’s act; and, above all, it is “not an action” (Scheler 1979: 67). Since it is directed 
to the surroundings, fellow-feeling is “blind to value” (Scheler 1979: 5) and 
                                            
16 In the German original text, fellow-feeling is called ‘Mitgefühl’ (Scheler 1973c) which means as much 
as ‘feeling with someone’ or ‘comprehend the feelings of someone’. 
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“essentially a reaction” (Scheler 1979: 6). ‘Blind to value’ means that fellow-feeling is 
not a conscious act, which requires a conscious recognition of the surroundings and 
an evaluation of a situation. Expressed in Scheler’s (1979: 130) own words, it is “an 
ultimate and original function of the spirit, whose empirical genesis is in no way due, 
in the first place, to other processes, such as reproduction, imitation or hallucination, 
in the life of the individual”. Thus, fellow-feeling is an intrinsic human disposition. 
Neither is it learned nor is there any one of us who lives without it. Since it is an 
empathic understanding, fellow-feeling founds social humanity as a human 
existential. In this manner, fellow-feeling founds human sociality by guiding our 
attention to someone or something in the surrounding world. Since fellow-feeling is 
not the only human phenomenon of feeling with someone or something, it is often 
confused with commiseration [Mitleid]. Scheler highlights the distinction between 
fellow-feeling and commiseration as “[t]he phenomenon of compassion, which is a 
heightened commiseration bestowed from above, and from a standpoint of superior 
power and dignity, commiseration displays its characteristic consideration for the 
condition of its object, in a special degree” (Scheler 1979: 39f).17 From this definition 
derives, that commiseration as well as compassion operates in a moral dimension. 
Obviously fellow-feeling, as Scheler has elaborated, has nothing in common with 
commiseration. Actually, Scheler (1979: 41) calls commiseration a “spurious type of 
fellow-feeling”18. Perceived as an act of sorrow, to feel mercy or “[t]o commiserate is 
[…] to be sorry at another person’s sorrow, as being his” (Scheler 1979: 37)19. In 
contrast to fellow-feeling, commiseration lacks the aspect of reproduction of feeling. 
In the quotation above, in highlighting the “as being his”, Scheler wants to underline 
the mental and emotional distance of commiseration. If we feel commiseration, we 
                                            
17 German original: “Besonders im Phänomen des ‘Erbarmens‘ − das gleichzeitig ein gesteigertes 
Mitleiden von der Höhe herab, von der Höhe einer gesteigerten Macht und Würde her ist − nimmt das 
Mitleid diesen seinsbezüglichen Charakter an“ (Scheler 1973c: 51). In the English version, the term 
‘Erbarmen’ is translated as ‘commiseration’ instead of ‘mercy’. Commiseration would highlight the 
affective conversion into someone, instead of Scheler’s focus on the suffering with someone, which is 
highlighted with the term ‘mercy’. 
18 Scheler (1973c: 52) here writes about “Scheinmitgefühl”. This German connotation means a 
phenomenological perception of something A seems like B. In contrast, ‘spurious’ means ‘wrong’, ‘false’, 
or ’not real’.In this English interpretation, an evaluation resonates, which the German notion does not 
include, since if we feel ‘Scheinmitgefühl’, it is true for us. In the German notion false belief is included, 
not a perceived value, since Scheler talks here about the phenomenological dimension, when the 
connotation of fellow-feeling is erroneously to commiseration, mercy, or compassion. 
19 German original: “Mitleiden, sahen wir, ist Leiden am Leiden des anderen als dieses anderen“ (Scheler 
1973c: 48). The English translation is misleading, since it highlights ‘to feel sorry’. Scheler means here 
the notion of ‘to imagine the same pain’ and ‘to feel the imagined same sorrow of the other’. 
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feel another’s sorrow “as being his”: it is the other’s sorrow as another’s sorrow. The 
only thing we feel for this other is simply care for another. Thus, “[a] sympathetic 
person feels along with another person but not necessarily into a person” 
(Buchheimer 1963: 63). Fellow-feeling is not conceived in this way. It includes sharing 
of feelings, which results from an internalized foreign perception. The feelings of 
another have been understood. That makes obvious that fellow-feeling is not a mere 
reproduction of another’s feelings. Indeed, it is possible to have, for instance, the idea 
of someone’s toothache, but it is impossible to have the same toothache (Schloßberger 
2003: 48). 
Nevertheless, in everyday life, we call sometimes our sympathetic expressions 
‘fellow-feeling’, but, indeed, they are emotional attitudes, which seem quite similar to 
fellow-feeling. Scheler (1979: 46) intends to separate these emotional attitudes from 
“genuine fellow-feeling” by distinguishing “from true fellow-feeling all such attitudes 
as merely contribute to our apprehending, understanding, and, in general, reproducing 
(emotionally) the experiences of others, including their states of feeling” (Scheler 
1979: 8). Apprehending and understanding are, “in principle, some sort of knowledge 
of the fact, nature and quality of experience in other people, just as the possibility of 
such knowledge presupposes, as its condition, the existence of other conscious 
beings” (Scheler 1979: 8). Thus, we are able to realize and understand experiences of 
others “without any sort of fellow-feeling being entailed thereby” (Scheler 1979: 9)20. 
Even because of lifetime experience and knowledge, the events of others can be 
reproduced. However, the mere reproduction of another’s feelings does not include 
fellow-feeling. By this means, we realize another’s feelings, since “it is not the same as 
going through experience itself” (Scheler 1979: 9). In the case of reproduction of 
feelings no participation must be given, we “can remain quite indifferent to whatever 
has evoked it” (Scheler 1979: 9). Although these sympathetic varieties of curiosity are 
not similar to fellow-feeling, they build the fundament for fellow-feeling. Since fellow-
feeling is a human disposition, it cannot be a mere conjunction or combination of the 
components of cognitive understanding and of emotional feeling. Without doubt, 
these components are fundamental parts of fellow-feeling, but fellow-feeling is more 
                                            
20 Scheler means here, and this makes the German original text clear − “ohne daß darum irgendeine Art 
des Mitgefühls gesetzt ist“ (Scheler 1973c: 20) – that fellow-feeling is set as foundation of particular 
(affective) emotional expressions. 
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than just a mere conjunction or combination of all of them. In Scheler’s view, it 
becomes clear that fellow-feeling has an extraordinary position in contrast to ‘mere’ 
empathy [Einfühlung], “which attempted to explain both [understanding and 
reproduction] at the same time” (Scheler 1979: 8). Thus, in Scheler’s view, empathy 
is a mere conjunction or combination of apprehending or understanding and the 
intrinsic reproduction of another’s feelings. What Scheler did not intend here was that 
his approach to fellow-feeling includes a deep-going and enriching approach to 
modern theories of empathy.21 This position of fellow-feeling in our acting leads to a 
graduation of so-called phenomena of fellow-feeling (Scheler 1979: 12). In 
consequence, Scheler distinguishes four phenomena which are closely related to 
fellow-feeling: community of feeling [“unmittelbares Mitfühlen”], fellow-feeling ‘about 
something’ [“Mitgefühl ‘an etwas’”], emotional infection [“bloße Gefühlsansteckung”], 
and true emotional identification [“echte Einsfühlung”] (Scheler 1973c: 23, 1979: 12). 
Scheler’s notion of community of feeling is performed, if we share “the ‘same’ 
sorrow, the ‘same’ anguish” (Scheler 1979: 12). There is not a symbiosis between us. 
Since we are two separate humans, we have at least two separate feelings. Even in this 
special case of a community of feeling, we can only emotionally overlap in one 
particular feeling in a particular situation we share; we have “a feeling-in-common” 
[“Mit-einanderfühlen”] (Scheler 1973c: 23, 1979: 13)22. This case is given, for instance, 
if parents mourn for the loss of their child (Scheler 1979: 12f). The overlap of the 
parents’ feelings as community of feeling covers a specific emotional respect, because 
they will always have each a different consciousness and thus two separate 
perceptions; therefore, they will stay separately even if they share the same feeling 
over a certain period. 
Fellow-feeling ‘about something‘ is very similar to commiseration. As explained 
above, fellow-feeling is not commiseration, but both feelings have some aspects in 
common. “All fellow-feeling involves intentional reference of the feeling of joy or 
sorrow to the other person’s experience” (Scheler 1979: 13). Even if it is not 
commiseration, fellow-feeling can contain commiseration. To underline this, Scheler 
(1979: 13) points out that commiseration and the sorrow commiseration is directed 
                                            
21 This tier of empathy I will explain later in part II of this work. 
22 Scheler’s original term means more than a mere common feeling. It means ‘sharing a feeling with 
each other’. 
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to are phenomenologically “two different facts”. On the one hand, there is Jane who 
suffers, feels sorrow, or pain; on the other hand, there is Peter who commiserates 
Jane. Scheler (1979: 14) calls this particular reaction “actual ‘participation’”23. Since 
fellow-feeling ‘about something’ can be joy and sorrow, this fact leads to an individual 
perception of fellow-feeling. Understood in a phenomenological way and in contrast 
to community of feeling, fellow-feeling ‘about something’ is a feeling that cannot be 
shared. Community of feeling demands to react in a proper way. This is not necessary 
for fellow-feeling ‘about something’. Let me show this by Scheler’s (1979: 14) own 
example: 
 
[t]he cruel man owes his awareness of the pain or sorrow he causes 
entirely to a capacity for visualizing feeling! His joy lies in ‘torturing’ and 
in the agony of his victim. As he feels, vicariously, the increasing pain or 
suffering of his victim, so his own primary pleasure and enjoyment at the 
other’s pain also increases.24 
 
It is obvious that the feelings of the cruel man are misled. The cruel man does not feel 
the sorrow of his victim; rather he enjoys his victim’s sorrow. Here it is not about 
moral valuation, according to Scheler (1979: 14) the cruel man has a kind of “defect”, 
because he does not feel what his victim feels. Such a defect has psychological reasons 
which include the lack of willingness or ability to let the other’s feelings come close to 
oneself (Kruse-Ebeling 2009: 178).  
Emotional infection is a case of “no true appearance of fellow-feeling” (Scheler 
1979: 14), because it includes “neither a directing of feeling towards the other’s joy or 
suffering, nor any participation in her experience” (Scheler 1979: 15)25. Emotional 
                                            
23 German original: ”faktische ‘Teilnahme‘” (Scheler 1973c: 24). Literally translated, Scheler means a 
‘factual participation’, which rather highlights the phenomenological attendance as participation 
within the life-world, at a particular moment. 
24 The Schelerian meaning here is: “Dem Grausamen ist der Schmerz oder das Leid, das er bereitet, 
durchaus in einer Funktion des Nachfühlens gegeben! Er hat gerade die Freude am ‘Quälen‘ und der 
Qual seines Opfers. Indem er im Akte des Nachfühlens den Schmerz oder das Leid des Opfers steigen 
fühlt, wächst seine originäre Lust und das Genießen des fremden Schmerzes” (Scheler 1973c: 25). 
Special about that is the passage ‘Indem er im Akte des Nachfühlens den Schmerz oder das Leid des 
Opfers steigen fühlt‘ which is translated with ‘As he feels, vicariously, the increasing pain or suffering 
of his victim’. This signifies an actually existent reproduction of feeling, but in a wrong way. 
25 In the German orginal Scheler uses here the word ‘intention’ instead of ‘directing’: “Weder besteht 
hier eine Gefühls-lntention auf die Freude und das Leid des anderen, noch irgendein Teilnehmen an 
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infection is involuntary, infectious and unconscious (Scheler 1979: 15): it lets 
another’s feelings look like our own feelings. For a short time a person can feel 
another’s feelings, but not as the other’s feelings, rather as her or his own feelings 
(Scheler 1979: 17). To perceive and to understand another as suffering is to feel the 
suffering by ourselves. As described above, emotional infection cannot be the same 
feeling; rather it is an imagination of another’s pain. For Scheler emotional infection 
as phenomenon of fellow-feeling is important, since he uses it to underline the 
distinction between fellow-feeling and the common understanding of commiseration. 
Thus, emotional infection is related to fellow-feeling, but not to its ‘false-friend’ 
commiseration. 
The last of Scheler’s phenomena of fellow-feeling is true emotional identification. 
Unlike emotional infection, true emotional identification enables the emotional unity 
of two humans for a longer period. “[I]t is not only the separate process of feeling in 
another that is unconsciously taken as one’s own, but his self (in all its basic attitudes) 
that is identified with one’s own self” (Scheler 1979: 18). Herein, Scheler (1979: 19ff) 
distinguishes sharply several different cases. He puts forward, for instance, that 
emotional unity is given, if we identify ourselves with the surroundings. That is given 
within the relationship between patient and hypnotist, erotic interactions, etc. 
Though Scheler (1979: 26) lists the same case as Hegel (1979), and refers at this point 
to von Hartmann and Bergson, only one of Scheler’s special cases of true emotional 
identification is interesting for this work’s further investigation of recognition: the 
relationship between mother and child. Scheler assumes that “the formula that ‘love’ 
of another consist in assimilating the other’s self into one’s own by means of 
identification” (Scheler 1979: 26) appears exactly in the relationship between mother 
and child. This case is “unique”, because the child “was once a spatial, corporeal ‘part’ 
of the one who loves” (Scheler 1979: 26). Even if they are two self-standing humans, 
they have a unique relationship with each other. The mother has a certain feeling for 
her child’s needs, for instance, “a mother can make intuitive prognoses for the turn of 
a child’s illness, which often astonish the doctor” (Scheler 1979: 28). From this 
example an ‘unconscious understanding’ for the child’s needs can be derived. “The 
                                            
seinem Erleben“ (Scheler 1973c: 26). By using the word ‘intention’ the acting potential is highlighted, 
whereas ‘directing’ brings to the fore rather the movement towards someone, which does not 
necessarily include an acting potential in Scheler’s sense. 
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intuitive psycho-somatic unity of mother and child is not so entirely severed by their 
physical separation that its place can be wholly taken by the interpretation of organic 
symptoms through a system of physical signs” (Scheler 1979: 28). Even though this 
relationship of mother and child lasts for the time of physical separation, it is the 
mother’s love which enforces the relationship between mother and child (Scheler 
1979: 27). The mother’s love encourages the child “as an independent being” (Scheler 
1979: 27). Here, Scheler contradicts former assumptions that motherly solicitude 
limits a child’s development of independence, because, with her love, a mother 
mediates security, care, and understanding for the child as independent and self-
standing individual. Against Hegel, Scheler points out that  
 
love ‘in its deepest sense’ does not consist in taking the other person and 
treating him as if he were identical with oneself. It is not a mere 
quantitative ‘extension of self-love’, nor is it a relationship of parts within 
a whole, whose collective exertions are devoted merely to its own 
(egoistic) self-maintenance, self-aggrandisement or growth. This is 
nothing less than a palpable misrepresentation of the phenomenon (Scheler 
1979: 70). 
 
Therefore, love cannot be a mode of emotional identification. It is even more. “If I take 
hold of someone and treat him ‘as if’ he were essentially identical with myself, this 
means that I am mistaken, firstly about his status in reality, and secondly about his 
nature” (Scheler 1979: 70). Perceived in this way, the struggle for recognition within 
the mode of love becomes impossible, since self-abandonment is excluded. We can 
only love each other, if we recognize our individuality, and, in mutual love, confirm 
each other in our individuality. 
From these phenomenal classifications of fellow-feeling two compounds of 
fellow-feeling can be derived: the emotional and the cognitive. Fellow-feeling is 
performed, if cognitive understanding of the other’s situation is given, but the mere 
understanding is not sufficient to perform fellow-feeling: emotional reproduction as 
emotional identification between us has to be given. Hence, only through 
understanding on a cognitive as well as emotional level, a holistic understanding of 
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the other is possible. And these abilities enable the recognition of “any organism as 
alive” (Scheler 1979: 31). 
Finally, as a human disposition and way to perceive, understand and interact 
with others, fellow-feeling, interpreted as metaphysical cognitive function, appears to 
serve Scheler to overcome the illusion of solipsism. 
 
The dissipation of this illusion follows, necessarily and uniquely, from the 
effect of fellow-feeling in enabling us to grasp how a man, or living 
creature, as such, is our equal in worth; though naturally this does not at 
all exclude the secondarily given differences of worth between men (or 
living creatures) in respect of their character. This equality of worth once 
established, the other person also becomes equally real to us, thereby 
losing his merely shadowy and dependent status. But fellow-feeling can 
only effect this if its intention is directed upon the essence of the other 
person’s ego (including its value-essence and the elements which make it 
up); of which it is no less capable than intuition, in the discernment of 
essences, or thought, in the contemplation of ideas (Scheler 1979: 60). 
 
Fellow-feeling creates a bond between us, whereas we exist for ourselves. It leads the 
direction of perception and enables us to recognize others. Therefore, fellow-feeling 
is our spontaneous, naturally given act to be connected and linked with the life-world.  
Scheler even goes a step further and develops a feeling-based model of intrinsic 
and evaluative perception. Philosophical insight is not only a particular way of 
cognition; it also refers to eros, understood as Platon’s notion for love to knowledge 
and wisdom. Love as well as hatred provide an excellent account of the life-world’s 
wealth of valuable things. “They represent a unique attitude towards objects of value, 
and it is certainly not just a cognitive function” (Scheler 1979: 148). Within 
philosophical insight, love and cognition are internally connected to each other 
(Albert and Jain 2000: 43). According to Scheler (1979: 152) love as well as hatred 
“can only be exhibited; they cannot be defined”. Thus, they stand for our particular 
ability to perceive the world by our feelings. However, it is love, which precedes 
hatred, since hatred “is the result of some incorrect or confused love” (Scheler 1973d: 
125). Perceived in this way, love is the fundamental condition of every individual 
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perception. “For love is that movement of intention whereby, from a given value A in 
an object, its higher value is visualized” (Scheler 1979: 153). “Hate is always and 
everywhere a rebellion of our heart and spirit” (Scheler 1973d: 127). Love fulfills the 
function of perception of the true values of life-worldly – animated and unanimated – 
things. “’Love is directed upon things as they are’” in their suchness (Scheler 1979: 
159). Therefore, for us, things do not appear as ‘better’, but they appear in a ‘higher 
value’. Such a value is not an additional one, rather it was always there, but it first 
appears within the act of love. 
 
[L]ove is that movement wherein every concrete individual object [thing] 
that possesses value achieves the highest value compatible with its nature 
and ideal vocation; or wherein it attains the ideal state of value intrinsic to 
its nature. (Hatred, on the other hand, is a movement in the opposite 
direction.) (Scheler 1979: 161).26 
 
The value of a thing is perceived ‘by heart’ and by cognitive – epistemological – 
achievement. Scheler calls this perceptual attitude “taking an interest“ (Scheler 
1973d: 127). This attitude is always directed to things and their value, but love never 
is this value (Scheler 1979: 148). Deriving from this premise, Scheler can “speak of 
the primacy of love over cognition” (Scheler 1973d: 127). That makes love a 
‘headlight’ or “a pioneer and a guide” (Scheler 1973a: 261), which leads our 
epistemological perception. 
 
 
4.3 Care and Ethos 
Related to the phenomenon of fellow-feeling is Heidegger’s concept of care as 
conceptualized in Being and Time (1962). Fellow-feeling and care are mutually 
dependent: care needs fellow-feeling to understand and feel another’s needs. In turn, 
                                            
26 German original: “Liebe ist die Bewegung, in der jeder konkret individuelle Gegenstand, der Werte trägt, 
zu den für ihn und nach seiner idealen Bestimmung möglichen höchsten Werten gelangt; oder in der er 
sein ideales Wertwesen, das ihm eigentümlich ist, erreicht (Haß aber die entgegengesetzte Bewegung) 
(Scheler 1973c: 164). The last part of the quotation “das ihm eigentümlich ist, erreicht” means that a 
value is not only intrinsic, but idiosyncratic. 
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fellow-feeling needs care to feel interest for the life-world of others. In the social and 
cultural sciences the concept of care has not been well investigated yet. Thus, I 
introduce the philosophical concept of ‘care’ [Sorge] and ‘solicitude’ [Fürsorge] 
developed by Heidegger (1962). His approach is fundamental ontological – strongly 
based on phenomenology − and – in a certain sense – hermeneutical, thus the 
Heideggerian conception of ‘care’ is unique on a high theoretical level. Whereas 
Heidegger’s philosophy is difficult to read on a level of every day life, since it has a 
high level of abstraction, behind the scenes – as I argue – his philosophy has a high 
practical claim and implication. Heidegger’s concern is to develop a fundamental 
ontology of our existence in a philosophical way, without being a philosophical 
existentialist. His philosophy is founded in Husserl’s phenomenology, but claims to 
start methodologically earlier than the Husserlian phenomenological approach. 
Heidegger aims to explain our existence and our world without presetting a pregiven 
life-world. 
Even more, in his philosophy Heidegger describes the process of our life-world’s 
development as thrownness-in-the-world: according to him, the Being is thrown “into 
its ‘there’” (Heidegger 1962: 174). Thus, our ‘being’ and our existence as ‘there’ 
become one. “The expression ‘thrownness’ is meant to suggest the facticity of its being 
delivered over” (Heidegger 1962: 174).27 Derived from the German original, ‘delivered 
over’ means to take responsibility for our Being and our being-‘there’ in the 
surrounding world. ‘There’, here, means the place, where the Being-there [Dasein] 
finds its complete expression as project. Thus, Dasein and world are inseparably 
interwoven with each other. “The ‘that-it-is’ which is disclosed in Dasein’s state-of-
mind must rather be conceived as an existential attribute of the entity which has 
Being-in-the-world as its way of Being” (Heidegger 1962: 174). Dasein is situated in a 
temporal structure whose foundation is Dasein’s ‘presence’ [Anwesenheit]28. “Entities 
are grasped in their Dasein as ‘presence’; this means that they are understood with 
                                            
27 German original: “Der Ausdruck Geworfenheit soll die Faktizität der Überantwortung andeuten“ 
(Heidegger 1967: 135). With the word ‘Überantwortung‘‚ Heidegger underlines the aspect of 
responsibility (cf. response) for the Being’s own existence in the world as Dasein. 
28 Heidegger’s term ‘Anwesenheit’ means more then the mere ‘presence’ of Being. The German term 
‘Anwesenheit’ has to be understood as a presence closely related to the Being’s nature. Thus, Being is 
not only present in the world with its physical presence; rather it is present with its nature, its 
character as a living, thinking and perceiving entity (Heidegger 1962: 47, cf. 1967: 25).  
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regard to a definite mode of time – the ‘Present’29” (Heidegger 1962: 47). Dasein is, 
eventually, in its there with all its being as presence. This presence influences the 
entire surroundings and the world. Thus, Heidegger develops an ontology of Dasein 
with high ontic respect. His concept of care is explained as a human existential, this 
means, care belongs fundamentally to our Dasein as factual existence. 
Care is deeply interwoven with the Dasein’s temporality and Dasein’s being-in-
the-world. If Dasein is regarded as our being who is, to speak ontologically, ‘thrown in 
the world’ as projection. 
Dasein moves in the ontic world in its everyday life. Through its thrownness in 
the world, Dasein cares about its own being, since the world mirrors Dasein’s 
temporality and transience. The intrinsic structure of care becomes visible in the 
nature of Dasein’s existence. Through its thrownness and projection, it is a present 
entity with direction to the future. It seems that it is “constantly ‘more’ than it factually 
is“(Heidegger 1962: 185). However, “Dasein is never more than it factically is, for to 
its facticity its potentiality-for-Being belongs essentially. Yet as Being-possible, 
moreover, Dasein is never anything less” (Heidegger 1962: 185). In fulfilling its 
presence in being, it becomes what it is (Heidegger 1962: 186). Care, therefore, means 
Dasein’s presence and being. By implication, Dasein cares about its surroundings, and 
through world-related time, Dasein can observe its transience. It stands in a clearing 
[Lichtung], which means a place of consciousness and awareness by illumination. “To 
say that it is ‘illuminated’ [‘erleuchtet’] means that as Being-in-the-world it is cleared 
[gelichtet] in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the 
‘clearing’” (Heidegger 1962: 171). Here, it is obvious that Dasein has an immediate 
perception of the world. Dasein ‘lights up’ its surroundings to understand it. “Things 
show up in the light of our understanding of being” (Dreyfus 1993: 163). Clearing, 
thus, means a bright focus of understanding the world. “Only for an entity which is 
existentially cleared in this way does that which is present-at-hand become accessible 
in the light or hidden in the dark” (Heidegger 1962: 171). Obviously, Dasein, world 
and Dasein’s temporality are deeply interconnected. Understanding and thinking are 
for Heidegger fundamental human dispositions. 
                                            
29 The German connotation of ‘present’ [Gegenwart], is derived from the Middle High German, there it 
had only the meaning of ‘Anwesenheit’ without a temporal relation, like the Englisch ‘being there’ 
(Hennig 1974: 136). 
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Dreyfus (1993: 238) offers an interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of care by 
relating Dasein’s thrownness in the world to caring as the fundamental feeling of 
‘there’ [da]. At this point, ‘there’ marks a particular consciousness of Dasein. This 
consciousness is clearly associated with Husserl’s intentional consciousness, but 
Heidegger does not aim to set Dasein’s consciousness in a phenomenological context, 
rather in an ontological context. Thus, Dasein’s consciousness is personal and context 
related, as far as Dasein’s own thrownness in the world and the world are connected. 
Dasein, however, is not considered as a classical subject, or even an object. “Dasein is 
‘between’ subject and object […]. Rather Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is always 
already outside itself, formed by shared practices, and absorbed in active coping” 
(Dreyfus 1993: 163). Thus, Dasein utilizes the “entities which are encountered in a 
world with involvement (readiness-to-hand)” (Heidegger 1962: 120). Dasein “has 
always submitted itself already to a ‘world’ which it encounters, and this submission 
belongs essentially to its Being” (Heidegger 1962: 121). Submission [Angewiesenheit] 
here means the link between Dasein and world, which has a referential character. 
Being-in-the-world, thus, has its intrinsic constitution as Being-in (Heidegger 1962: 
79). It is a way of active participation, like 
 
having to do with something, producing something, attending to 
something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something 
up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, 
considering, discussing, determining … All these ways of Being-in have 
concern as their kind of Being (Heidegger 1962: 83). 
 
Being-in is a mode of Being, it is the condition to ‘get in touch’ with other entities in 
the world. “When two entities are present-at-hand within the world, and furthermore 
are worldless in themselves, they can never ‘touch’ each other, nor can either of them 
‘be’ ‘alongside’ the other” (Heidegger 1962: 81f). ‘Present-at-hand’ here means actual 
presence in the world by a given perception. Being-in thus is a necessary condition to 
perceive and understand the world and its entities. It is the link between Dasein as a 
single entity and the others considered also as Dasein, or as Heidegger likes to call ‘the 
others’: Being-with. By moving in the world, Dasein is not only a being, but also a 
Being-with by meeting others in the ‘with-world’ [Mitwelt]. Regarding Dasein as a 
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single entity between others, the concept of Dasein is enlarged by putting a Being-
with in the Dasein’s world. “By reason of this with-like [mithaften] Being-in-the-world, 
the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-
world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is Being-with Others. Their Being-in-themselves with-in-
world is Dasein-with [Mit-dasein]” (Heidegger 1962: 155). Being-with thus is the 
mode of being which enables recognizing the others in the world. In fact, the 
ontological structure of Dasein and Being-with is the same, since each Being-with is a 
Dasein, and vice versa (Heidegger 1962: 156). In consequence, Dasein in its within-
the-world [Innerweltlichkeit] is always ‘essentially’ Dasein-with (Heidegger 1962: 
156). Despite arguing that “[t]he expression ‘Dasein’ […] shows plainly that ‘in the first 
instance’ this entity is unrelated to Others” (Heidegger 1962: 156), it is as Being-in 
necessarily related to others. Thus, “’Dasein is essentially Being-with’” (Heidegger 
1962: 156). Considering the essential Being-with others within Dasein, Being-in as 
‘concern’ about entities which are present-at-hand in the world include one’s own 
Dasein (Heidegger 1962: 83). 
Interpreted on a phenomenological level, Being-with ensures the recognition of 
others and ourselves by directing our awareness to our Being as well as to the other 
Being. Fundamental ontological speaking, this is a fundamental structure of 
Heidegger’s Dasein, since Dasein cannot be the only existence in the world. Thus, 
Heidegger has to elaborate a connection between all Beings. By integrating a double 
structure into the concept of Dasein, the Dasein appears, as mentioned above, 
between subject and object. It is only directed to perceive its own Being-with and the 
one of others. 
The structure of care ensures Dasein’s ability to act, but as essentially Being-
with Dasein is woven into an immanent structure with others (Rousse 2013: 19). Care 
and solicitude are in a special way related to Heidegger’s notion of ‘freedom’. To 
explain this, it has to be considered that ‘freedom’ in Heidegger’s Being and Time 
(1962) has a dual structure. Freedom lies in the possibility of the mode of being: 
“Dasein is the possibility of Being-free for its ownmost pontentiality-for-Being” 
(Heidegger 1962: 183). Dasein is free to choose between the given possibilities which 
arise from Being-in-the-world. By implication, and this point is derived from the 
precedent one, freedom means ‘Being-towards-death’ [Sein zum Tode] (Heidegger 
1962: 311). Being conscious about one’s own death, brings Dasein in the situation to 
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feel the freedom to act, since it is alive. It enables Dasein “being itself, primarily 
unsupported by concernful solicitude” (Heidegger 1962: 311). Dasein is free in its 
Being by means of being independent of others. Nevertheless, it is concerned about 
other entities within the world as well as about its Being, thus, through the 
“potentiality-for-Being” it is directed to the future (Heidegger 1962: 159). By this 
means, Dasein is concerned at using entities, and it is concerned by being free to 
develop its own Being. 
 
The world not only frees the ready-to-hand as entities encountered within-
the-world; it also frees Dasein, and the Others in their Dasein-with. But 
Dasein’s ownmost meaning of Being is such that this entity (which has 
been freed environmentally) is Being-in in the same world in which, as 
encounterable for Others, it is there with them (Heidegger 1962: 160). 
 
In consequence, freedom enables possibilities, but also concern on a social level, since 
Being-with is being with others and oneself as own Being-with. “Thus as Being-with, 
Dasein ‘is’ essentially for the sake of Others” (Heidegger 1962: 160). ‘Care’ as German 
‘Sorge’ has a great holistic connotation as “’cares of the world’” (Dreyfus 1993: 239). 
Heidegger does not propose an abstract concept of care, but rather wants to show 
with his ontological concept of care that every being is supposed to care about the 
world and others. “Because Being-in-the-world is essentially care, […] Being with the 
Dasein-with of Others as we encounter it within-the-world could be taken as solicitude 
[Fürsorge]” (Heidegger 1962: 237). Even without care Dasein would be Being-with, 
but without an immediate realization of other Beings, since Being-with only ensures 
the mediated awareness of others in the world. Thus, care effects that Dasein is not 
indifferent to other Beings (Marx 1986: 22), rather it “lies ‘before’ [‘vor’] every factual 
‘attitude’ and ‘situation’ of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; that means that 
it always lies in them” (Heidegger 1962: 238). Solicitude, thus, is a direct reaction to 
others as Being-with. 
Heidegger uses both terms, care and concern, to describe the readiness-to-hand 
of objects and other entities. One has to consider the ontological difference between 
objects and other – real living – entities. By anchoring concern as a fundamental 
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structure in Dasein, there are objects of concern [besorgen] and solicitude 
[Fürsorge]30 for others as Dasein as well as the own being as Dasein. Thus,  
 
[t]his kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to 
the existence of the Other, not to a ‘what’ with which he is concerned; it 
helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become 
free for it (Heidegger 1962: 159). 
 
Thinking one-step ahead, solicitude completes Dasein’s (self-)care and Dasein’s care 
of others: It is “the shepherd of being. It is in this direction alone that Being and Time 
is thinking when ecstatic existence is experienced as ‘care’”(Heidegger 1998: 252, cf. 
1962: §44c).  
For Heidegger, to put something in language is to fulfill the act of understanding: 
Something is perceived, thought, and understood, since “in thinking being comes to 
language” (Heidegger 1998: 239).  
 
Thinking builds upon the house of being, the house in which the jointure 
[sic!] of being, in its destinal unfolding, enjoins the essence of the human 
being in each case to dwell in the truth of being. This dwelling is the 
essence of ‘being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger 1998: 272). 
 
Consequently, for Heidegger (1998: 239), “[l]anguage is the house of being”. Dwelling 
is a comfort zone of perception and existence. It makes the clearing appear as a 
horizon of familiarity. In the context of dwelling, Heidegger sets understanding into 
relation with language, since language is the ontological and phenomenal expression 
of Dasein’s understanding. Language and thought correspond with Heidegger’s notion 
of ‘care’. 
 
Thus thinking is a deed. But a deed that also surpasses all praxis. Thinking 
permeates action and production, not through the grandeur of 
achievement and not as a consequence of its effect, but through the 
                                            
30 In English the similarity between ‘besorgen’ and ‘Sorge’ does not exist, here one has to compare the 
references ‘to bring’ or ‘to provide’. 
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humbleness of its inconsequential accomplishment (Heidegger 1998: 
274). 
 
Thus, dwelling is “in which the essence of the human being perserves the source31 that 
determines him” [Herkunft seiner Bestimmung] (Heidegger 1998: 247). This refers to 
the origin of Dasein in its Being, but also to the direction of Being through care. This 
way shows once more, Dasein is directed to the future with the intention to fulfill the 
possibilities of Being in concern of its own Being and the Being of others. That moves 
concern, care, and solicitude to the center, and, at the same time, to the origin of 
understanding of the world (Heidegger 1962: 273) and of the others as Being-with. 
 
Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-
Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its 
Being is capable of […]. As a disclosure, understanding always pertains to 
the whole basic state of Being-in-the-world (Heidegger 1962: 184). 
 
Interpreted on a hermeneutical level, care and solicitude mirror the consciousness 
and awareness of Dasein as being-in-the-world and being-with with others. They have 
a “primordial structural totality”, and thus, they lie “’before’ [‘vor’] every factical 
‘attitude’ and ‘situation’ of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori” (Heidegger 
1962: 238). In order to draw a preliminary conclusion: care and Being-with are the 
basic formal structure of Dasein to perceive the world in which it is moving in. 
Regarded from this perspective, and also from solicitude as self-care, selfhood is 
inherent in the structure of care and thus in the structure of Dasein (Käufer 2013: 
343). 
Through its intrinsic and fundamental function within Dasein, understanding 
itself has an ‘existential structure’. Dasein understands through attunement 
[Gestimmtheit], which is a “’state-of-mind’ [Befindlichkeit] […] ontologically [it is] the 
most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned” (Heidegger 
1962: 172). In consideration of the state-of-mind of Dasein as the reference of Being-
                                            
31 The German word ‘Herkunft’ read as ‘origin’ or ‘source’ has stronger reference to ‘Zukunft’ (future) 
than the English words ,origin’ or ,source’ and ,future’ would suggest. In the context of Heidegger’s 
philosophy this means, Dasein comes from an abode and moves further through the forward directed 
care and through understanding to a ‘future being’.  
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in-the-world, the character of understanding thus shifts to a prepredicative and 
prereflexive mode (cf Marx 1986: 17). 
 
In the state-of-mind Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always 
found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but 
in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has. As an entity which has 
been delivered over to its Being, it remains also delivered over to the fact 
it must always have found itself – but found itself in a way of finding which 
arises not so much from a direct seeking as rather from a fleeting 
(Heidegger 1962: 174). 
 
By means of a steady Being-in-the-world, Dasein has no choice as to perceive through 
an ‘attuned’ consciousness, which leads – or lets Dasein ‘flow’ – through the 
consciously perceived world by mood. The state-of-mind as mood discloses the 
perception of Dasein’s world, it “closes it off”, however, by focusing on particular 
aspects inked by mood (Heidegger 1962: 175). That makes attunement dependent on 
the state-of-mind, which finally leads to subjective, but also intuitive perceptions of 
the world. 
Understanding as an intuitively felt perception underlines Dasein’s moving 
forward towards possibilities (Heidegger 1962: 184f). To lead this movement, a stock 
of experience, as explained above following Schütz and Luckmann (1974), is needed. 
This is the ‘conscience’32. It “gives us ‘something’ to understand; it discloses” 
(Heidegger 1962: 314). It is the voice from the inside which tells something already 
known, since “[i]n conscience Dasein calls itself” (Heidegger 1962: 320). Conceived 
from this point of view, conscience is the call of care (Heidegger 1962: 319ff). Or, to 
put it down more to the point, conscience “manifests itself as an attestation33 which 
belongs to Dasein’s Being” (Heidegger 1962: 334).  
                                            
32 In Heidegger’s terminology, ‘conscience’ is the German ‘Gewissen’. He changes the meaning of 
conscience as moral instance to a kind of knowledge (Wissen), which is already prior known and 
therefore ‘in mind’. 
33 ‘Attestation’ is the English translation for ‘Bezeugung’. As with ‘Gewissen’ and ‘conscience’, this 
meaning does not cover the whole meaning of Heidegger’s usage. ‘Bezeugung’ also means 
‘testimonage’, which means here, ‘being testimonial for the already known’, and ‘being responsible for 
remembrance of the known.’ 
Aspects and Problems of Empathy 
 134 
Heidegger distinguishes here between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’. For him, it is 
obvious that praxis is related to movements and actions, whereas theory is related, 
for instance, to “’political action’” (Heidegger 1962: 238). Nevertheless, “’[t]heory’ and 
‘practice’ are possibilities of Being for an entity whose Being must be defined as ‘care’” 
(Heidegger 1962: 238). In conclusion, it has to be said that care, concern and 
solicitude motivate Dasein’s moving and acting on a theoretical and practical level in 
the focus of its Being-towards-death. 
The argument of Being and Time (1962) ends at this point, since in this work 
Heidegger dissociates himself from an ethical aspect, or then an ethical character of 
Dasein. Since it is on such an abstract level, there is no space for practical moral values 
and norms in his philosophy. Nevertheless, a relation between Heidegger’s structure 
of Dasein and ethics may be discernible. It has to be asked what are the fundamental 
characteristics of being human? Considering Heidegger’s structure of Dasein, as 
decribed above, the chraracteristics of being human are mortality and sociality (Marx 
1986: 12, 16). These characteristics refer directly to the Dasein’s understanding, its 
conscience and its pursuit of care for itself and for others. 
The relation between understanding, conscience and care in Heidegger’s 
philosophy enables the question about ethos (ἔθος), which means ‘character’, 
‘custom’ or ‘habit’, but also covers the notion of “space, place, or location […] [which] 
helps to reestablish ethos as a social act and as a product of a community’s character” 
(Reynolds 1993: 327). Considering these notions of ethos as human characteristics 
and the philosophy of Dasein as fundamental ontology, we are directly refered to the 
fundamental being of the human. For that reason, Heidegger rethinks his position 
towards Dasein and ethos in his Letter on ‘Humanism’ (1946). The fundamental 
question about ethos is to ask what does the ‘humanum’ in the word ‘humanism’ mean 
for us as humans? And the complex – Heideggerian style − answer is: “‘humanum’ in 
the word points to humanitas, the essence of the human being; the ’-ism’ indicates that 
the essence of the human being is meant to be taken essentially” (Heidegger 1998: 
262). And the relation to ethics is explained as follows: 
 
[i]f the name ‘ethics,’ in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ἔθος, 
should now say that ethics ponders the abode of the human being, then 
that thinking which thinks the truth of being as the primordial element of 
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the human being, as one who eksists, is in itself originary ethics (Heidegger 
1998: 271). 
 
Such a point of view makes ethics in a traditional and modern sense superfluous. If in 
ethics something is furnished with a value, this ‘something’ is objectified (Heidegger 
1998: 265). “Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does 
not let beings: be” (Heidegger 1998: 265). This position does not mean to negate 
values or to say everything is worthless, but this position also sets a critical focus on 
the action of evaluation, which leads to a necessary objectivation of the evaluated 
thing. Heidegger refuses to begin his argument with the modern interpretation of 
ethics; rather he begins at the roots of this word: ethos. For Heidegger, ethos  
 
means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in which 
the human being dwells. The open region of his abode allows what 
pertains to the essence of the human being, and what in thus arriving 
resides in a nearness to him, to appear. The abode of the human being 
contains and preserves the advent of what belongs to the human being in 
his essence (Heidegger 1998: 269). 
 
Considering Dasein as standing in the clearing through its Being and thus gaining 
understanding, because of having cared for it, ethos describes the mode of standing 
in the clearing (as described above). Being-in as standing in the clearing of Being, 
interpreted in this way, is dwelling. Thus, care functions as a kind of ‘back door’ for 
ethics understood as ethos. Ethos regarded as situation or place in Heidegger’s 
understanding, means the clearing of being wherein the Dasein dwells. However, for 
Heidegger, dwelling means more as the mere existence or just standing in the clearing 
of Being. It means to live in the “house of being” (Heidegger 1998). That house is, as 
shown above (Heidegger 1998: 254; 272), language which manifests itself by 
thinking. Thus, for Heidegger (1998: 271), “thinking that inquires into the truth of 
being and so defines the human being's essential abode from being and toward being 
is neither ethics nor ontology”. Rather ethics and ontology is our original and 
fundamental being. By situating fundamental human characteristics within 
theoretical constructs, means to include the possibility that several humans exist who 
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do not have these characteristics. Every existing human is an existing being in the fact 
that is true. The same is for ethos, since we possess the ability to perceive, not limited 
to the eyes but with other senses as well, the surroundings, and over lifetime develop 
a particular idea of understanding the world. In Heidegger’s thinking, as it has been 
shown, any other assumption is impossible, since Heidegger aims to overcome the 
Kantian thinking and the related problems of metaphysics. Ethics are for him a part 
of metaphysics (Heidegger 1962: §1, 1998: 243). In Heidegger’s approach to the 
human’s Dasein, “there is no thought without the ethical, without a ‘decision’ about 
the stance toward the other, without, in other words, an ethical inflection” (Ziarek 
1995: 389). Dasein does not have first to perceive and recognize normative values, 
rather they are already disclosed (Rousse 2013) and thus already part of Dasein’s 
essence.  
Here ethos comes close to Aristotle’s “intuitive reason” (νοῦς) as he described it 
in The Nicomachean Ethics (2009: 8.6–7), which does not need further conscious 
reflection or nourishes itself from experience and other stocks of knowledge; it is a 
spontaneous, but still intellectually perceiving reaction to the surroundings. In The 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle regards it as the ability to perceive the fundamental 
facts of the world or the “first principles”(2009: 1.7). Thus, Aristotle aims to sketch 
the human ability to think and understand as fundamental human intellect. This 
human ability can be understood as “reasonable perception” or “reasonable insight” 
(Marx 1986: 22); but this kind of perception or insight is contrary to sensual 
perception. It sheds a light of reasonable insight on the perceived world. It is 
prereflexive and preconscious, even before attunement arises or considering or 
judging (Marx 1986: 22). 
In the context of care and reasonable insight, the movement of Dasein is 
furnished with a poetic character. From the perspective of the fundamental structure 
of care and ethos, acting becomes intentional. Since caring about the Being-with is a 
mode of reasonable insight and introduces an attitude of responsibility, ethics as a 
sometimes hard to explain construct of rules, maximes, and norms is not necessary at 
all (Marx 1986: 24). If care ensures intersubjectivity through concerned directedness, 
Being-with in the with-world, thus, is always the “ontological destiny” (Marx 1986: 
28). 
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Figure 5: trias of Dasein – Being-with – care.  
 
Figure 5 enclosing the trias Dasein – Being-with – Care shows that care ensures the 
intersubjectivity to be able to introduce the concerned directed solicitude towards 
Being-with; here should be considered once more – as the fountain arrow shows – 
that every Being-with is a Dasein, and vice versa. Thus, Being-with is within the trias 
of Dasein – Being-with – Care the component which ensures sociality. Here it becomes 
visible how they build up our ability to act. Care ensures the identification of Dasein 
as Being-with through social interaction. However, it has to be emphasized that due 
to this structure Dasein is not fundamentally social (Zahavi 2005: 164). It refers rather 
to a permanent and continuous Dasein with others (Glendinning 1999: 59), with an 
attached ability to care.  
 
 
4.4 Theories of Mind 
As we have seen above, understanding is a crucial factor to perform empathy. From 
the cognitive and the anthropological point of view as well as from the standpoint of 
the philosophy of mind, understanding as a mode of empathy is described in several 
‘theories of mind’ or/and ‘theories of mindreading’. Besides the critique of the theory 
of mind in practical psychological essays (e.g. Apperly 2012), I would like to introduce 
the term ‘theory of mind’ as a very generous notion to describe empathy as human 
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ability. ‘Theory of mind’ can be understood, in general, as ability to perceive others as 
being human just like ourselves. In academia, theory of mind is usually defined as our 
consciousness to attribute mental states to us and others, and thus to understand our 
and other’s beliefs, desires, and intentions (Apperly 2012: 826; Astuti 2012). This is 
one side of the theory of mind. Astuti (2012) points out another factor within the 
theory of mind:  
 
[w]e use Theory of Mind to attribute knowledge and ignorance, emotions 
and thoughts, intentions and desire to others, and to predict and explain 
their behaviour (this is the second reason it has been called a theory: because 
it is used to make predictions). 
 
By this means, theory of mind concerns “the human being and his/her possible 
relationships to others […], the inner life and its transparency for others” (Wassmann 
and Funke 2013: 237). Alternatively, to put it in a more vivid picture: 
 
[h]aving a Theory of Mind […] means having the capacity to go beyond the 
surface, beyond the behaviour and the actions to the intentions, the 
desires, the beliefs that motivate them. From this ‘deeper’ perspective, the 
world is not just made up of arms, legs and eyes that move in a coordinated 
fashion; the world is also made up of a host of mental states – your own 
and those of others – that direct and animate what those arms, legs and 
eyes do (Astuti 2012). 
 
Empathy, which can be described with concepts of the theory of mind, is crucial for 
individual interaction with others, because it ensures understanding and abstract 
imagination. 
Theory of mind has been, and still is, investigated since decades. Even in newer 
research the strongly criticized (e.g. Träuble et al. 2010; Sodian 2011; Slaughter and 
Repacholi 2012), most famous example in development psychology to prove or 
disprove theory of mind for children is the false-belief-test. This task was first 
developed by Wimmer and Perner (1983). 
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Figure 6: the false-belief-task. 
 
In this false-belief-task (figure 6), a young child observes how a puppet named Maxi 
hides a chocolate in a location1. Then Maxi ‘leaves’ the room, and the experimenter 
takes the chocolate and hides it in a location2. Now, the child is asked where Maxi 
would look for the chocolate. A child, which does not have a sense of theory of mind, 
would answer that Maxi would look for the chocolate at location2, because the child 
has no idea, even it cannot imagine, that Maxi does not know that the chocolate 
changed its location. A child, which has a sense of a theory of mind, would answer that 
Maxi should look for the chocolate where the puppet has left it, since Maxi has not 
seen the experimenter, and thus Maxi has no idea that the chocolate’s location has 
changed. Thus, an adequate prediction of another’s behavior is only possible with a 
sense of a theory of mind. Nowadays, this task is criticized for only focusing on the 
explicit development of a theory of mind, therefore, recent research has been focused 
on investigations of implicit development of theory of mind (Träuble et al. 2010). By 
this means, the focus of investigation shifts from asking children “direct questions 
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about an actor’s belief” to measuring “’spontaneous’ responses” (Träuble et al. 2010: 
435). 
Nowadays, there exist several theoretical research concepts of a theory of mind 
(Träuble et al. 2013), thus, the theory of mind does not exist (Apperly 2012). All 
concepts of a theory of mind provide a particular aspect of our affective and cognitive 
understanding. Birgit Träuble, Andrea Bender, and Christoph Konieczny (2013: 16f) 
point out five “[d]ifferent accounts” of a theory of mind, which itself differ in method 
and focus. For instance, they list modular accounts of a theory of mind, which assume 
that a theory of mind is activated by a module within the first three years of life 
(Träuble et al. 2013: 16f). Thus, it is assumed that there exists a cognitive module 
which enables the ability of a theory of mind to a particular point in time in child 
development. There are theory theory accounts which assume that infants have 
‘intuitive theories’ about the world, for example, about biology, physics and 
psychology. This theory assumes an inherent mode of a theory of mind, which allows 
mental interpretations of perceiving the world and making intuitive assumptions 
about how the world works. One might say, this theory theory account assumes a 
theory of mind since birth. Another account is the simulation theory which assumes, 
contrary to theory theory accounts, that mental interpretations are not theory-based, 
rather they depend on “direct experience of our own inner mental processes” 
(Träuble et al. 2013: 17). Oriented by interaction theory accounts are social-
constructivist approaches. These approaches assume that infants or children actively 
develop their theory of mind by interacting with the surroundings. Last to mention 
are domain-specific accounts. These approaches focus on specific domain which are 
assumed to be crucial for the development of a theory of mind, like working memory, 
general cognitive abilities etc. (cf. Träuble et al. 2013: 17; Wassmann and Funke 
2013). All of these examples of different accounts refer to the infant development of a 
theory of mind, but some accounts even might contradict each other. This fact shows 
that the research on a theory of mind has not reached a sufficient level yet. It is not 
the purpose of this work to bring all this approaches on a ‘green road’, even on a 
philosophical level. Nevertheless, and without doubt, a theory of mind and a broadly 
conceived ability to mind reading as ability to make assumptions about another’s 
behavior can be regarded as human disposition. This fact is supported by recent 
research on a theory of mind of infants (Träuble et al. 2010; Wellman 2011). This 
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research points out that a theory of mind is not a phenomenon which only can be 
observed in children from three years upwards; rather, a theory of mind is a 
phenomenon which starts much earlier, even in six months old infants (Sodian 2011). 
Beate Sodian (2011: 40) lists several experiments with infants from the age of 18 
months till the age of six months, which already show “dispositional predicates (the 
‘helper’, the ‘hinderer’) from behaviors displayed by particular agents, and they 
interpret subsequent events accordingly”. Such developments in recent research can 
lead to the conclusion “that there is an ‘underlying universality of cognitive processes’ 
[and] that ‘cultural differences in cognition reside more in cognitive styles than in the 
existence of a process in one cultural group and its absence in another’” (Wassmann 
and Funke 2013: 244). This conclusion is in contrast to the assumption that cognition 
is  
 
information processing, analogous to how information is processed in a 
computer. And for a long time, cognitive scientists were assuming that the 
processor and the algorithms with which it operates are shared by all 
humans, and that only information and output is culture-dependent 
(Andrea Bender in Wassmann and Funke 2013: 244). 34 
 
Actually, the opposite is the case, recent researches have proven that “the cognitive 
processes depend on cultural input […]. Not only the contents of the processing, but 
also the processing itself, thus, the basic cognitive processes are influenced by 
culture” (Andrea Bender in Wassmann and Funke 2013: 244f; cf. Domahs et al. 2010; 
Haun et al. 2011). 
 
 
4.5 The Problem of the Opacity of Mind 
Only in Western discourses, the theory of mind is recognized and practiced actively. 
In non-Western cultures, there can exist cultural restrictions, which lead to 
perceptions of “opaque” minds (Stasch 2008). The “doctrine of ‘the opacity of other 
                                            
34 This quotation refers to personal communication by Wassmann and Funke with Bender. 
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minds’”(Robbins and Rumsey 2008: 408) is practiced, since the “sensitivity about not 
presuming to know others’ minds is intertwined with sensitivity about not presuming 
to impinge on each other’s self-determination” (Stasch 2008: 443). Thus, the opacity 
of mind is the downside of empathy. If we are empathic, then we try to understand 
the other. Therefore, we impose our thoughts on the other. The other is not free to 
explain her or his thoughts, desires and beliefs, because the person spoken to is 
already in the mode of interpretation, and merges her or his own thoughts with the 
assumed thoughts of the other. In consequence, these assumed thoughts of the other 
are not the thoughts of the other anymore. If we try to understand the other’s 
thoughts, a translation of the other’s thoughts to our own way of thinking is 
performed. Thus, the other’s thoughts are merged in our translation. Since we are 
prone to endless interpretations and have a disposition to understand (Gadamer 
2003), the state of truly understanding the other in this others own thoughts, thus, is 
completely unachievable.  
Despite the fact that the phenomenon of opacity of mind has been first observed 
in the Pacific area, “[t]he opacity doctrine is not limited to the Pacific […], and it is 
likely that in most societies one can occasionally find people ruminating on how 
difficult it is to see into the hearts and minds of others” (Robbins and Rumsey 2008: 
408). Keane (2008: 475) argues at this point of understanding of the other that 
“[o]pacity claims, then, would seem to be less about intentions than they are about 
talk about intentions”. Thus, speech is regarded as “’mere talk’ or ‘just talk’ − not 
something one should treat as of much importance” (Robbins 2008: 421). Here, Keane 
takes for example a woman from Bosavii. He concludes from her utterances that the 
doctrine of the opacity of mind does not 
 
deny the reality of other minds and those inner intentions − they are not 
really the expressions of behaviorism they sometimes seem to be − so 
much as they respond to a certain phenomenology of mental and social 
experience” (Keane 2008: 475). 
 
From Keane’s point of view (2008), the claim of universality of the theory of mind is 
proven to be true, because children have to be “conformed” and “[t]hey have yet to 
learn not to impute intentions to others or at least not to do so publicly and explicitly, 
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to put those intentions into words” (Keane 2008: 475). The awareness of other minds 
is given, but these other minds are treaten like “hidden interior” about which one does 
not like to talk about (Keane 2008: 475; cf. Meinerzag 2006). Considering this ‘hidden 
interior’, Keane gives a psychological and a very pictorial metaphor. First, the 
psychological metaphor, the “inner theater”, 
 
in which the self is divided into a speaker and an addressee. Thought then 
becomes a kind of reported speech […]. [T]he basic way of talking about 
one’s own thoughts is in a reported speech frame: ‘My heart says...’ ‘My 
heart told me...,’ and so forth. Thus my own thoughts in this inner theater 
are portrayed as so many words in an introjected social interaction in 
which I play two parts. The heart is the speaker, and the reporting ‘I,’ the 
person who reports on the words of the speaker, is the actor, the person 
who carries out the action in response to the words of the heart. This might 
be a folk model of intentionality, and a good candidate for the 
psychological reading of opacity claims (Keane 2008: 475). 
 
In the case of the opacity of mind, to hear someone talk about her or his inner thoughts 
– to see this ‘inner theater’ – is not “just intruding on someone’s interior or private 
space”, but also “being made witness to the embarrassment” of losing the ability of 
hiding this ‘inner theater’ (Keane 2008: 477). In turn, as Robbins and Rumsey (2008: 
408) point out,  
 
people tend to put little store in the veracity of what others say about their 
own thoughts, rarely expecting that they can take such reports as reliable 
guides to how those who make them will behave in the future. 
 
Due to cultural impact the doctrine of the opacity of mind is deeply and firmly 
embedded in our cognitive structure so that there is no chance to believe someone 
who talks about the own inner thoughts and to get access to that other’s thoughts. To 
put it simple: it is socially not assumed to talk about inner thoughts, neither about our 
own thoughts nor the thoughts of others. The opacity of mind thus keeps our thoughts 
and the ‘inner theater’ safe. For Keane (2008: 477), it is not about the claim of 
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unawareness of an other’s thoughts, they are truly “unspeakable”. At this point the 
question of morality rises. Keane (2008: 478) points out that it is not about whether 
thoughts can be put in words adequately; rather it is a cultural claim which is 
traditionally rooted. Traditional moral norms are speaking here: we are able to talk 
about our thoughts, others are not permitted to do so. The second ‘pictorial’ metaphor 
is about the pocket, and what we all carry with us. 
 
What have I got in my pocket? In many accounts from Melanesian societies, 
the pocket is often where I can keep goods out of sight from those who 
might make a claim on them. We see here a link […] between material 
exchange and acts of hiding or revealing one’s inner thoughts or one’s 
inner self […] The links across semiotic modalities, from words to material 
goods, develop parallels between thought and its expression, on the one 
hand, and other domains of social action, on the other. These domains 
include the exchange of valuables and body decoration. Articulated by 
semiotic ideologies, the relations between thought and word may be 
construed as parallel to other revelations of the self (or, say, the viscera in 
which a meaning might be concealed) in the gift or on the skin (Keane 
2008: 475f). 
 
To carry pockets is similar to carrying space for material stuff. Along this metaphor, 
our own thoughts are in mind as in a pocket we carry with us. If we talk about them, 
and let people talk about them, it is like giving away all the stuff, which is carried in 
the pockets. 
 
To walk around exposing one’s thoughts to others in words is like walking 
around with no pockets, having no hiding places for things. The threat here 
[…] is the threat of chaos that might break out were people to start to 
confessing freely. Again the issue is not what is possible but what are the 
consequences of losing control over these possibilities (Keane 2008: 477f). 
 
From this pocket-metaphor moral obligation ensues. “The opacity claim is 
responding, in part, to the asymmetry between verbalizing my thoughts and yours” 
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(Keane 2008: 478). The issue is who has the right to verbalize our thoughts? It is 
obvious that it is all right to verbalize our own thoughts. But other people hear these 
thoughts and this is the moment where they begin to interpret and to translate. Now, 
do they have the right to verbalize, to express the thoughts of others – and do we have 
it? In turn, do we have the right to bring these people in a complicated situation by 
uttering our thoughts? 
From the Western point of view, the – let us call it this way – ‘problem’ of 
language obtains here. Anglo-American philosophical traditions of language, as for 
example the philosophy of language and linguistic pragmatics, initiated and 
influenced by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) in particular, have influenced even 
anthropology. These traditions lead to a focus on language and its role in acting 
intentionality due to how “people are adept at construing the intentions behind the 
communications other people produce” (Robbins and Rumsey 2008: 412; Robbins 
2008). This hypothesis in the frame of linguistic pragmatics and philosophy of 
language seems to be incommensurable with the doctrine of the opacity of mind. 
Thus, the question arises if Western theories can encompass an understanding of the 
other without making assumptions about the other’s mind. With this question, many 
other questions as to the Western concept of a theory of mind are associated. 
 
Can our theories imagine that we might approach other people without 
assuming that we can know something about what goes on in their heads? 
Or that we might interpret their speech without explicitly making guesses 
about their intentions in producing it? Or that we can get along with others 
without assuming that we can replicate their thoughts and feelings within 
ourselves as a way of understanding how things are with them? Could we 
ever cooperate with each other without being able to mind-read on all 
these levels? (Robbins and Rumsey 2008: 408f). 
 
It is a matter of the cultural perception of another’s mind. Without doubt, every one 
of us possesses a concept of a theory of mind. But what really matters is the question 
if we decide to use this ability without restrictions or not. Thus, according to any 
theory of mind, it has to be said that the “culturally defined person is in the centre [of 
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a theory of mind] because it depends on him or her whether a theory of mind applies” 
(Wassmann and Funke 2013: 238). 
Considering the concepts of a theory of mind as well as the opacity of mind, it is 
crucial to point out that awareness/consciousness and knowledge introduce and 
motivate action or a particular behavior in the social world. Since language is public 
(Searle 1995), due to performed or omitted speech acts, nevertheless a particular kind 
of communication is performed. The fact that the ‘culturally defined person’ decides 
to speak or not to speak leads to the academic conclusion that obviously either the 
phenomenological or rational cogito are not a mere passive function of perception, 
rather, both cogito initiate processes of understanding (Angehrn 2008: 25). 
Supplementary, Heidegger (1962: §18) calls exactly this process “referential context” 
[Bewandtniszusammenhang] (Angehrn 2008: 25). To understand something means to 
understand world contexts. In consequence, within the process of understanding, at 
each moment the world is construed and interpreted. 
 
 
4.6 Summary 
Empathy is a broad and sometimes diffuse field. With the five concepts I have 
explained here, I approach empathy from the point of social understanding and social 
feelings. They show the social foundation as well as the own position within the social 
field. Understanding enables the possibility of communication with each other on a 
rational level: we perceive actions of others and evaluate them. Feelings of sympathy 
exhibit a rich variety of sharing feelings. Consciously I have chosen a philosophical 
account, since it is an intellectual distinction which kind of fellow-feeling or charity I 
am feeling. In ordinary language, such a distinction may not exist. Important for my 
investigation is this intellectual distinction. It shows how we are able to distinguish 
between these feelings, but at the same time they feel like the same for us. In the 
context of biographical narration, this observation gives us an opportunity to re-
interpret our feelings and re-contextualize them. These empathic differences give us 
a sense of our complex inner life and all the factors of social relation which play a role 
for our empathy and emotions. A special stand here has care, since care is related to 
ourselves and to others, thus, care makes us, as being ourselves, fundamentally social. 
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Once more, here, philosophy delineates in an abstract way the basic structure of 
human being. In fact, it is Being-with. Since Being-with is the inherent direction 
toward ourselves and others, the realization that we are with us as well as others 
enables us to be for us and others by caring. That makes empathy a social ability and 
quality which can be regarded as universal. However, its characteristics and shape 
differ with cultural framing and individual preferences. That is also reflected in 
research on the theory of mind. In deed, theories of mind have been well-investigated 
in recent decades, but with the claim to universality of these findings, problems occur. 
Not only modified and alternative models occur, but also the doctrine of the opacity 
of mind has been investigated. Thus, the will to make explicit assumptions about 
another’s mind has to be calles in question. 
Empathic understanding becomes a necessary basis for living with others, since 
living in a social community requires a sense of being oneself as well as a sense of 
another’s being. On this abstract level, our need for explicit and implicit 
understanding becomes visible. In the next part of this work the previously 
introduced philosophical concepts may help to show an adequate way for empathy 
and social being, which is not strongly related to cognitive awareness, consciousness 
and rationality, but to the human being itself. 
.
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Part II: 
A Self-Based Concept of Mutual 
Recognition 
 
By setting the focus on the self, and therefore inside ourselves, mutual recognition as 
a social act surpasses political recognition and mere phenomenological introspection, 
insight, perception or recognition. The intention of the self-based model of mutual 
recognition does not only involve the recognition of the ontological or ontic other who 
has the ability to reflect her or his acting on a hermeneutical level; but it has to 
recognize this other as an acting human similar to the ourselves.  
To introduce the self-based model of mutual recognition, several perspectives 
on the self are necessary. The first perspective encompasses the recognition of our 
self as dynamic and developing process. According to Ricœur (1992: 19f, 2005: 69), 
recognition of our actions is similar to the recognition of our self as narrative identity, 
since our biography is indeed the story of our actions. The moment we recognize this 
action, is the moment of the recognition of our narrative identity. Thus, within this 
concept, we comprehend our ability to act and to recount a story. We also realize our 
ability to give recognition; in turn, we realize our need for recognition as well. 
The next perception of the self seems to be similar to the recognition of our own 
identity− with the little modification that now the ontological other is replaced by an 
ontic other, with all her or his abilities to think, feel, and perceive like us. The other is 
able to give recognition, but also is in need of it. This relation between our self and the 
other requires a concrete notion of the person, but also an account of empathy which 
is not only based on conscious awareness, but rather takes into consideration the 
opaqueness of our self as well as the other. 
These prior perceptions of the self enable the recognition of epistemological 
values. So far, the other is realized as another, but an equivalent acting human. In 
realizing Peter, Jane performs an act of recognition. In consequence, Peter has to be 
recognized as another. Thus, Jane has recognized Peter as a feeling and breathing 
being similar to her own being. To understand Peter in his being means to understand 
Peter’s acting. Hence, Peter is not a mere being among other beings anymore; rather, 
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he is another equivalent acting human who appears to Jane in his uniqueness. 
Therefore, Peter appears to Jane as a human with unique value who can be 
appreciated by her. The self-reflexive line is linked to our experiences and knowledge, 
which were gained during our lifetime. Personal preferences of particular values are 
formed through cultural backgrounds and thus experiences. It can be asked which 
value we receive within a community where we are compared with others, and where 
particular values are preferred among others. On a social level, this process mirrors 
social action. Hence, the category of appreciation has to be enhanced by adequate 
regard. 
This entire self-based model of mutual recognition simplies that the act of 
recognition does not remain on a phenomenological level; rather, on every level of 
acting, the act of mutual recognition is performed with hermeneutical reflection of 
ourselves and in a certain sense of the other in the phenomenological life-world. This 
means that the role of the self has to be recapitulated on every level. The self-based 
concept of mutual recognition is constituted as follows: 
 
Figure 7: graduation of self-recognition. 
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Figure 7 shows the basic structure of the self-based concept of mutual recognition. All 
levels are not strictly divided; rather, they flow smoothly into each other. Right at the 
bottom, the level identity symbolizes the recognition of our identity, since it has to be 
determined who is the self who recognizes ourselves. The lowest common 
denominator here is our own identity, which is to be recognized by ourselves. In other 
words, our self has to be recognized as being oneself as another. On the level above, we 
recognize ourselves as persons. In particular, we have to recognize ourselves as acting 
persons. An act of recognition so understood includes taking responsibility for one’s 
own acting. The next level contains the empathic attitude for our self and for others. It 
is enough to recognize that others are similar to our self. By not only perceiving the 
other but also recognizing the other in thinking and feeling, we mean to understand 
her or him and to comprehend that the other has feelings, wishes and needs. This step 
cannot be realized without the prior steps of recognizing our and the other’s identity 
and our acting responsibility. Within empathic understanding as act of mutual 
recognition the entire presence of the other becomes evident. Thereby, social 
appreciation is performed. Within this kind of recognition, some of us appear to be 
more sympathetic than others. So it comes that they are appreciated. Since we are 
social beings, social appreciation is able to set the focus on our specific values. Within 
real social existence, by recognizing we can only give adequate regard in comparison 
to others, since we are always in a social dynamic which only allows preferring of 
values. In the context of Hegel’s concept of recognition of the self, adequate regard is 
also a mode of recognition. Closer examined, adequate regard is the only possible 
mode of recognition, since we never can be recognized in all personal aspects, rather 
only in particulars. “[T]he criterion for adequate (as opposed to inadequate) regard is 
given by the contents of the best possible views and convictions that would be 
available to the parties” (Laitinen 2010: 323). Adequate regard is given, if these 
aspects are not placed in a false light, but still appear in the same identity framework. 
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5. About Being Oneself as Another 
In comparison to Hegel’s (1977) concept of self-consciousness, Ricœur’s concept of 
narrative identity has some outstanding advantages. Narrative identity has a pacifist 
account of self-confirmation which leads to a peaceful path of our self-consciousness, 
since our self confirms perpetually itself through the dialectics of idem- and ipse-
identity by itself. In the act of confirmation, there is no need of an ontic other. Of 
course, such a self-confirmation is not sufficient to operate on a social level, but it 
shows that a struggle for recognition is naturally excluded. We as permanent others 
confirm ourselves as being permanently another. This permanent otherness means 
that self-confirmation begins from the inside: before we are not directly dependent 
on the other, we recognize ourselves. 
Identity is constituted through biography as lifetime story. By this means, we 
have a history as well as an individual perception of the cultural context in which we 
were born. Bearing these facts consciously and unconsciously in mind, we 
individually recount stories depending on the social context, which influences 
perception and personal reality. This context, as described above with Ricœur, is – in 
the special case of our personal identity – culture, social community and tradition.  
 
 
5.1 Cultural Embeddedness of Narrative Identity 
Since the mimetic aspect of narrative identity is perceived as metaphorical 
application of cultural traditions and rituals, storytelling of our life is, if conscious or 
not, a human universal, and can be applied to every single human (Hutto 2007b). 
Traditions are delivered from the past, but through the threefold concept of mimesis 
they can be updated. In this case, they will be refigured in alternate symbolic 
structures. Consequently, only if traditions are refigured and understood, they can be 
applied adequately. By the refiguration of traditions we learn “to ‛isolate‘ a closed 
system from its environment and to discover the possibilities of development 
inherent to this system“ (Ricœur 1984: 135). We reconstruct the given goods as 
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tradition, notice that it cannot be applied in its current form, and modify it. This 
process is grasped as understanding. 
 
To follow a story, in effect, is to understand the successive actions, 
thoughts, and feelings in the story inasmuch as they present a particular 
‘directedness’. Let us understand by this that we are ‘pulled forward’ by 
the development, as soon as we respond to this force with expectations 
concerning the completion and outcome of the whole process (Ricœur 
1984: 150). 
 
Stories always have a particular directedness, because “narrative answers the 
question ‛Why?’” (Ricœur 1984: 152). “We tell stories because in the last analysis 
human lives need and merit being narrated” (Ricœur 1984: 75). If the process of 
understanding is interrupted, an explanation is needed to keep the process of 
understanding going on. Here, understanding refers to the comprehension of an act 
which is performed. This act is an integral part of the process of understanding, since 
this act is already situated within a social and cultural context, which includes 
temporal aspects like past, present and future: every act also has a history. This 
history, which is embedded in the individually perceived social and cultural context, 
is the story of lifetime experience and knowledge which can be told. Thus, to have a 
lifetime story means to move in a particular context of experience and knowledge 
(Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 16). In reference to Ricœur’s threefold concept of 
mimesis (1984: 52–90), the acts of reinterpretation, creation and creative imitation 
are all acts of applied understanding: “[t]o follow a story is to actualize it by reading 
it” (Ricœur 1984: 76). By repeating this central passage from the chapter about 
Narrative Identity and Personal Narration (cf. Chap. 3.2), it can be said that stories like 
the cultural and traditional narrations, first, have to be understood – one might say 
culture and traditions are read and understood. Second, given the hypotheses that we 
act within the cultural and traditional context, we update contexts by acting and 
performance. Conceived this way, we create new aspects within cultural and 
traditional contexts, since our acting and performance of culture and traditions is 
never exactly the same as another’s acting and performance. That makes culture and 
traditions to substructures in which we are born (mimesis1). Therefore, every act has 
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its causes and is embedded within culture, socialization and tradition (mimesis2). This 
causal embeddedness is reinterpreted within cultural and traditional habits as 
attempts of imitation (mimesis3). To a greater degree, attempts of imitation are 
always individual and personal efforts to interpret cultural and traditional 
substructures. By posing acting within time, a tension rises from past to present in 
our existence. “Debating the past is prolonging it into the present” (Ricœur 1985: 70). 
Through storytelling, the narrative of an act is extended from its beginning in the past 
to its fulfillment in the present. This is one part of this tension. Through the 
directedness of the narrative act, present is extended into the future as well. At this 
point, once again, the helical structure of narrative identity becomes visible. The 
structure of the helix is endless, because every time something is interpreted, it passes 
through a new and individual process of interpretation at every one of us in every age. 
By implication, culture and traditions are situated in a dynamic process, which results 
from (inter)action. Redundancy is always present in this process: it seems a bit ironic 
that we always use something already existing to create something new. By stressing 
imitation, we always pass through a hermeneutical process of interpretation and 
creation. Through the execution of an act the act’s directedness is not yet attained. 
Within acting, we pursue our individually intended direction of our act. Not until we 
reach it, the intended future purpose becomes present. In consequence, becoming a 
present act, the act immediately has become past. 
 
 
5.2 The Ethos of the Self 
The term ‘person’ has undergone a change as ethical notion. In reference to Mauss 
(1985), the notion of the person has been passing through a change of meaning from 
a social actor to a psychological being, “and further on to the conscious and 
autonomous unit, the ‘individual’” (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 235). Derived from 
ancient Greek, the term ‘person’ becomes similar to ‘personage’ or ‘character’. This 
meaning corresponds to the Aristotelian definition of ‘character’ as good habit. In this 
respect, the term ‘person’ becomes moral. For that reason, ‘person’ is conceived as 
“the true face” (Mauss 1985: 18). Our true face should be both good and responsible 
for others. According to Ricœur (1992: 120ff, 2005: 71), who refers to Aristotle’s 
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elaborations in The Nicomachean Ethics (2009), acting motivation results from the 
belief and the conviction of one’s own good acting: “the character holds himself 
responsible for an action that he does not dissociate from himself” (Ricœur 2005: 71).  
 
The narrative constructs the identity of the character, what can be called 
his or her narrative identity, in constructing that of the story told. It is the 
identity of the story that makes the identity of the character (Ricœur 1992: 
147f). 
 
This is a direct derivation of Ricœur's assumption that “character has a history which 
it has contracted, one might say, in the twofold sense of the word ‘contraction’: 
abbreviation and affection” (Ricœur 1992: 122). With respect to Ricœur’s concept of 
narrative identity (1992), the self is dynamic, despite its having a permanent part. 
Let us remember, how Heidegger understands ethos: “[t]he word names the 
open region in which the human being dwells” (Heidegger 1998: 269). In a bold and 
brave interpretation of this quotation, Heidegger’s notion of Dasein appears as 
fundamentally social. That can be explained through the extended notion of ethos, 
since, in Heidegger’s understanding, ethos is considered as situation or place within 
the clearing of being wherein the Dasein abodes and dwells. From this point of view, 
Dasein takes up of course a particular situation within the life-world, but, dependent 
on its social orientation and direction, it can construct a different perception of 
ourselves. As we do without changing our habitual situation in our ‘lebenshaus’, we 
can move from one room to another, and thus construct our angle of view for us as 
well as for others (Galuschek 2014). As we remember from above: “[t]he abode of the 
human being contains and preserves the advent of what belongs to the human being 
in his essence” (Heidegger 1998: 269). Our ethos is Being-in-the-world, and therefore, 
being for and with others. Within the clearing, the presence of Dasein is not limited to 
the mere situation of Dasein. By dwelling, Dasein takes direct effect in the world. Thus, 
Dasein is basically directed to ‘being with others’. 
The cultural and traditional sedimentation of our personal identity leads to the 
obvious occurence of the dialectics of permanence (idem) and dynamic (ipse) within 
narrative identity. To achieve a syntheses here, Ricœur links permanence and 
dynamic within our character as a particular, individual stand to past, present and 
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future, to ensure the recognition of our self as identical in its own acting through time. 
Within this concept of narrative identity, the recognition of past traits involves taking 
responsibility for our acts. This recognition is fulfilled through loyalty to our self as 
idem-identity. Without ipse, which founds the dynamics of character, the significance 
of loyalty would be dispensable. Therefore, the ethos of narrative identity is 
developed within the notion of character, which itself builds a dialectic within the 
tension of idem and ipse. 
 
[M]y character is me, myself, ipse; but this ipse announces itself as idem. 
Each habit formed in this way, acquired and become a lasting disposition, 
constitutes a trait − a character trait, a distinctive sign by which a person 
is recognized, reidentified as the same − character being nothing other 
than the set of these distinctive signs (Ricœur 1992: 121). 
 
By this means, “character has a history” (Ricœur 1992: 122). Situated in the context 
of history, character needs to “be set back within the movement of narration” (Ricœur 
1992: 122). 
 
It will be the task of a reflection on narrative identity to balance, on one 
side, the immutable traits which this identity owes to the anchoring of the 
history of a life in a character and, on the other, those traits which tend to 
separate the identity of the self from the sameness of character (Ricœur 
1992: 123). 
 
Personal identity is conceived as located within a story that is abstracted in a never-
caught present combined with past and future. That makes us the performing main 
characters of our lifetime play. Thus, “[i]t is the identity of the story that makes the 
identity of the character” (Ricœur 1992: 148). Character and narrative identity 
conceived as ‘performing main character’ lead to the perspective of our acting as 
‘habitus’, which constitutes our character and enables role playing and identification 
(Ricœur 1992: 319). Character “designates the set of lasting dispositions by which a 
person is recognized” (Ricœur 1992: 121). Thus, idem and ipse overlap in three 
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functions of character: habit, acquired identification, and – viewed from a certain angle 
– promise (Ricœur 1992: 121ff). 
Habit gives history to the character by acting in the context of cultural, 
traditional and social frames, or by mimetic learning of new acting possibilities 
(Ricœur 1992: 121). “[T]his is a history in which sedimentation tends to cover over 
the innovations which preceded it, even to the point of abolishing the latter” (Ricœur 
1992: 121). By incorporating customs, some habits stay the same; others change or 
are renewed. Herein, an overlapping of ipse and idem can be observed.  
Acquired identification has influence on the social environment, in which we 
move around, since it includes a process of identification.  
 
[T]he identity of a person or a community is made up of these 
identifications with values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes, in which the 
person or the community recognizes itself (Ricœur 1992: 121). 
 
Through this processes, within a character a certain kind of loyalty arises because we 
are not “distinct from […] [our] ‘experiences’. Quite the opposite: […] [we share] the 
condition of dynamic identity peculiar to the story recounted” (Ricœur 1992: 147). 
Technically, promise is not subsumed under the category of character; rather it 
is “another model of permanence in time besides that of character” (Ricœur 1992: 
123). Promise as keeping one's word ensures permanence in time as well, but Ricœur’s 
distinction can be explained through the fact that promise provides the opposite of 
character. “Keeping one's word expresses a self-constancy which cannot be inscribed, 
as character was, within the dimension of something in general, but solely within the 
dimension of ‘who?’” (Ricœur 1992: 123). Keeping one’s word does not flow with the 
time, rather, it denies a dynamic by standing contrary to the dynamic flow of time. It 
forces us to stay at a particular point in our history, where a promise has been given: 
against its nature as dynamic self, our ipse is forced to stay idem. In turn, promise as 
keeping one’s word can be conceived as a synthesis of both prior points character is 
constituted of: within promise, both habit and acquired identification with a human 
and/or a group are related to loyalty. Our self has to cultivate the habit of keeping 
one’s word, and to identify itself with this decision conceived as our own act. In an 
excellent sense, to give a promise means to take responsibility for our acting. To keep 
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this promise, resistance in time outcrops. Therefore, a promise is given with the 
motivation or intention to be performed in the future. 
Habit, acquired identification and promise, all share a common requirement: 
sociality. They all need another human to be learned, fulfilled and confirmed. 
Therefore, considering the social side of ethos, it includes a concept of ‘attitude’. The 
notion of ethos as attitude does not only include the local situation of the self or Dasein 
within the life-world, but also the temporal attitude of ethos, since the narration of 
our lifetime in the context of cultural and traditional experience and knowledge 
appears in a very thick and complex relationship as recognition of our own identity. 
We must not only permanently confirm that our identity is still the same, but that it is 
necessary to allow changes due to knowledge and experience. Every self has a choice 
of personal narrations it can recount based on experiences and knowledge it gained 
during its lifetime. The decision to recount a particular story is motivated by personal 
and individual expectation, but also by answering the questions ‘Why I am acting?’ 
and ‘What do I want to achieve?’. Decisions are unconscious or conscious motivations, 
which refer to a particular way to act. The decision to recount a particular story 
continues our narrative identity, since all reasons for a particular acting decision are 
found here. So, it can be once more concluded with Ricœur (1984: 152): “[e]very story 
[…] explains itself. In other words, narrative answers the question ‘Why?’ at the same 
time it answers the question ‘What?’”. As explained above with Schütz (1967) and 
Schütz and Luckmann (1974), the motivation of acting can be summed up in past- and 
future-motives. However, not only the motives of acting can be found in the temporal 
structure of narrative identity, but also the decision for acting can be derived from 
that structure. Here, the triad of knowledge, horizon and experience becomes visible. 
Stories, which are recounted, mark a particular horizon, since they are based on 
particular knowledge and experience. This existential interwovenness is thickly 
related to the already existing knowledge which is necessary to be able to recount a 
story. However, through this recounting, more knowledge is accumulated, since past 
experiences are recapitulated and set in new contexts. Our personal life-worldly 
horizon expands: by acting, we have been been founding ourselves permanently in an 
expanding world. Since we are life-world, we are in a permanent dynamic by 
mirroring our knowledge and experience in the life-world. From this point of view, 
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the Western subject perceived as phenomenological ‘I’ seems to be completely 
embedded “in a social context” (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 235). 
 
 
5.3 The Recounting and Relational Self 
Surroundings, environments, with-world, life-world – terms for the personalized 
world we all live in − can change spatially and over time. In turn, it is possible that the 
life-world stays the same, while the way we perceive the life-world can change. 
Considering personhood as life-world-filled and life-world-filling sphere, statics and 
dynamics of narrative identity maintain a very special relation. Through permanence 
of the idem-identity, the life-world as the acting self has a unchangeable core, but 
through experience and gaining knowledge the perception and recognition – or even 
structure – of the life-world changes. This refers to Ricœur’s (1992: 114) triad 
“describe, narrate, prescribe”. Within this triad, we are always aware of the cultural 
and traditional setting and are able to understand contexts and expected conducts. In 
practicing cultural and traditional conducts, prescription is performed, while our life-
world is reinterpreted and created. Thus, narrative identity is constituted in a 
backward mode. We may think about the future, but we are never able to perceive it. 
Since, our self  
 
who merely conceives a series of events, however connected, has not yet 
made a narrative; that requires a coherent representational vehicle − 
words, sounds, images − capable of making the events and their relations, 
or some of them, intelligible to an audience. A narrative is an artefact, 
wherein the maker seeks to make manifest his or her communicative 
intentions. When the audience grasp those intentions, they have a grip on 
what the events of the narrative are, and how they are related (Currie 
2007: 17f). 
 
The only thing, which can be perceived from ourselves’ perspective, is our past 
through which we recount our biography. This past is represented by ourselves in an 
individual way influenced by its individual lifetime biography, since “no story 
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manages (or seeks) to determine the world of its happenings with precision and 
completeness” (Currie 2007: 19). In so doing, particular evaluations are also 
communicated. They are expressed by highlighting a particular storyline, event or 
through chosen words, which lead to an emotional coloring. This approach makes the 
narrative itself a personal expression of the story we want to recount (Currie 2007: 
18f); even more: “narratives represent their stories” (Currie 2007: 18). They fulfill two 
functions within our life: the connection of events and the framing of these events 
(Currie 2007: 19). In the context of mutual recognition, through the narration, our self 
recognizes our story and expects recognition of the other through the narrative 
coloring of expressions and evaluations. This kind of narration guides the audience’s 
attention in a particular way and, thus, leads to a particular perspective of the 
perception of events. By the attentional guidance we construct, we directly influence 
the others’ reaction conceived as act of recognition, since the other comprehends the 
narrative framework and is able to understand it emotionally. This concept of 
guidance of the other’s attention can be conceived as Scheler’s concept of fellow-
feeling as an authentic sympathetic feeling with another. 
The downside of such sympathetic feeling with another can be called “the 
problem of imaginative resistance” (Currie 2007: 21). This problem is distinguished 
by two aspects: there are situations where the audience does not believe the narrated 
story; they take the entire or parts of the narrated story as fiction: the audience is 
“resistant to imagining some component of the story” (Currie 2007: 31). For example, 
we tell a friend that his girlfriend is cheating on him, but he is still so in love with her 
that he refuses to believe it. But there are also situations where the narrated story is 
taken to be true, only the narrated facts are taken as fiction (Currie 2007: 31). For 
example, the audience by all means believe our trip form New York to Pittsburgh by 
car, but they do not believe that it took only one hour. Though Gregory Currie here 
refers to truly imaginative situations, denying or permitting narrated facts can also be 
applied to real life. Since every narrated story – might it be fantasized, or not – is a 
fiction for the audience as the other, the audience always has to believe or deny a story 
or certain parts of it. To say it with Gadamer (2003): if two people meet and they talk 
with each other, two individual horizons (of knowledge and experience) meet at the 
same time. By this means, these two people can – even if that is possible – only agree 
to negotiate about their subject, thus only parts of these two horizons overlap. If this 
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overlap of horizons does not happen, the two people do not understand each other. 
They cannot imagine the world, or the way of another’s thinking. 
Dan Zahavi (2007) is quoted in the chapter about Narrative Identity and Personal 
Narration to outline the interconnectedness of the stories recounted by the self and 
by others about the self, which constitute the self and, at the same time, answer the 
question ‘who am I?’, he, nevertheless, questions “this train of thought” (Zahavi 2007: 
179). He aims to expose that “the emphasis on narratives is not merely to be 
understood as an epistemological thesis” (Zahavi 2007: 180). It should be questioned 
whether narratives are, in deed, “the primary access to self” (Zahavi 2007: 191 
emphasis by the author). Considered in a dialogical setting, narratives do not merely 
refer to the just now existing self, since this epistemological perception would include 
a pre-existing self (Zahavi 2007: 180), through assumptions and beliefs of the 
dialogical other, they also enable future assumptions and beliefs. But the time 
perception of the present remains the same. Perceived through the expanded time 
perspective of the present in past, present and future, Zahavi (2007: 180) levels down 
the self to a single time perspective, namely the present. Within the present moment, 
not all recounted stories are the same. One has to distinguish between “the kind of 
narratives that characterize our ongoing lives from consciously worked-up 
narratives” (Zahavi 2007: 180). Such “unacceptable oversimplification[s]” are the 
argumentative start mark for Zahavi (2007: 185) to introduce his concept of “the 
experiential self”. He takes into account, in contrast to recounted stories, the 
perspective of experiences, which he perceives as foundation of self-constitution, 
since “self-consciousness must be understood as an intrinsic feature of the primary 
experience” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 46). 
 
Our experiential life possesses a focus of experience, a point of view. It is a 
first-person perspective in the sense of being tied to a self. Thus, it doesn’t 
make sense to speak of a first-person perspective without speaking of a 
self. But what does this experiential selfhood amount to? (Zahavi 2007: 
186). 
 
A first-person-perspective cannot be separated from both a phenomenological and 
hermeneutical perception of oneself. Taking into account approaches by Antonio 
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Damasio (1999) and Metzinger (2003), Zahavi (2007: 187) concludes to an 
“experiential dimension of selfhood”, which is already to be found in classical 
phenomenologal approaches. 
Seemingly similar to Ricœur’s approach (1992), Damasio’s neurologist account 
(1999) deals with the hypothesis that there does not exist just one mode of 
perception. He shows that “[c]onsciousness is not a monolith” (Zahavi 2007: 185); 
rather, it consists of two parts: a stable core consciousness, which is the core self as 
unchangeable and basic ability to perceive the world through emotions and bodily 
sensations, and an extended consciousness. Core consciousness 
 
provides the organism with a sense of self about one moment – now − and 
about one place − here. The scope of core consciousness is the here and 
now. Core consciousness does not illuminate the future, and the only past 
it vaguely lets us glimpse is that which occurred in the instant just before. 
There is no elsewhere, there is no before, there is no after (Damasio 1999: 
16). 
 
Further, Damasio (1999: 16) describes the core consciousness as a “simple, biological 
phenomenon“ with the following attributions: 
 
it has one single level of organization; it is stable across the lifetime of the 
organism; it is not exclusively human; and it is not dependent on 
conventional memory, working memory, reasoning, or language (Damasio 
1999: 16). 
 
In contrast, what might be understood in common sense as consciousness, Damasio 
call extended consciousness: 
 
there are many levels and grades, [it] provides the organism with an 
elaborate sense of self − an identity and a person, you or me, no less − and 
places that person at a point in individual historical time, richly aware of 
the lived past and of the anticipated future, and keenly cognizant of the 
world beside it (Damasio 1999: 16).  
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Extended consciousness thus is directly depending on memory and language 
(Damasio 1999: 16). With core consciousness there is a biological self, which can be 
understood as classical phenomenological I, and with extended consciousness a 
reflexive, conscious awareness of the surroundings. Zahavi (2007: 185) processes an 
experience related aspect from Damasio’s (1999: 17) approach by attributing core 
consciousness to a core self – similar to the classical phenomenological ‘I’ – and 
extended consciousness to an autobiographical self – similar to the hermeneutical 
‘me’. Both parts of consciousness are dependent on each other. 
 
Regardless of how well autobiographical memory grows and how robust 
the autobiographical self becomes, it should be clear that they require a 
continued supply of core consciousness for them to be of any consequence 
to their owner organism. The contents of the autobiographical self can only 
be known when there is a fresh construction of core self and knowing for 
each of those contents to be known (Damasio 1999: 175f). 
 
One cannot exist without the other. The next step Zahavi has to take is the junction of 
the perceptions of the self and experience. Despite approaches of the early Husserl 
and Sartre who assert a non-egological account, they distance themselves from this 
position by realizing that there exists something like self-experience (Gallagher and 
Zahavi 2012: 203). The crux here is that experiences do not have an ‘I’. They are 
realized through the reflexive ‘me’. Only if the experience is objectified within the 
process of reflection, then the experiencing self as ‘I’ appears (Zahavi 2005: 100f). 
However, Metzinger argues that experience is not possible without the awareness of 
“being someone” (Metzinger 2003). That leads Zahavi (2007: 186) to the conclusion 
that “it doesn’t make sense to speak of a first-person perspective without speaking of 
a self”, since “it possesses a focus of experience, a point of view” (Metzinger 2003: 
157). According to Zahavi (2007: 186) this experiential ability of the self is a kind of 
pre-reflexive awareness, which is a 
 
präreflexive Selbstvertrautheit [pre-reflexive self-intimacy]. […] It is a very 
basic and seemingly spontaneous, effortless way of inner acquaintance, of 
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‘being in touch with yourself’, and phenomenally, of being ‘infinitely close 
to yourself’ (Metzinger 2003: 158). 
 
The state of conscious self-experience is performed afterwards, since  
 
pre-reflective self-consciousness is related to the idea that experiences 
have a subjective ‘feel’ to them, a certain (phenomenal) quality of ‘what it 
is like’ or what it ‘feels’ like to have them” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 49). 
 
It may be derived from this “selfhood requires more than merely a non-conscious 
differentiation between oneself and the environment. In fact, the crucial idea is that 
some minimal form of self-experience is essential for selfhood” (Gallagher and Zahavi 
2012: 204). In both, the pre-reflexive consciousness as well as the reflexive 
consciousness, exists a self-relation. In respect to the life-worldly relation of the self 
this makes the self itself relational. A type of porosity of the self seems inherent in this 
relationality, which allows of a particular permeability to the surrounding life-world 
as well as to one’s own self (Smith 2012). In consequence, an ontological dichotomy 
between an unconscious or conscious subject and the objective environment is 
excluded. But even Karl Smith’s (2012) suggestion of a revival and reformulation of 
Charles Taylor’s (2007) porous and buffered selves remains in the metaphysical 
dimension of subjects. The subject as an ontological entity, which has to be marked 
with attributes and characteristics, has become a metaphysical concept without any 
relations to reality. 
This explanation of a pre-reflective self-consciousness recalls Scheler’s (1973a) 
material value ethics as unconscious perception of a thing’s true value. Love as 
intentional movement towards something directed to us comes along with the ability 
to understand love guiding our understanding of the other. 
 
This understanding love is the great master workman and (as 
Michelangelo says so profoundly and beautifully in his well-known 
sonnet) the great sculptor who, working from the masses of empirical 
particulars, can intuitively seize, sometimes from only one action or only 
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one expressive gesture, the lines of the person's value-essence (Scheler 
1973a: 488). 
 
This poetic description of love’s possibilities and abilities shows that only through the 
intrinsic interest in another the other appears, and can be understood in the 
individuality of this other’s appearance. What Scheler here describes, is not a mere 
inductive scientific method; rather, it is empathic understanding. We send love as 
empathic interest to the other. By this means, the other appears as a living human and 
as a complex whole, and not as an epistemological combination of parts. Perceived on 
this phenomenological level, this makes us ‘relational individuals’. We are relational, 
since as a phenomenologically conceived unit we are part of a social community, 
which in turn builds up a unity. By implication, within our personal and individual 
uniqueness, we consist of many parts which are unified, in our being as a single 
human; this unity of parts marks our wholeness in personhood. The dividuality within 
the wholeness can be explained through our phenomenological primary composition, 
which is exactly the body. Although, at the same time, the body individualizes us and 
makes us distinct from others, since “each of them [the others] forms a special centre 
about which the collective representations reflect and colour themselves differently” 
(Wassmann and Funke 2013: 234). In this biological stage, we are formed by 
relational individualities similar to the interplay of the different organs we consist of. 
These individualities compose a unity in almost every stage of being (Strathern 1988: 
15). This composition is continued on the social level, when we build up and move 
through a social microcosm within the own life-world. As discussed above, we are 
social microcosms, and thus cosmomorphic (Strathern 1988: 268). This approach 
does not exclude our bodily perception, but rather deepens and expands it. Within a 
cosmomorphic and sociomorphic perception of ourselves, our body is expanded, 
because the life-world is also perceived as our body. It is animated and included in 
this dividual perception of the person. To put it simply, the contrast between the 
individual and the dividual approaches, as explained above, can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
the dividual is considered to be divisible, comprising a complex of 
separable − interrelated but essentially independent − dimensions or 
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aspects. The individual is thus monadic, while the dividual is fractal; the 
individual is atomistic, while the dividual is always socially embedded; the 
individual is an autonomous social actor, the author of his or her own 
actions, while the dividual is a heteronomous actor performing a culturally 
written script; the individual is a free-agent, while the dividual is 
determined by cultural structures; the individual is egocentric, and the 
dividual is sociocentric (Smith 2012: 53). 
 
This quotation resembles like an oversimplification of the Melanesian perception of 
personhood (Hess 2009) − which it is −, but it mirrors the different approaches in 
anthropology and philosophy, and their statements in a very brief way. 
Thinking this dualistic way back in history, it becomes clear that individuality 
has not biological roots, but rather theological. It is the Christian soul which builds “an 
individual relationship with God” (Hess 2006: 288). But even the Christian 
individuality is indeed dividual: the Christian soul consists of the Trinity of Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit. But later, besides Christianity, two other forms of individualism 
occur: the “capitalist notion of individual ownership […], and the Western 
psychological value that every person has a ‘core self’” (Hess 2006: 288). The core self 
is individual as well as it is in an individual relationship to God, since it participates in 
God. Conceived like that, even the concept of individuality rooted in Christianity is 
partible (Hess 2006; Mosko 2010; Smith 2012). “That is, by entering into an exchange 
relationship with God one becomes part of Him and He becomes part of oneself” (Hess 
2006: 294). This concept of the “’natural’ Christian person” shows up similarities with 
the dividual perception of personhood (Hess 2006: 294). “Through acts of believing, 
repenting, praying, attending church ceremonies, or donating money people engage 
in mediated relationships with God that can be understood as dividual in a 
Strathernian sense” (Hess 2006: 294). Due to colonialization, this behavior is similar 
to the attitudes of sharing with Melanesian people, who want to give parts of 
themselves to others and receive parts of others in return. In this way, they create a 
relationship with others and deepen their community. Nothing else happens during a 
Christian ceremony. And, this is at the center of mutual recognition: recognition is 
given to another, and by reacting in any way to this act of recognition, we receive the 
other’s recognition. On the simplest level we recognize another’s existence by giving 
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her or him the basket of donation during a Christian Mess. This other reacts by taking 
the basket, which is the other’s recognition of our action. This mutual experiences of 
recognition are “subjectively experienced as inner events and, in standard situations, 
as one’s own states” (Metzinger 2003: 267). They directly refer to ourselves, where 
they are recognized as attributed to us. That suports Zahavi’s approach of the 
experiential self, since the “self is claimed to possess experiential reality” (Zahavi 
2007: 188). The self is “closely linked to the first-person perspective, and is in fact 
identified with the first-personal givenness of the experiential phenomena” (Zahavi 
2007: 188). 
In sum, the simple explanation for this perception is the unquestioned reference 
to our own experiences. This account is doubtlessly related to our self, our perception 
and our being. Thus, every experience is perceived in a self-reflexive, self-relational 
and self-referential way. There cannot be an experience without context. “ 
 
If the experience is given in a first-personal mode of presentation, it is 
experienced as my experience, otherwise not. In short, the self is conceived 
as the invariant dimension of first-personal givenness in the multitude of 
changing experiences (Zahavi 2007: 189).  
 
Zahavi’s approach to an experiential self connects on a reflexive phenomenological 
level not only to Ricœur, but also to Schütz. Considering Schütz’s account of life-
wordly actions through experience, the junction between the experiential self and the 
life-world becomes visible (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 202ff). 
It is obvious that Zahavi would not agree with Schütz’s account, since Schütz’s 
account is founded on understanding. Zahavi assumes a biological self which has 
experiences on an unconscious level. Nevertheless, the interpretation of our 
experiences – be they unconscious or conscious – depends on the context. And this 
context consists of other – already made – experiences. Without doubt, experiences 
can be unconsciously conceived, interpreted and evaluated, but they take effect in 
apparent action. Every experience thus flows with a smooth transition into the 
subjective and personal pool of experiences, here again on an unconscious as well as 
conscious level. The resulting act, however, is visible within the life-world and has its 
effects, which fit into the pool of experiences. In the context of Schütz’ approach, 
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action intentions as because-motives (‘Why am I acting?’) and the act’s in-order-to-
motives (‘What do I want to achieve?’) always result from unconscious and conscious 
interpretations and evaluations of experiences made before. 
Although Zahavi (2007: 200) claims an inclusive course of phenomenological 
and hermeneutical approaches, which Ricœur obviously already has established, 
there still exists a lack of a deep-going access to the junction of the self and 
experiences. A solution could be a self-based approach to experience and action. It 
bypasses the epistemological lack of narratives and anchors the epistemological 
principle in the self by providing first-person-experiences. Although Zahavi (2007: 
200) argues that a so conceived self is “a more primitive and fundamental notion of 
self than the one endorsed by the narrativists”, a multi-level notion of the self 
designed as a complex self-structure which claims, on every level, an – unconscious 
or conscious – me considering itself as a reflexive entity. Therefore, an experiential 
self does not contradict a narrative self; rather it deepens the epistemological 
structure of the self. 
In contrast to the reflexive self-consciousness, Gallagher and Zahavi (2012: 64f) 
argue that the pre-reflexive self-consciousness builds a unity, which “involves a form 
of self-division or self-fragmentation” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 64), and is 
contextualized and temporally unified by narratives (Ricœur 1992: 141). Perceived 
in this way, by completing the narrative self, the concept of the experiential self 
replaces the concept of the classical phenomenological ‘I’, since it complements the 
narrative self. 
 
The experiential self, although constantly accommodating changing 
experiences, has a structure (defined by temporality and embodiment) 
that remains stable across the lifetime of the organism. In contrast, the 
narrative self evolves across the lifetime of the organism. From a 
developmental perspective, there are little more than simple states of core 
self in the beginning, but as experience accrues, memory grows and the 
autobiographical/narrative self develops (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 
205). 
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Perceiving the experiential self and the narrative self in this way, leads to a correlation 
between both. In addition, Gallagher and Zahavi (2012: 205) point out that our self 
has to be aware of our actions, before it can set these actions in a context relating to 
our lifetime or biography. For that reason, Gallagher and Zahavi (2012: 205) suggest 
to attribute the classical philosophical term ‘personal self’ to the ‘experiential self’, 
and ‘person’ to the ‘narrative self’. To recount a story is always to recount something 
personal from our biography. It also always conveys “personal character or 
personality; a personality that evolves through time and is shaped by the values […] 
[and] actions” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 205). This view of personhood underlines 
the concept of the person, already introduced in this work, as a performing actor in a 
play or in a story. Personhood thus regarded is conditio humana, since it is our 
essential quality to act; but it is crucial to perceive us as persons and thus as social 
actors. Relationality, here, becomes visible as foundation for personhood as selfhood, 
since we move within relationships and interact with others. These interactions are 
reflected in our behavior, for instance, as sharing, laughing, talking, helping and 
listening. 
 
 
5.4 Summary 
In every moment, with every encounter, we are, indeed, ourselves, but we are also 
oneself as another, as Ricœur (1992) named his famous work. Being oneself as 
another, means actualizing oneself in every moment of our lifetime. We actualize our 
life by narration. It is not necessary to recount this story to a factual other, to 
externalize it; it is more than enough to recount the story to oneself. In doing so, we 
make our life plausible and contextualize it. In other words, we find explanations for 
our actions. 
Narrating such a lifetime story, and, at the same time, to realize that we are still 
the same person is our autobiographical effort, but also our cultural framework. 
Actually, we are influenced by the life-world and its events in the same way as we 
influence the life-world with our presence. Within the concept of ‘ethos’, I have shown 
that our stand is in every moment factual, but at the same time dynamic, as Ricœur 
shows with his concept of narrative identity. As already said, stories, which are 
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recounted, mark a particular horizon, since they are based on particular knowledge 
and experience. 
Perceived in this way, the narrative self as person is relational by means of 
telling stories. It identifies itself with its actions and contectualizes them in 
accordance to its being. At the same time, experiences and experience-making, and so 
the life-world, are thickly interwoven in our being. Being related to the life-world as 
our ‘lebensraum’ and our social sphere of interaction makes us relational beings. 
Therefore, the next step is to investigate how selfhood can be conceived as 
personhood and how its structure of autonomy can be comprehended in respect to 
Western and Melanesian notions.
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6. The Self as Person 
Following the suggestion of Gallagher and Zahavi (2012: 205), the narrative self 
should be comprehended as concept of personhood. From a phenomenological point 
of view, to illustrate this in an easy way, I begin with Ricœur’s approach to 
personhood. He understands the term person, in the first instance, as a “’basic 
particular’” (Ricœur 1992: 31). Following Strawson (1977), he borrows the concept 
of the person as basic particular to describe the body as phenomenal unity of the 
human: 
 
[p]hysical bodies and the persons we ourselves are constitute, in this 
masterful strategy, such basic particulars in the sense that nothing at all 
can be identified unless it ultimately refers to one or the other of these two 
kinds of particulars (Ricœur 1992: 31). 
 
This interpretation recalls the above-described perception of the body as ‘dividuality 
within wholeness through the composition of the human being’. At the same time, the 
body is both our individual attribution, which makes us unique, and a composition of 
body parts, which makes us alive. That includes that through the body we feel life; the 
body is the first instance that links us to the surrounding life-world, and takes effect 
in it (Ricœur 1992: 30f; Merleau-Ponty 1962). 
From this point of view, the body appears as the first characteristic of the 
person, since the body is the first part of us which is perceived and recognized: it is 
the first impression. To put it in poetic words: the first thing we see from the person, 
is not the heart but the body, the person’s phenomenal appearance, and the person’s 
charisma through the bodily presence. Being aware of the body as the first 
manifestation of personhood, throws consciousness from the preceding position of 
defining personhood. In the second instance, we as persons are aware of our actions 
and are able to reflect these actions. We may, consciously or unconsciously, decide 
that we are hungry; however, in both cases we take our wallet and go to the bakery. 
Here, it is not the objective to deny consciousness, but consciousness is shaped 
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through bodily sensations and experiences which are made through the physical 
presence within the life-world. These bodily sensations and experiences are 
attributed to us as our bodily sensations and experiences. Consciousness enables this 
self-relation and “self-designation”, which clearly refers to personhood, rather than to 
our perception of being a thing (Ricœur 1992: 34). 
Considering the reflexive level, in our acting and through the body we have a 
particular uniqueness which can only be attributed to our single and unique being. It 
is this vary uniqueness that enables the awareness of the own personhood as a self. 
The self-reflection enables the awareness of an acting referent as ‘me’, ‘my’ and 
‘mine’– and no ontological or ontic other (Ricœur 1992: 32f). In this account, in 
reference to our own self which reflects our acting, the relation between person, self 
and identity can be expressed as follows: being ‘self’ is a particular role of a person. 
The relation of self and person as associated roles build human identity (Perry 2011: 
380). The self confirms itself in the moment of acting as being the same as the act 
(Scheler 1973a): the ownership of the act is directly, but temporally limited 
confirmed. Thus, a direct relation to our actions is given, without a third party 
resembling another who has to be confirmed as oneself. Such a permanent self-
confirmation, Ricœur (1992: 32) sees fulfilled within the concept of idem through 
which we confirm at every step our self being. 
On closer examination, such an approach also corresponds with Scheler’s 
(1973a) notion of a person as shaping concept. The being of the person appears within 
the act we perform. Therefore, Scheler’s concept of personhood should be understood 
as follows: our actions shape our presence in the life-world. From this derives that the 
notion of the person is defined through our active presence and participation within 
the life-world. We are actively shaping and transforming the life-world through action 
(Sax 2006: 474). These are characteristics and qualities which are attributed to the 
term ‘person’. This self-relation and self-designation enables us to recount a story 
through action, or, perceived in this way, to perform a play to recount a particular 
story. Our character confirms the own past action by narration and play. 
Scheler’s (1973a) notion of the person as shaping concept and Ricœur’s (1992) 
self-attributing approach to personhood support Gallagher and Zahavi’s (2012) 
proposal to consider personhood and narrative identity as the same human condition. 
They assume that we as persons are able to recount stories, and are able to talk about 
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our experiences. These are contextualized and involved in our lifetime story. To be 
precise, experiences are not perceived “as isolated moments but as part of an ongoing 
story” (Schechtman 2011: 398), since every experience is embedded within an 
individual experiential context.  
Perceiving the person as a fractal dividual, which is merged in the environment, 
overcomes the dichotomies of individual – dividual, I/me – the other, and entity – 
society. Such a notion of the person enables new investigations in empathy and 
mutual recognition as appreciation and adequate regard, since every act, whether it 
is intended for us or for others, is an act performed within our own life-world. By 
implication, every act retroacts onto the life-world and influences it. Therefore, acting 
is always social in order to act for us or for and with others. 
 
 
6.1 Western and Melanesian Relations 
Sociocentrism and egocentrism do not necessarily exclude each other; rather, they are 
“integral aspects of every self” (Sökefeld 1999: 430). It is quite obvious that we have 
undoubtedly our own self, which just refers to our own being (e.g. body, reflection, 
self-relation, self-regulation, etc.), but foremost to the ‘outer’ life-world, where we can 
experience ourselves (e.g. agency, feelings, interaction, etc.). 
In the tradition of Sartre (1960) and Meleau-Ponty (1962), the body precedes 
cognitive awareness, since it is conceived as the primary mode of the surroundings’ 
perception as well as conscious and unconscious awareness. It is a naturally given fact 
that every one of us is “normally aware of his or her own body from the inside” 
(Cassam 2011: 146). That does not correspond with our natural conscious awareness 
to think about moving a finger or a leg. Sometimes, the movement of body parts is 
unconscious like raising or lowering the breast due to breathing. Metaphorically 
speaking, “most of us can tell, without looking, whether we are moving or not, or 
whether our legs are crossed” (Cassam 2011: 146). This mode of perception is called 
proprioception, which “is a tacit, pre‐reflective awareness that constitutes the very 
beginning of a primitive body image” (Gallagher 2005: 73; cf. Cassam 2011: 146). 
Nevertheless, the sensation of crossed legs, or the perception of somebody as walking 
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is present. Therefore, “embodiment plays a central role in structuring experience, 
cognition, and action” (Gallagher 2005: 136). 
Like empathy, embodiment is also a broad and diffuse concept. And if it is not 
enough, perspectives on the concepts of body and embodiment differ widely 
(Gallagher 2005: 17–23). Nevertheless, it is useful to distinguish between “body 
image” and “body schema” (Gallagher 2005: 17).  
 
The concept of body image helps to answer the first question about the 
appearance of the body in the perceptual field; in contrast, the concept of 
body schema helps to answer the question about how the body shapes the 
perceptual field (Gallagher 2005: 18).  
 
Both perception and modes of awareness of the life-world, called by Gallagher 
‘perceptual field’, join in the self-reflexive perceptive/awareness of embodiment. 
From this follows, body image is considered as 
 
system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one’s own body 
[…]. It can include mental representations, beliefs, and attitudes where the 
object of such intentional states (that object or matter of fact towards 
which they are directed, or that which they are about) is or concerns one's 
own body (Gallagher 2005: 24), 
 
Whereas body schema is considered as “system of sensory‐motor capacities that 
function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring”, it “involves 
certain motor capacities, abilities, and habits that both enable and constrain 
movement and the maintenance of posture” (Gallagher 2005: 24). Through the body, 
we have a – conscious – bodily perception of the surroundings, and an – unconscious 
– perception of our own self as moving entity. According to that, I suggest here the 
view of embodiment as conscious or unconscious recognition of and reaction to 
processes and influences of the surrounding life-world (Niedenthal and Maringer 
2009: 123). It is therefore no wonder that Gallagher and Zahavi (2012: 132; emphasis 
by the author) can paradoxically, but logically conclude: 
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it is certain that our cognitive experience is shaped by an embodied brain. 
Indeed it is increasingly accepted that the brains we have are shaped by 
the bodies we have, and by our real world actions. Cognition is not only 
embodied, it is situated and, of course, it is situated because it is embodied. 
 
Since from an enactivist point of view, “perceiving is something we do rather than 
something that happens to us” (Cassam 2011: 153), the life-world opens itself to the 
perceiving and bodily present human, and “makes itself available to the perceiver 
through physical movement and interaction” (Noë 2004: 1). This passage reminds one 
of Heidegger’s (1962) concept of being in the world and handiness of equipment, 
which is situated in the world. Dasein stands in the clearing of being. At the same time, 
it discloses the world in the general way of just being in the world, and thus it uncloses 
the world for itself. However, the difference to the enactivist approach is that 
Heidegger (1962) sharply distinguishes between the exterior life-world and our 
interior being. The enactivist approach allows the recognition of ourselves and the 
life-world in exactly one single step, namely through our “sensorimotor knowledge” 
(Noë 2004: 12), since the border between interior being and exterior world is no 
longer strictly given. 
On this account, the criticism of the classical theory of the subject, as postulated 
at the beginning of this work, is substantiated. First, the object within the subject-
object-relation is abolished; second, the subject is no longer directly related to the 
surroundings, rather, it is reflexively directed through its self-wareness: “the subject 
is self-aware in a tacit and non-object-directed manner in and through its being aware 
of the world” (Henry and Thompson 2011: 234). At this point, another connection to 
Scheler (1973d, 1979) and his conception of sympathy and love occurs. As a classical 
phenomenologist in the tradition of Husserl, Scheler (1973a: 372) conceives the body 
as non-living material or “spatial extension” which is animated by our consciousness. 
But even in Scheler’s concept of a person, the personal involvement in the life-world 
is essential. Only through the body we become present. Though Scheler (1973a: 479) 
favors the “domination about the lived body”, it is the awareness of the lived body, 
which allows interaction with the life-world; and Scheler (1973a: 398) determined 
that 
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the lived body does not belong to the sphere of the person or the sphere of 
the acts. It belongs to the object sphere of any ‘consciousness of something’ 
and its kind and ways of being. 
 
this can be understood as our perceived individuality. This understanding of 
individuality has a dual significance. First, it does not include personal characteristics; 
it only refers to the phenomenal unity, which is shaped by us. Second, by using the 
body as presence in the life-world, it is an individual characteristic to reflect the inner-
personal characteristics. By supporting the thesis that emotional perception precedes 
cognitive perception, Scheler must recognize that the body as affective being and ‘the 
human’ as conscious being are divided. In the case that emotions are situated in the 
body, Scheler’s concept of personhood and his thesis of primary emotional perception 
supports, on a basic level, the embodiment-thesis, since the recognition and 
processing of emotions happens in consciousness. Thus, Scheler’s concept of 
personhood shapes individual unity on a phenomenological level. Our consciousness, 
which is tied up within our acts, expresses our being in the life-world. 
From the enactivist approach sketched here follows that bodily awareness as 
self-perception leads to self-consciousness (Bermúdez 2011: 166; Noë 2004): 
through constant self-identification and self-confirmation, which self-consciousness 
ensures, we are always aware of our selfness (Bermúdez 2011: 168). This refers also 
to Ricœur’s (1992) dialectic of idem and ipse in which a constant self-confirmation 
and self-intimacy is given. In addition, bodily awareness influences mental states, for 
instance, the way of counting with the fingers has a direct effect on abstract mental 
representations (Domahs et al. 2010). In reference to pre-reflexive self-intimacy and 
through being oneself, an “effortless way of inner acquaintance, of ‘being in touch with 
yourself’, and phenomenally, of being ‘infinitely close to yourself’” opens up 
(Metzinger 2003: 158). Thinking a step ahead, this concept of embodiment completes 
on a philosophical-theoretical level, the cosmomorphic and sociocentric aspects of 
personhood as introduced with the Melanesian perception of personhood. 
This bodily perception of personhood is supplemented by the temporal 
perception of personhood. As we remember, narrative identity seeks in our own 
biography for reasons of personal development and thus, one could say, narrative 
identity seeks in our own biography for personal identity. It is a continual search for 
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contextualization and our concordance with our actual state. Therefore, the state of 
“synthesis of the heterogeneous” is permanently actual (Ricœur 1992: 141). In other 
words, diachronic lifetime events are permanently actualized in the actual state of 
being. Considering our life as narrative, our self “might be both the narrator and the 
main character, but […] not the sole author” (Zahavi 2005: 109). By this means, 
experiences are of course self-related but shared since they are made in the life-world. 
Therefore, narrative stories belong to more than just one human, rather they are 
multi-authored (Zahavi 2005: 109). In Melanesian communities where the awareness 
of the relationship between our individuality and the social affiliation is very tight, 
narratives constitute a “nexus of relations between past, present, self, and other” 
(White 1991: 4). Through narratives our self and the world are related, since they 
constitute a relation between personal identity and the past, which consists of 
tradition and cultural background (Ricœur 1992: 113f). The narratives already 
investigated in Melanesia work in this manner, since “all myths tell a story” (Lévi-
Strauss 1966: 26). The act of designation of oneself to the world “thus renders 
personal identity a form of historical narrative, which constitutes both the self and the 
world” (Josephides 2008: 108). In this manner, through collective remembrance, 
collectivity and social affiliation are created. This can attain the point where the focus 
of self-recognition shifts from the single human to the social community.  
This corresponds with the cultural, traditional and social background and 
context of every human’s existence, since “the differences [between Melanesian and 
Western perceptions of individuality] are more a product of our (Western) concepts 
of the person than any given quality of social reality” (White 1991: 5). Another aspect, 
apparently problematic here, is ‘social reality’. This can be a tribe, a neighborhood, a 
sports club etc. The notion of ‘social reality’ or ‘social field’ cannot be defined in a 
precise sense. Already made dichotomies like ‘social culture’ and ‘individual culture’ 
depend on Western points of view, within a transfiguration of one’s own ‘social field’. 
Therefore, I suggest conceiving ‘social reality’ or ‘social field’ as a cultural relational 
notion. 
Furthermore, we do not have to move within one social field only; rather, it can 
be created a synthesis derived from elements of other fields. The opportunities for 
such acting are given due to the diachrony of personal as well as social and cultural 
identity, as we have seen with Ricœur (1984). We can compare this improvisation and 
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creation of behavior along with mimesis3. Here, the concept of relational dividuality 
appears. 
In the context of the Melanesian perception of personhood, the diachronic 
structure of narrative identity is consistent with the concept of relational 
individuality. The self seeks and pursues relationships of its surroundings. It finds 
itself within a social life-world where it can create contexts, relationships and 
concerns everywhere. Through this thick web of meaning, autobiographical, 
episodical stories are generated which can become a whole cosmos, or just a short, 
thin, and temporally limited thread. Within the stories a particular storyline is 
highlighted, which recounts the story of a particular aspect of the personal identity. It 
must be admitted that not every experience is worth to be recognized and 
remembered. Even unconscious experiences influence life and lifetime story. Thus, 
formally, it has to be distinguished between ‘mere experience’ and ‘an experience’, but 
all experiences are in a particular stream of chronological temporality as Turner 
(1986) points out in reference to Dilthey (2002). 
 
Mere experience is simply the passive endurance and acceptance of events. 
An experience, like a rock in a Zen sand garden, stands out from the 
evenness of passing hours and years and forms what Dilthey called a 
‘structure of experience’ (Turner 1986: 35). 
 
Each of these experiences can be emphasized and highlighted in our lifetime 
narration. Every narration of our identity allows of another focus. The structure of 
experiences can be ordered enew, and we can recount new stories about our self. 
These stories are not ‘inventions’; rather, they are perspectives on our personal 
biography: in a particular field we introduce ourselves as daughter, in another field as 
student or Rock-Fan. We configure story sequences out of our own lifetime events. In 
a storyline, some events may be excluded, whereas these events appear in other 
storylines. These stories all fit in our narrative identity, but they are only particular 
highlights of the sum of our lifetime experiences. The only important thing, a story has 
to refer to is the individual consistence as well as the plausible relation to reality 
(Schechtman 2011: 405). This “unstable structure of discordant concordance 
characteristic [sic!]” reflects the mode of self-recognition in a particular social role 
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(Ricœur 1992: 142). Every narrative recounts social events and highlights particular 
characteristics. 
Thus, from the perspective of narrative identity, personal identity falls into 
pieces. Identity is never accomplished. As already explained above, every 
interpretation is unique in time as well as space. It creates in every moment a unique 
identity which is destroyed in the next moment. But the pieces persist, and are 
reconfigured within the Ricœurian concept of mimesis. This creative act is situated in 
a cultural as well as temporal context where style and mode matter.  
In relation to the other, our own biographical lifetime, or just certain parts of it, 
are recognized by our self. By implication, our self has to give up a certain part of its 
selfhood conceived as wholeness to allow recognizing and being recognized by the 
other. As Bedorf (2010) already pointed out, the act of recognition always includes 
also its negation. The self is only able to show particular parts of its personality in 
particular situations. Therefore, it is only recognized in those parts of itself which it is 
showing. Since the ontological or ontic other is essential to confirm our identity as 
well as the one of the other, without the other selfhood cannot be recognized. Only 
through the other, our self can stand within the permanence of time as self-identical 
in its personal identity, and confirm itself in its existence. Our self confirms its 
relationship to the other through the promise as keeping one’s word, and through the 
permanent parts of the character. Heidegger (1962, 1998) already showed that our 
ethos is our situation and relation to the other, which is care for the other, and for us 
− if ipse-identity is conceived as the phenomenological other. These concepts and 
perceptions of identity do not contradict the concept of our permeability and 
partibility. On a theoretical level, narrative identity supports these aspects of 
personhood, since the self can only recognize itself through the mediation of 
otherness. This otherness could be the surrounding life-world as well as the other 
concrete living human. Permeability here also functions as openness for other 
surrounding influences. Partibility is provided for by the different stories, which can 
be recounted. 
Our self performs a hermeneutical reflection by making conscious both our 
acting and the relation of responsibility for the other. By taking responsibility for our 
acting, we are understood as autonomous acting humans. But, what does the term 
‘autonomy’ mean? From a Western point of view, an autonomous acting human is a 
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human whose acting is self-sufficient, self-confirming, and independent. Bearing in 
mind that autonomy is a universal human concept does such a Western concept of 
autonomy fit in with a decentralized and desubjectivated concept of personhood, as 
illustrated by this work? In the eyes of Taylor (1985: 97) we are a “respondent” who 
gives a response as a perpetual reaction to the action of another. That makes ‘person’ 
a “sub-class of agents” (Taylor 1985: 97). Considering social acting as perpetual 
process, the perspective on ourselves as perpetual respondents is logically true. Our 
exceptional quality is, however, that we can act due to acting as creating meaning. By 
this means we respond out of “the original significance of things” (Taylor 1985: 99), 
wired by our individual perception. According to Taylor (1985: 105), in the acting role 
of the person “[t]he centre is no longer the power to plan, but rather the openness to 
certain matters of significance”. This definition goes beyond the standard definition 
of a person and solves the question of autonomy in a certain kind. 
 
 
6.2 The Question of Autonomy 
Considered from a Western point of view, the Western individual is always provided 
with the attribute ‘autonomy’ or ‘autonomous acting’ (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 
35). The previous remarks on the self as ‘relational individual’, however, show that 
such an attribution of autonomy to personhood is not that clear and logical anymore. 
To illustrate this, I begin this argument with a short history of autonomy according to 
Mauss (1985). 
As Mauss (1985) points out, within the context of personhood our name unifies 
social and personal identity as well as our narrative self and our personhood. The first 
name is personal and individual, whereas the surname describes traditionally the 
tasks and roles within the social community as well as the family origin. Thus, Mauss 
(1985) uses the term ‘personnage’ to emphasize the social roles we represent. Here, 
‘personnage’ means ‘wearing a mask’ like actors in ancient dramas used to do, which 
alludes to the different personal characteristics focused on within particular social 
fields. 
As a symbol, our names show who we are, and why we act. Through our name, 
we symbolically identify our self as own being, and thus we are able to objectify our 
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self in a reflective way. By this means, we are able to identify our self as the 
grammatical third person (Ricœur 1992: 34) or in a accusative as “’It's me here’ (me 
voici!)” (Ricœur 1992: 22). Both views of our self refer to a particular kind of 
objectification, which allows to perceive our self as another through the diachrony of 
narrative identity. Even if in every stage of self-objectification we confirm our identity 
with the ontological ‘other self’, this perception continually allows a new focus on our 
lifetime, since the ‘new self’ is enriched with new experiences and knowledge. Thus, 
we are perceived and perceive ourselves as social and cultural actors who “receive 
the imprint of society or, in turn, may be regarded as changing and altering the 
character of those connections and relations” (Strathern 1988: 12). On that basis, 
Mauss (1985: 18ff) adjudges moral and social awareness only to personhood. With 
the rise of morality in personhood the problem of autonomy occurs. Thus, autonomy 
always needs interconnectedness with others, or else it would be a “psychological 
chimera” (Straub and Zielke 2005: 167). 
 
Autonomy therefore appears to be dependent on heteronomy, but in 
another sense of ‘other’: the other of freedom in the figure of the law, which 
freedom nevertheless gives itself; the other of feeling in the figure of 
respect (Ricœur 1992: 275). 
 
This definition of autonomy is not Ricœur’s conclusion. Rather it is the beginning of a 
way; we could walk from autonomy to respect for the other. Exactly this is the point 
which seems interesting in Ricœur’s approach: autonomy is a kind of our self-
regulation, which leads to a particular role in society. It is deeply intervowen with 
responsibility and promise towards us and the other (Straub and Zielke 2005: 168). 
In this context, it is again visible that we are always situated in relation to the social 
environment, what makes us necessarily social. 
The freedom of autonomy comes along with responsibility, and so is a moral 
anchor of personhood. The moral notion of the person or ‘the moral person’ can be 
conceived in reference to the permanence of the self within narrative identity. As 
Proust (1954: 80) described it:  
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[l]a fille de cuisine était une personne morale, une institution permanente 
à qui des attributions invariables assuraient une sorte de continuité et 
d’identité, à travers la succession des formes passagères en lesquelles elle 
s’incarnait.35 
 
As explained in this passage, morality is conceived as something continual and 
perpetual within our identity, like a never changing character or keeping one’s word. 
Morality binds us to past events and past decisions, to a ‘personne morale’, an 
institution of reliability and promise. For this reason, identity corresponds with 
personal responsibility in acting. 
Acting is a behavior we necessarily execute to be and to exist. In a particular 
way, we act freely, and thus we are able to improvise behavior which we have not 
learned or experienced yet. By responding to an act performed by others, we attribute 
meaning to the other’s acting. Through this meaning, a human can give responses 
freely. Therefore, autonomy can be conceived as a universal concept in self-
fulfillment. In accordance with Ricœur (1992), identity is a complex, dynamic, 
diachronic and, at the same time, synchronic structure that is never accomplished. 
Based on this interwoveness, the execution of an act can be described as follows: 
 
[o]n the one hand, self-understanding passes through the detour of 
understanding the cultural signs in which the self documents and forms 
itself. On the other hand, understanding the text is not an end in itself; it 
mediates the relation to himself of a subject who, in the short circuit of 
immediate reflection, does not find the meaning of his own life. Thus it 
must be said, with equal force, that reflection is nothing without the 
mediation of signs and works, and that explanation is nothing if it is not 
incorporated as an intermediary stage in the process of self-
understanding. In short, in hermeneutical reflection − or in reflective 
hermeneutics − the constitution of the self is contemporaneous with the 
constitution of meaning (Ricœur 1991a: 118f). 
                                            
35 English translation: “The kitchen-maid was an abstract personality, a permanent institution to which 
an invariable set of functions assured a sort of fixity and continuity and identity throughout the 
succession of transitory human shapes in which it was embodied“ (Proust 1928: 110). 
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Considering this perspective, our autonomy becomes visible by symbolism and 
significance of meaning, not only by practical actions, since symbolism and 
significance of meaning are embedded in traditions and the cultural context as 
theoretical or tacit knowledge. It is obvious that there does not exist just one single 
concept of meaning or significance, since 
 
the lives of selves must be described in ways that make the events and 
actions in them meaningful or significant in ways that naturalistic, 
reductive descriptions cannot. Meaning and significance of the relevant 
sort are humanistic concepts, not scientific ones, and are related to human 
goals and projects (Schechtman 2011: 402). 
 
The directedness of acting to reach particular goals and achieve projects, which are 
furnished with significance and meaning, leads to the conclusion: “autonomy assumes 
its strong sense, namely the responsibility for one's own judgment” (Ricœur 1992: 
275). 
In contrast, autonomy as qualitative human autarchy, normative personality or 
autoplexy, and as being self-responsible and self-acting, is not only a Western concept 
– it is above all a Western invention (Welker 2002: 9f). The latter, autoplexy, is a 
postmodern neologism. It means “‘playing with’ a multiplicity of shifting roles and 
identities to secure freedom of action and social position” (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2002: 79). Autoplexy, therefore, involves autonomous acting and playing with our 
narratives, whereas autonomy highlights the normative aspects of acting. Both 
approaches are socially bounded, since particular social roles are related to the 
structure of society, and therefore, are normatively regulated. 
As a social concept, autonomy is not that easy to investigate. Köpping (2002) 
doubts if it is necessary to use the term. For him, the concept of autonomy is a 
“European chimera” (Köpping 2002: 48). In particular, the term itself has Western 
roots. Therefore, it is difficult to integrate such a concept into the understanding of 
other cultures. An apex of autonomy or the ideal of a full autonomous human would 
be asocial, because a full autonomous human would be that free in behavior that there 
would be no social or cultural dependency or restriction that would hypothesize a 
sense of interaction. Such an ultimate autonomy is − among humans – unthinkable, 
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since we are social beings, and define ourselves through interaction which has 
necessarily a social basis. 
However, attempts exist to render a universal statement of autonomy that 
involves not only Western aspects, but includes concepts of autonomy from other 
cultures. Therefore, autonomy is considered as a social concept (Welker 2002: 10f). 
Through the prism of normative aspects like acting, normative personality, or a Greek 
agonistic self, autonomy means free acting in a cultural way (Welker 2002: 9f). 
In reference to Mauss (1985), Köpping (2002) compares autonomous acting 
humans with protagonists in a play. They have a script according to which they 
behave. Thus, they are acting as if wearing a mask. This approach to perceiving culture 
as a script has often been criticized, but this is not Köpping’s intention. He suggests 
perceiving such a cultural script as a useful guidance for action, which is contextual, 
historic, and culturally related. Such a script makes an impact on intertextuality, 
intersubjectivity and social performance and their habitual behavior (Köpping 2002: 
49). Especially this perception on ourselves following a normative script makes the 
Western concept of individual to a relational dividual. Perceived in this way, human 
autonomy does not depend any longer on the unlimited freedom of agency; rather, it 
depends on freely acting in accordance with social scripts, which leads to social acting 
conceived as masking within a role-play. For this reason, Köpping (2002) refers to 
Bourdieu’s (1984, 1990, 2012) habitus and field theory. According to this theory, 
simply formulated, in each field, perceived as a structured social space, we have a 
particular habitus, since each social field has a particular structure consisting of roles, 
beliefs, expected conducts, and behaviors. According to Bourdieu (1984; 2012), acting 
is definitively structured, but it possesses dynamic components. Though it consists of 
only four primary and fundamental elements, Bourdieu’s concept is very thick. 
Bourdieu’s approach sets up the concept of habitus as our system of dispositions. 
Habitus means knowledge about specific objects and their reality, but also “common 
knowledge or theoretical knowledge” (Bourdieu 1984:467). By this means, habitus is 
both a special status in society and socially influenced by individual and personal 
everyday behavior. In Bourdieu’s approach a transformative act can be performed, if 
habitus as our action in a particular field, like friendship circle, school, or family, 
introduces an individual change in this particular field, which influences the others’ 
acting in this field. 
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Through habitus and acting in the field, more knowledge is gained. Bourdieu 
calls this particular knowledge and the consciousness about this knowledge in a 
particular dimension social, economic, cultural, and symbolic capital. In particular, 
these are types of consciousness about one’s own knowledge, experience and life 
situation so that they have a direct effect on habitus. In consequence, acting seems 
distinct as well as similar to other particular groups. Thus, the notion of capital 
expresses knowledge, life style, taste and social status. Through that distinct or similar 
acting, we possess social space where life style and taste are lived and shown. 
Bourdieu is able to derive a formula of practice to set in context his concepts of 
habitus, field, capital and social space: [(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice (Bourdieu 
1984:101). Although this formula lacks social space, it is inherent within the 
combination of habitus and capital. Finally, habitus is a “modus operandi” which is not 
learned in discourses but in practice (Bourdieu 2012:87). Every learned behavior is a 
deviation from previous existing structures, which are interpreted in an individual 
way related to a “style of a period or a class” (Bourdieu 2012:86).  
Köpping (2002) claims that habitus structures a new performance, since it is 
situated between the given structure of the world and our action motivations. The 
nature of our habitus is a certain improvisation between the world’s structure and 
our self’s desires (Köpping 2002: 52). In this context, we always orientate our habitus 
towards the surrounding field. Following Köpping (2002: 52), habitus is newly 
structured in every interaction. This matches with the notion of personnage 
conceived as a mask wearing protagonist in a play, according to Mauss (1985). Just 
like a protagonist in a play, we have to highlight particular characteristics and a 
particular behavior to be recognized in a social field. This is more than mere role-
playing along a special script. To emphasize that, Köpping (2002) introduces the term 
improvisation in this context. Improvisation does not have a script, which prescribes 
a particular way of acting in a particular social field. In consequence, improvisation 
requires a behavior that deals with autonomy. 
The factor of the social community builds a necessary counterpart to confirm 
our self, as already shown with Hegel. Thus, social interaction is the necessary mirror 
for our self to confirm it and to achieve self-legislation. Therefore, against Mead’s 
concept of the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ (1962: 173–178), which says that our ‘Me’ is related to 
the generalized other, which is understood as “organized community or social group 
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which gives to the individual his unity of self” (Mead 1962: 154), narrative identity is 
characterized through continuous self-relation, without an objectification. For Mead 
our self is even more related to social structure than to one’s own self being 
(Josephides 2008: 24). Through Honneth in his early work follows Mead in his claim 
that the self struggles for recognition by complying with the expectations of others 
(Juul 2013: 88), through the embeddedness in narratives, the narrative self does not 
necessarily have to externalize itself. We act in accordance with our will, since we are 
embedded in cultural, social and traditional frames. We obey ourselves to obey the 
claims of others. Such an argument follows Lévinas’s notion of the trail of the third 
party. The third party is not directly related to the own self or the other, but through 
the ethical involvement it cannot be understood as a generalized other (Bedorf 2005: 
53). The third party has to be understood as  
 
a double figure: Insofar as it can be an other for the Ego, it maintains on 
the one hand a relation with the Ego as radical as the other himself (Bedorf 
2006: 263). 
 
Here, it becomes visible that the third is not only an external ethical instance, 
but,rather it also works inside our self as the inherent other. In this way, the third 
party shows more similarities with the narrative self. It cannot be taken as a ‘neutral’ 
or ‘objective’ position, rather, the third party is the ethical relation of the ‘I’ and the 
other, who in her or his self-being only appears in the social dimension, in other 
words, it “is at the same time an other for the I and the representative of the symbolic 
order” (Bedorf 2006: 260). An objective position would mean to situate oneself in a 
metaphysical dimension, where one is able to overlook all subjective circumstances 
in favor of an objective review of all situation. Such a position is equal to God. 
Accordaning to Ricœur (1992: 207), this fits in the concept of autonomy 
conceived as a state where our acts obtain their self-legislation, and which is 
embedded in cultural, traditional, and social frames. “[W]hen autonomy substitutes 
for obedience to another obedience to oneself, obedience has lost all character of 
dependence and submission. True obedience, one could say, is autonomy” (Ricœur 
1992: 210). By this means, the self acts according to its own will, which is culturally 
and socially determined. Therefore, in the context of mutual recognition, full 
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autonomy “is achievable only under socially supportive conditions” (Anderson and 
Honneth 2005: 130). In summary, the relation between social context and autonomy 
can be formulated as follows: 
 
[i]n a nutshell, the central idea is that the agentic competencies that 
comprise autonomy require that one be able to sustain certain attitudes 
toward oneself (in particular, self-trust, self-respect, and self-esteem) and 
that these affectively laden self-conceptions […] are dependent, in turn, on 
the sustaining attitudes of others (Anderson and Honneth 2005: 130f). 
 
The problem, which occurs here, is, above all, the opacity of mind, since we have to 
ask ourselves: ‘what do I know about the other?’, but also ‘how much otherness do I 
have in myself?’ This question can be answered with Lévinas’ (1969) concept of 
totality and infinity of the other. The self cannot understand the other in the full sense 
of his meaning, rather, the self can recognize the other as other than the own self. 
 
 
6.3 Summary 
In the way of Gallagher and Zahavi (2012: 205), the narrative self complies with 
personhood, whereas selfhood complies with the experiential self. In retrospect on 
the personal relationality to the life-world, personal acting appears as always social. 
This approach is on its way to meet the Melanesian perception of personhood. 
Narrativity is fundamentally relational, since when we recount a story, we highlight a 
particular red threat of our life. This read threat is a part of our identity, but it remains 
a part. It is exactly this particular part of our life we recount, which is recognized by 
others. Other parts are not important in this particular situation. Through the other, 
we gain recognition for our story and for our self. We are in ‘divided’ in recognized 
story-parts by being related to the social life-world, but we allow this social process 
of recognizing because we want to know our self. That makes us permeable for the 
other. The concept of autonomy fits in this social and cultural framework, since 
autonomy appears as self-regulation in dependence of the self and the other against 
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the background of the cultural framework oneself is living in. Here, the concept of 
autonomy creates a social foundation, in which everyone is interwoven. 
We do not only recognize ourselves as persons, but also the other. In this 
context, empathic understanding becomes an act of recognition. We are aware of the 
fact that the other is a person ‘like me’, thus we have implicit and explicit assumptions 
about the other’s action. As I show in the next part, this also works within the 
dimension of the relational self, which perceives the other as part of itself. 
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7. Empathic Understanding 
as Act of Mutual Recognition 
What empathy is and how it is performed depends on the social community and its 
cultural background and traditions (Feinberg 2011; Mageo 2011). Context and 
surroundings define the particular and culturally limited notion of empathy. In a 
double sense, understanding is a crucial factor for empathy. Without a diffuse 
understanding of ourselves and of the other, feelings and actions cannot be 
comprehended. This applies for acting persons as well as for the structural observer 
(read: ethnographer). But, what does it mean to know something? 
Cavell’s (1976) approach to the notion of recognition examines a linguistic 
account of the question what the expression ‘I know’ does mean. By not taking the 
term ‘recognition’ in favor of ‘acknowledgement’, Cavell’s approach bears a semantic 
wideness (Bedorf 2010: 130). Within the context of recognition, the term 
‘acknowledgement’ allows to deal with the following question: 
 
unless we can share or swap feelings, we can’t know what that person is 
experiencing (if anything). I do not say this is a perfectly unobjectionable 
idea, but I am far from confident that I know what is objectionable about 
it. And I am confident that if I have to consider the question ‘Can I have the 
same feeling he does?’ (Cavell 1976: 247). 
 
From the perspective of acknowledgement and understanding, utterances of 
everyday life deal with the various meanings of ‘I know’. Considering the impossibility 
of access to another’s inner life, the soul or the mind, the only means, through which 
the inner life of the other can be observed is language and bodily expressions (Cavell 
1976: 245; Bedorf 2010: 130). 
As a skeptic, Cavell asks how we can have an idea about another’s pain without 
feeling it by ourselves. Certainly, if someone feels pain and shares it with others by 
communication, everyone has an idea about this pain. The response to the utterance 
‘I have pain’ is acknowledgement. From such a reaction, it can be derived that we 
  Empathic Understanding as Act of Mutual Recognition 
 189 
know how the other feels. Although it is impossible, as shown above with Scheler’s 
phenomenology of sympathy, to have the same feeling, it is a given fact that the other 
understands the utterance ‘I feel pain’. Thus, the utterance ‘I know you feel pain’ is 
logically true. But, what does it mean to say I know? 
Cavell begins his investigation with an analysis of the different notions of the 
utterance ‘I know’. 
 
(1) There is ‘I know New York (Sanskrit, the signs of the Zodiac, Garbo, 
myself)’. To know in such cases is to have become acquainted with, or to 
have learned, or got the hang of. (2) There is, again, ‘I know I am a 
nuisance’, ‘I know I am being childish’, ‘I know I am late’. To (say you) know 
in these cases is to admit, confess, acknowledge. (3) There is, again, the use 
of ‘I know’ to agree or confirm what has been said, or to say I already knew 
(Cavell 1976: 255). 
 
With regard to these three notions of ‘I know’, the meaning of recognition as 
acknowledgement is brought into consideration with knowledge, acceptance, praise 
and respect as ways of empathy. Within the first and the third context, ‘I know’ means 
a confirmation or acceptance that a fact is already known or learned (Cavell 1976: 
255). In the second context of his interpretation of ‘I know’, Cavell accomplishes a 
little masterpiece in his argument by deriving from the structure of knowledge a form 
of recognition: if we admit that something is known or learned by ourselves, then this 
knowledge is true for us, and it is recognized as our own knowledge. Conceived in this 
way, the content of knowledge is respected and praised. However, this perception of 
recognition as a state or a situation is more than mere knowledge about something. 
“[F]rom my acknowledging that I am late it follows that I know I’m late (which is what 
my words say); but from my knowing I am late, it does not follow that I acknowledge 
I’m late” (Cavell 1976: 256f). In other words, knowledge about something does not 
mean to acknowledge or to recognize it.  
 
It is not enough that I know (am certain) that you suffer − I must do or 
reveal something (whatever can be done). In a word, I must acknowledge 
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it, otherwise I do not know what ‘(your or his) being in pain’ means (Cavell 
1976: 263). 
 
Cavell’s approach to knowledge and acknowledgement shows that it is necessary for 
the recognition of the other to perceive the other as a human who acts and feels. Thus, 
acting and feelings lead to a particular behavior as a direct reaction. The act of 
recognition as a particular kind of care or sympathy unveils the true content of known 
facts. Cavell’s approach does not show an outline of recognition as knowledge, but it 
makes visible how the act of recognition is a particular behavior toward knowledge. 
It is obvious that “certainty is not enough” (Cavell 1976: 258); rather an empathic 
relationship, which ensures the understanding of the other, has to be established. It 
has to be considered that in each stage understanding is bound to the individual stage 
of personal communicative relationships between us. 
Empathic understanding is led by feelings and biography, and that means it is 
lead by perception and experience. Since understanding demands some previous 
knowledge, “perceptual experience presents the world as being this way or that; to 
have experience, therefore, one must be able to appreciate how the experience 
presents things as being” (Noë 2004: 181). On this foundation, empathic relationships 
are based on. The empathic level is dependent on the personal motivation of interest 
which leads empathic understanding. For example, if Jane does not have any interest 
in Peter, Jane would not understand Peter in the same way as when she would be 
interested in Peter. Thus, if Jane likes Peter very much, Jane’s empathic level is high; 
if Jane does not like Peter, Jane’s empathic level is low. In the context of acting 
motivation, empathic relationships can be called ‘we-relations’, where “our 
experiences are not only coordinated with one another, but are also reciprocally 
determined and related to one another” (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 67). These 
relationships are based on mutual recognition, since “[t]he mirroring of self in the 
experience of the stranger (more exactly, in my grasp of the Other’s experience of me) 
is a constitutive element” (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 67). Precisely through this 
particular act of mutual recognition, the other is conceived as a human being, just like 
us. Since in this act not only understanding is performed, but also sympathy and care 
(Bedorf 2010: 131). 
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Especially in the case of personal recognition it can be reconstructed how we 
are recognized: through empathic understanding an act of knowledge is achieved, in 
which the other is perceived and acknowledged as another human similar to 
ourselves. Through empathic understanding a transformation from a simple being to 
a full person is performed. To put it down to the point, the utterance ‘I know you feel 
pain’ is not an assertion about knowledge, rather, it is an expression of care and 
sympathy (Bedorf 2010: 131). 
 
 
7.1 The Ethos of the Caring and Sympathetic Self 
The definition of our being through care and sympathy highlights our social wellbeing. 
We see that the recognition of others is constitutive for the community, as we 
recognize others and take care of them.  
With Heidegger, I argue that care and solicitude are the primary points of 
understanding the world, since they ensure the interest for being in the world. The 
life-world is enclosed by naturally given curiosity: “Understanding is the existential 
Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being 
discloses in itself what its Being is capable of” (Heidegger 1962: 184). In other words, 
care constitutes the relational meaning [Bezugssinn] toward the world (Aurenque 
2011: 60). Therefore, Heidegger (1962, 1998) links care and action responsibility on 
an existential level which refers to the good character and results in ethos as our good 
attitude. Ricœur (1992) extends this approach toward a direction to the other. The 
relationship between our self and the other within an ethical relationship is described 
by Ricœur (1992: 192) as follows: 
 
in the case of the injunction coming from the other, equality is 
reestablished only through the recognition by the self of the superiority of 
the other's authority; in the case of sympathy that comes from the self and 
extends to the other, equality is reestablished only through the shared 
admission of fragility and, finally, of mortality.  
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In consequence, the ethical relationship between the self and the other describes 
mutual solicitude, and in this way mutual self-confirmation. 
 
On the level of the ethical aim, however, solicitude, as the mutual exchange 
of self-esteems, is affirmative through and through. This affirmation, 
which can well be termed original, is the hidden soul of the prohibition. It 
is what, ultimately, arms our indignation, that is, our rejection of indignities 
inflicted on others (Ricœur 1992: 221). 
 
Our self’s solicitude is a reflexive function which ensures the relationship of our own 
self and the other. Solicitude is always already there, but it can only be there with 
others, out of sociality (Ricœur 1992: 180). Aditionally, solicitude is tightly bound to 
autonomy (Ricœur 1992: 18), since the social surrounding brings us into 
responsibility. In the wake of Lévinas, we are forced to care for the other and feel 
responsible for her or him. For that reason, Ricœur (1992: 138f) is able to ask, “if my 
identity were to lose all importance in every respect, would not the question of others 
also cease to matter?”. Our identity is bound to the permanent confirmation of our 
own self within our identity, even if it is subjected to dynamic changes. Such things 
like ‘carefreeness’ cannot exist, since we at least always care about our self-
confirmation: through the inextricable relationship of our self to the other, which is 
based on self-confirmation through the active existence of the other in the life-world, 
the self cannot be freed from its purpose to care. 
Within the context of Heidegger’s conception of care and ethos, solicitude in 
Ricœur’s sense, represents the same function of reasonable insight, which confirms 
both existences, our’s and the other’s. Consequently, both care and solicitude operate 
on the level of “ontological destiny” (Marx 1986: 28) to be directed to the other, and 
thus to ensure mutual recognition. Althrough Ricœur (1992) does not refer to 
Heidegger’s concept of care, a certain similarity appears. Especially through the new 
perspective provided by Heidegger’s notion of care through ethos, care moves close 
to Ricœur’s concept of solicitude. At this point, I take figure 5 as basis into account, 
and extended it by an arrow to create figure 8: 
 
  Empathic Understanding as Act of Mutual Recognition 
 193 
 
Figure 8: the self-related trias of Dasein – Being-with – care. 
 
As figure 5, figure 8 shows the trias Dasein – Being-with – care with the particular 
extentions that solicitude is labeled with self-reflexivity. Each Dasein is Being-with for 
another. Thus, social interaction processes between Being-withs which indeed are 
Dasein. Considering the context of the self, self-reflexivity has to be integrated into 
this process of social interaction. By this means, through self-esteem and self-
confirmation care for the ontological and ontic other is performed. Based on the 
premise that every Being-with is a Dasein, and vice versa, our being has to be 
confirmed and recognized through the existence of the other. Whereas, a step 
‘outside’ from Dasein to Being-with has to be made with Heidegger, this step becomes 
unnecessary with the complete reflexivity of the self, which can only recognize itself 
through the other in its own existence. Dasein and Being-with appear as the same, 
since a human without sociality and “worldly involvements” is unthinkable, “is an 
abstraction” (Barresi and Martin 2011: 49). From the perspective of narrative identity 
our self is always another, thus, self-reflexivity secures the identity of our self. From 
Heidegger’s view, care secures the social inclusion of Dasein, but if care is directed to 
Being-with as the ontological or ontic other, Being-with is the purpose of this 
directedness.36 Care is necessary to ensure a certain dynamic movement within 
                                            
36 Heidegger himself writes: “Der Grundsinn der faktischen Lebensbewegtheit ist das Sorgen 
(curarare). In dem gerichteten, sorgenden ‚Aussein auf etwas‘ ist das Worauf der Sorge des Lebens da, 
die jeweilige Welt. Die Sorgensbewegtheit hat den Charakter des Umgangs des faktischen Lebens mit 
seiner Welt. Das Worauf der Sorge ist das Womit des Umgangs“ (Heidegger 2005: 352). 
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Dasein (Aurenque 2011: 36). Within a brave conclusion, I claim that in Heidegger’s 
conception of Dasein, Being-with is more social than care, since ‘care’ is Dasein’s 
ability or quality to be directed to the other. It is the means to be social. Without the 
other as Being-with, care would not have any sense. But, the point of dichotomy of the 
self and the other is not bridged yet. 
Empathy has not only to be settled in the dimension of our self and the other, it 
has to be settled in the dimension where our personal self merges with the act itself. 
By implication, our self has to be conceived as embedded or embodied in the life-
world, since it is the body who is present in the life-world. 
 
Our body, through postures and conventional as well as non-conventional 
gestures, is a continuous source of information for others to get access to 
our conscious and unconscious attitudes or to the possible direction of our 
future actions. Even the most conventionalized of the codes at our 
disposal, human language, is typically at work at a speed and in a fashion 
that implies a considerable dose of routine, habitual thought, and encoding 
(Duranti 2008: 492). 
 
Embodied or bodily communication is performed all the time. By sharing parts of the 
inner life, “people see and practice introspection” (Duranti 2008: 492). In recent 
Western debate, such introspection can be performed as ‘felt analogy’ or, to put it in 
philosophical vocabulary, in the “argument from analogy”, which says: 
 
the only mind I have direct access to is my own. My access to the mind of 
another is always mediated by his bodily behaviour. But how can the 
perception of another person’s body provide me with information about 
his mind? In my own case, I can observe that I have experiences when my 
body is causally influenced, and that these experiences frequently bring 
about certain actions. I observe that other bodies are influenced and act in 
similar manners, and I therefore infer by analogy that the behaviour of 
foreign bodies is associated with experiences similar to those I have myself 
(Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 181). 
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If the self cares about its own being, it automatically cares about the other, because 
the other is – or is part of – our life-world. Against this background, life-world as the 
biography of the self is established, as already shown at the beginning of our journey, 
as our ‘home’ or “Lebenshaus” (Galuschek 2014: 377). We live in the life-world for a 
complete otherness. At the same time, we furnish our life-world with memories, 
beliefs, desires and wishes. The way we arrange these memories, beliefs, desires, and 
wishes is the style of our narration. We narrate from the past to the present for the 
future’s sake, since every one of us has experience- and knowledge-based 
expectations and wishes for the future. Thus, life-world is self-narrated, but at the 
same time, it provides our self with narration: the life-world appears as our own story, 
where past and present are linked with expectations for the future. 
 
 
7.2 Still the Problem of Opaque Minds 
Until now, we have talked a lot about understanding, reflexivity, care and their social 
and communicative abilities and qualities, but even such intrinsic human features 
need to be performed. All these abilities and qualities as assumed human dispositions 
are acts, which can be performed unconsciously as well as consciously. The 
unconscious way to perform is to reflect constantly and to set all perceived 
phenomena in contexts. The latter one can also be a conscious process, but if the 
context is not self-given, we have to ask questions. Through questioning, knowledge 
can be expanded which allows us to discover new horizons and to make new 
experiences (Angehrn 2008: 53,55). Thus, hermeneutical reflection is performed on a 
social and cultural level. With Cavell, I have pointed out that empathic understanding 
is already performed in human relationships, because a logical certainty is not enough 
to understand the other in an empathic way. So, every empathic act deals with 
understanding. It has to be established an empathic relationship which ensures the 
understanding of the other. Such kinds of relationships are developed since birth over 
the entire lifetime. Without doubt, we are moving in and between such relationships 
without being able to resolve these relationships. 
Taking a step back, the act of understanding has to involve phenomena of the 
life-world. These can be all animated or unanimated things the life-world consists of. 
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On the phenomenological level, understanding is not only a social act, but also – of 
course – a conscious act. The classical phenomenological introspection, which 
involves only the pure conscious act, is not sufficient for the observation and 
description of natural human behavior and interaction within the life-world. In 
Heidegger’s sense, empathy, however, appears as much more than mere 
understanding and reproducible interpretation. It is the constant relationship with 
others. The inherent structure of care secures an intentional directedness towards the 
life-world with all its animated and unanimated things. Thus, it shows a deep interest 
in and interwovenness with the surroundings. 
Considering that the self is only able to perceive and understand things within 
individual, personal and relational contexts, the theory of mind provides different 
frames to ‘understand our understanding’, since it includes individual, personal and 
relational framings. At exact this point, it is obvious that a pure phenomenological 
approach in a classical sense is not sufficient to render the whole act of empathic 
understanding. It seems more likely to be a combination of classical phenomenology 
and hermeneutics: narratives are found in a phenomenological state, since they refer to 
experiences and knowledge which are gained in the phenomenological life-world. But 
they are individual, personal and relational, and thus context related, therefore they 
need to be formulated as hermeneutical reflection on an unconscious or conscious level. 
 
[N]arratives are grounded in observable events that take place in the 
world. […] [N]arrative is a particular mode of thinking that relates to the 
concrete and particular; it takes the concrete context to be of primary 
importance in the determination of meaning. In contrast, theories in the 
proper sense of the term are concerned with the abstract and general, and 
in this sense they abstract away from the particular context (Gallagher and 
Zahavi 2012: 194f). 
 
Here, Gallagher and Zahavi favor the argument from analogy in contrast to theory 
theory or simulation theory accounts by combining both accounts. Simulation theory 
is represented through the approach of “an immediate and direct access to the content 
of our own minds”, whereas theory theory is represented through the argument that 
“understanding of others is an inference to best explanation, an inference bringing us 
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from observed public behaviour to a hidden mental cause” (Gallagher and Zahavi 
2012: 181). However, all these approaches “miss some basic and important capacities 
for social cognition” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 192). The argument from analogy 
links both approaches because only life-wordly experiences through the body are 
observable for us and for our mind. On this basis, we are able to make assumptions 
about the life-world, and we “therefore infer by analogy that the behaviour of foreign 
bodies is associated with experiences similar to those” we have ourselves (Gallagher 
and Zahavi 2012: 181). Since it has not to be a conscious process, the argument from 
analogy is conceived as universal. 
Wassmann and Funke (2013: 240) encourage the thesis that the “theory of 
mind, the possibility to put oneself in the position of someone else, is probably 
cognitive and affective, universally present”. They point out that without doubt “[t]he 
cognitive competence exists, yet, and this is decisive, due to cultural reasons it can be 
made visible only at a later stage or can be entirely unwanted” (Wassmann and Funke 
2013: 241). Emotions, to be more precisely ‘feelings’, are classified in the same way 
(Wassmann and Funke 2013: 241), since they “operate like overlearned cognitive 
habits” and are “shaped, to a significant degree, by the environment” (Reddy 2001: 
34). Neither the ability to access a theory of mind nor emotional competences are 
“culturally predetermined […], but they are innate, and according to culture and 
language suppressed, expressed or differently classified. If a word is lacking, it does 
not mean that the emotion is lacking” (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 241). Thus, the 
degree of development of a theory of mind depends on the cultural and linguistic 
context. The claim that “theory of mind abilities develop universally among all human 
populations” (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 246) can thus be broken down to the 
consideration: empathy as ability to focus “on representations as motivators for 
behaviour […] is a human universal” (Träuble et al. 2013: 25). In this case, the ability 
for a theory of mind, and not the concept itself should be in the focus of investigation 
and observation (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 246). 
An issue in the discussion about the concept and practice of the opacity of mind 
is the idea to investigate the universality of such ‘visible’ or ‘invisible’ introspections. 
Within common everyday life, for instance, even in Western societies, one may 
observe that people feel uncomfortable while talking about others; or if they know 
that others are talking about them, they feel uncomfortable, too. We know it by 
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ourselves. Considering this personal context, the doctrine of the opacity of mind 
appears “as a defense strategy against the accountability that comes with making 
claims about what others think or want” (Duranti 2008: 493). We might also guess 
that this attitude of the doctrine of the opacity of mind is, in reality, an attitude of 
respect for the other with a moral implication, which “implies a pan-human 
preoccupation with reducing one’s accountability” (Duranti 2008: 493). By 
implication, the doctrine of the opacity of mind does not limit our ability to 
understand the other. Understanding, as already shown above, does not implicate 
mind reading abilities like “comprehending […] discrete ‘mental states’ but rather 
their attitudes and responses as whole situated persons” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 
193), since the problem with the doctrine of the opacity of mind is that it is a doctrine. 
It is a folk belief. Strictly speaking, it is a traditional custom which is performed by a 
particular cultural community. Althrough mind reading is a human universal, which 
means that every one of us possesses the ability to empathic understanding or mind 
reading, cultural frame and individual interpretation within which it is realized, lead 
to the acceptance and usage of this ability or its denial. In many cases, mind reading 
is an unconscious action which is linked with particular expectations of contextual 
common behavior (Carruthers 2011). Therefore, Carruthers (2011: 236) argues for 
considering two systems of mind reading: 
 
[o]ne is quick and intuitive, and doesn't require the resources of domain-
general working memory. The other is slower and more reflective, and 
utilizes the rehearsal and global broadcasting qualities of the working 
memory system.  
 
Therefore, transparence is not even given in our own mind, since assumptions are 
made unconsciously, since during lifetime “sometimes” situations occur, where “the 
actions of others cry out for explanation” (Hutto 2007a: 45). This fact makes opacity 
of minds also to a necessarily given human disposition, as we cannot know exactly 
what the other’s action motives are. Through intuitive assumptions, we enhance the 
transparency of other minds; even if we respect the others right for her or his 
thougths. In reference to Strathern (1988), Josephides (2008: 158) points out that 
with the expression “’we don’t know what’s in other people’s heads’, they [the 
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‘Melanesian’ tribe Kewa] mean that they must wait for the meaning of their actions to 
be manifest in their effects on others”. Folk psychological narratives can help here to 
construct reasons for our actions, and explain them (Hutto 2007a: 45). This account 
offers a way which even within the doctrine of the opacity of mind allows making 
assumptions about the other’s actions. 
Folk psychological narratives refer to “‘embodied expectations’” (Hutto 2007a: 
44), which are unconscious, enculturated and socialized expectations about another’s 
actions. “In ‘normal’ contexts these are not only quicker but also far more powerful 
and reliable ways of relating to others and navigating social dynamics” (Hutto 2007a: 
44). A narrative account of comprehending and understanding is given, even if we 
follow the doctrine of the opacity of mind: facial expressions, bodily movements, or 
just stress and intonation of particular words or sentences encourage mutual 
understanding. These narratives are not, like the concept of a theory of mind, inborn 
traits; rather they are developed. The folk psychological narrative skill requires 
theoretical and practical understanding of cultural peculiarities. From this point of 
view, the Melanesian view of the person confirms exactly this embodied 
understanding. We are totally involved in the social dimension, as social participants 
we need the understanding of the other’s actions or else, judgments about adequate 
social actions cannot be made. 
The argument from analogy makes visible a smooth shift to admit the existence 
of something like the doctrine of the opacity of mind. This argument grants that 
understanding, or the mere attempt of understanding, is not sufficient to be able to 
talk about empathy. The felt corporeal, empathic, conscious and unconscious analogy 
marks a mere sense of understanding or interpreting another’s behavior within our 
own experiential context. Such a perspective on empathic feelings is reminiscent of 
Scheler’s comprehension of empathy as ‘Einsfühlung’, “which attempted to explain 
both [understanding and reproducing] at the same time” (Scheler 1979: 8). 
There are still cultural differences in developments of a theory of mind, and – of 
course – there is still the problem of the doctrine of the opacity of mind. Even if there 
are cultural differences in behavior, thinking and problem-solving, as shown above, 
these abilities are universal – they only differ in their ways (Wassmann and Funke 
2013: 242). Tasks, which only focus on the development of the concept of a theory of 
mind, lack in focusing on other developments which are related to theory of mind, but 
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may have another cultural framing (Mishra and Dasen 2007). This shift of focus leads 
to the investigation of cognitive styles in favor of theories of mind. Shifting the focus 
to cognitive styles leads to approaches which do not investigate the ability for decision 
making, but to inverstigations of the processes which lead to these decisions. Exactly 
that are cognitive styles: they enable to investigate cultural, social, and individual 
differences in problem solving and decision making. Such an approach 
 
could also provide guidelines for finding the right balance between an 
individual and a cultural perspective on cognition and culture, which in 
turn would be of utmost relevance for both the field-working 
anthropologist and the brain-scanning neurobiologist (Wassmann and 
Bender 2015: 17). 
 
Within the research area of empathy such an approach provides a broader account of 
empathic understanding, since the research is not only focused on the ‘that’ of 
decision, but on its ‘how’ and ‘why’. 
Focusing on the ability for empathy and thus to image a theory of mind, cultural 
frames lose their importance in favor of cognitive styles (Dasen and Mishra 2010). In 
doing so, the Western concept of a theory of mind is not fitted by force on other 
cultures, which possibly do not have a concept like theory of mind, or set a focus on 
other abilities in early child developments. However, empathy and a concept of theory 
of mind are still culturally bound, since individual ways of thinking and perception 
are still culturally influenced. What Dasen and Mishra (2010), however, highlight by 
choosing the term ‘cognitive style’ is that cultural differences are not only measurable 
through the presence or absence of an ability for a theory of mind, since such a theory 
measures only the ability to make assumptions about another’s beliefs, intents, 
desires, pretending and knowledge. In contrast, cognitive style, which “encompasses 
the meaning of all ‘style’ constructs postulated in the literature, such as cognitive style, 
conceptual tempo, decision-making and problem-solving style, learning style, mind 
style, perceptual style, and thinking style” (Zhang and Sternberg 2006: 3). Or, to put 
it more down to the point: cognitive style “is one’s preferred way of processing 
information and dealing with tasks” (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 241; cf. Dasen and 
Mishra 2010: 11). This difference in style depends on factors like age, gender, 
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previous experiences, socialization and cultural framing (Dasen and Mishra 2010: 
11). Therefore, it does not have to be conscious, “it is in fact more likely to be 
unconscious, linked to habits, customs or preferred values – in other words, to 
‘culture’” (Dasen and Mishra 2010: 11). 
Considering the definition by Zhang and Sternberg (2006: 3), the concept of 
cognitive style naturally includes the concept of theory of mind. With this broader 
focus of ‘cognitive style’, the research of cultural differences in a theory of mind and 
empathical development becomes more precise. With focus on this individuality of 
cognitive styles, judgments about the preference of a particular style necessarily have 
to be excluded. There “is not [a] inherently ‘better’ or ‘more advanced’” way to react 
(Dasen and Mishra 2010: 11). The individual relation to culture, society, biological 
relation and to our own biography is considered here, as the following figure 9 shows: 
 
Figure 9: comparison between theory of mind and cognitive style. 
 
Here, in figure 9, it becomes visible that the concept of cognitive styles encompasses 
besides cultural and biological determination, individual relations. The individual 
cognitive style influences problem solving and decision making at every step, since 
even here it becomes visible that the personal biography, self-perception and self-
reflection have a direct effect on decisions and problem solving processes. 
Considering empathy and thus some concept of a theory of mind or cognitive 
style as universal human ability, “children seemed to be inclined to automatically 
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compute other people’s belief and expectation […], as they grow older, they might 
gradually learn to abide by culturally specific folk theory” (Wassmann and Funke 
2013: 242), which denies or teaches the impossibility of taking assumptions about 
other minds. The problem of the ability to read another’s mind or to deny of this 
ability is culturally dependent, thus it can be concluded that 
 
[a]ll of this means that (i) a certain amount of figuring out what others are 
up to is always going on and is necessary for people to manage their daily 
life; (ii) whether or not this type of thinking should always be glossed as 
‘reading other minds’ depends on the specific situation as well as on our 
theory of human action, including our view of intersubjectivity; (iii) 
conscious and explicit reading of other minds is one of the possible routes 
to understanding a situation retrospectively and prospectively; (iv) 
communities (and individuals) vary in the extent to which reading other 
minds is recognized, verbalized, and justified (Duranti 2008: 492f). 
 
All these conclusions do not only refer to the folk psychological perception of mind 
reading, they also refer to scientific mind reading research, which is founded on folk 
psychological observations. Especially scientific research has to deal with these 
consequences. The focus must switch to the cultural framing, to which, (i), (ii), and 
(iv) refer. Recalling the Melanesian perception of being a person, such a thing like 
intersubjectivity is not thought in a separate way, rather it is inherent in us, as already 
Nietzsche claimed: “the ‘subject’ is not something given but a fiction added on, tucked 
behind” (Nietzsche 2003: 7[60]). Like every other concept or perception of life and 
human being, the subject is a conceptual invention, a scientific, theoretical assumption 
to found a base for further investigation. Such a concept can work or not, as the case 
may be. If the concept of the subject has reached its limit, then another perception of 
personhood might be useful for further work. In reference to (iii), reflexivity is not 
only a conscious process; rather, there are several processes and actions, which base 
on unconscious decisions. Through, we are only able to perceive ourselves as person 
in relation to others and through our reflexivity, we are influenced by our own 
unconscious processes, which lead ourselves to actions without knowing the motives 
or expectations. 
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7.3 Agency and Social Relationships 
The approaches to care and sympathy through understanding and ethos, as well as 
the construction of theories of mind and the opacity of mind, result in the question of 
the nature of the acting and recounting self, since emotions play also a particular role 
within the motivation and explanation of acting. Action can be considered as edged in 
“affective perception”, which means that “an emotion is an occurrent conscious state, 
with a certain affect, and with a certain kind of intentional content” (Döring 2003: 
220). This approach simply means that “[i]t is the emotion’s affect which gives it 
motivational force, rather than any desire being ‘part’ of it” (Döring 2003: 224). 
 
It is its affective character in which experiencing an emotion differs from 
experiencing a sense-perception: unlike a sense-perception, an emotion 
represents the target’s import for the subject, and thus has an 
interoceptive dimension which makes it an affective perception and gives 
it motivational force (Döring 2003: 226). 
 
Emotions maintain the state of desires, which can also be conceived as emotional 
objectives. Even if Döring (2003: 221) excludes moods from emotional intentionality, 
since e.g. depression lacks an objective, moods color experiences, and therefore they 
are able to cause actions in a second order. We are not only concerned by thinking in 
a theoretical way, rather thinking is considered as action, and therefore the acts of 
recounting and reflecting have always practical consequences. 
 
Our life is not driven by theoretical wondering, although some 
philosophers have considered this as our ultimate talent. It is driven by 
practical concerns. In our everyday lives we are pragmatists. To put it 
differently, our primary way of encountering worldly entities is by using 
them rather than by theorizing about them or perceiving them in a 
detached manner (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 153). 
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Such a perception situates us within a world plenty of practical motivations and 
purposes. It makes us from top to bottom to an acting entity. That leads to the question 
of the human agency. 
The definition of agency itself is a diffuse field. In general, it can be said that 
agency is our capacity and ability to act. Reconsidered in detail, the structure of 
agency appears more complex. It can be used to describe our capacity to make choices 
(Dasti 2014: 3), and thus it is related to the free will (Dasti 2014: 3); that leads to the 
conception of agency related to “practical normativity and the reﬂexive self-relation” 
(Rousse 2013: 2). Furthermore, within the concept of agency, it is assumed that every 
one of us has a particular motivation to act (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 156), which 
also refers to experiences and knowledge. Motivations, therefore, are related to 
corporeal and sensual experiences from the life-world. Understood in this way, 
agency is related to modes of empathy and conscious and unconscious experiences as 
well as to active and tacit knowledge. However, these action intentions or motivations 
are not necessary to define agency, in other definitions it is enough to say that agency 
is the “capacity to perform actions” (Dasti 2014: 3). 
If acting is assumed to be motivated − this means action has a particular purpose 
−, this purpose can only be understood in a reflection thereafter. “’Reflexivity’ hence 
should be understood not merely as ‘self-consciousness’ but as the monitored 
character of the ongoing flow of social life” (Giddens 1984: 3). That makes acting 
reasonable and purposive, but only in the “durée of daily social action” (Giddens 1984: 
27). Since acts are fundamentally social and are not performed by “separate 
intentions, reasons, and motives” (Giddens 1984: 3), reflexivity gives social acting a 
thick context by marking every act as a result from prior acts. Acts, in turn, are socially 
constructed, which leads to the flow of social life by reflexivity and reasonable acting. 
In consequence, the dualism of structure and agency is suspended in favor of a 
continuous structuration caused by reflexivity (Reckwitz 2007: 315): we do not 
formulate a prior intention or meaning concept for our own acting motives and 
intentions anymore; sense and intention are fulfilled during the act. Therefore, action 
motivations are situated in the life-world, where actions have their effects and cause 
reactions. Context, meaning, and intention are not pre-formulated, rather they are 
socially structurized and continuously re-formulated as illustrated in figure 10. 
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Figure 10: the stratification model of action (according to Giddens 1979: 56; Loyal 2003: 56). 
 
Figure 10 shows “’intentionality’ as process” (Giddens 1979: 56). By this means, there 
is a motivation or intention of action with rational reasons which correlate with other 
unacknowledged or unknown conditions. For a better understanding of the figure, the 
areas of ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ are labelled respectively. After or during a 
performed act, reflexivity about the acting starts, but it does not help to avoid 
unintended consequences. The act becomes conscious, but at the same time reactions 
to the performed act start, even if the act is not fulfilled yet. In this context, Gallagher 
and Zahavi (2012: 161) make a distinction between the “Sense of ownership” and the 
“Sense of agency” within actions. The first one is “the [phenomenal] pre-reflective 
experience or sense that I am the subject of the movement (e.g. the kinaesthetic 
experience of movement)”, the latter one is “the pre-reflective [self-based] experience 
or sense that I am the author of the action (e.g. the experience that I am in control of 
my action)” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 161). It has to be considered that in this pre-
reflexive context only the current state of pre-reflection attracts interest. In this 
regard, Gallagher and Zahavi can speak about mere experienced movement which – 
without doubt exists. If we take into account that pre-reflexive consciousness has a 
particular sense of unconscious perception of the life-world, it seems quite self-
evident that even on an unconscious level the pre-reflexive consciousness has a 
certain acting intention dependent on prior experiences and unconsciously perceived 
context. Here, a resemblance with Scheler’s notion of love becomes visible. Since love 
precedes cognitive perception, it is an unconscious movement within the life-world 
  Empathic Understanding as Act of Mutual Recognition 
 206 
lead by interest. Therefore, movement always is motivated, even if it is unconscious. 
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012: 163) explain their distinction between the sense of 
ownership and the sense of agency within “the logic of involuntary movement”: 
 
[s]ince in the case of involuntary movement there is a sense of ownership 
and no sense of self-agency, and because my awareness of my involuntary 
movement comes from afferent sensory-feedback (visual and 
proprioceptive/kinaesthetic information that tells me that I’m moving), 
but not from motor commands issued to generate the movement (so, no 
efference signals), it seems natural to suggest that in ordinary voluntary 
movement the sense of ownership might be generated by sensory 
feedback, and the sense of agency might be generated by efferent signals 
that send motor commands to the muscle system. 
 
The objection here is that it remains open what this “involuntary movement” exactly 
is. They explain it as “I directly experience the movement as happening to me (sense 
of ownership), but not as caused by me (no sense of agency)” (Gallagher and Zahavi 
2012: 39). Here, the next diffuse term: “happening” crops up. The term is not precisely 
defined, just means as much as ‘… something does something to me, but I cannot 
realize it, because I’m not aware of it (Apologies, I’m not even allowed to think of it) 
…’. But, exactly this ‘happening’ is caused by unconscious contextualized experiences, 
which are stored in the pre-reflexive consciousness. Here, hidden motivations may be 
encountered, and they are just discovered during or after the performance. The 
question remains why the pre-reflexive consciousness is not used to make a thicker 
description of agency. Gallagher and Zahavi’s approach remains on this 
epistemological phenomenological level where the unconscious awareness is not 
taken into account. 
However, the question of authorship remains. Are we authors of our acts, or do 
we act due to social and traditional obligations? The answer lies, of course, in the eye 
of the beholder. Following a subjectless approach to recognition and action, 
authorship is social. Therefore, it cannot exist one single author; rather we all are 
‘authors’ of our actions. For “the Melanesians”, there does not exist an indigenous 
author who tailors their perception of personhood adequately for the Western 
  Empathic Understanding as Act of Mutual Recognition 
 207 
discourse. Beginning with Leenhart (1979) or Strathern (1988), or even this work, 
anthropological approaches always refer to the author’s understanding rooted in 
Western notions. Considering the Western discourse about personhood, self, and the 
human being, all these approaches need a Western reference framing, since they try 
to find a place on a traditional thread. 
From a Western point of view, motivation of an act is not directly dependent on 
the expression of an act (Davidson 2001: 47). For Giddens (1979, 1984), it is obvious 
that not every action intention or motivation is conscious; they could be unconscious 
till an act is performed. Thus, there is no contradiction to reasonable acting. He 
explains that assumption with a dual structure: in such a structure, we produce 
meaning by acting, but owing to the cultural and social frame, meaning is already 
there. Meaning is never produced; rather it is re-produced. In addition, the 
environment is already included in our relatedness, thus, there exist always implicit 
reasons for ‘doing for me’ and a ‘doing for you’. As LiPuma (2000) pointed out, the 
relational concept exists in Western thinking as well, but it is encompassed by the 
individual structure of the ‘theoretical person’. Therefore, agency can be embedded in 
a social context as well as in a so-called individual context: within the social context, 
our acting depends only on individual and social motivations, which are in turn 
embedded in a social context. 
Each of these approaches, even if they contradict each other in some aspects, 
seems to be right and well founded. So I am asked to consider these approaches 
against the background of narrative and performance theory, since “selfhood, 
narrative, and agency” are thickly bound, and therefore, “[s]elves are fundamentally 
agents on this view, and agency requires narrative” (Schechtman 2011: 395). As 
already shown in the context of narrative identity, all these stories have to be 
consistent, the work, which the recounting self fulfills, is to contextualize particular 
parts of its lifetime story. Therefore it fulfills a “synthesis of the heterogeneous” within 
the everlasting “discordant concordance” (Ricœur 1992: 141). In recounting these 
lifetime stories we perform parts of our own personal identity (Bruner 1986: 145). 
These parts do not necessarily already exist; rather, the possibility always exists to 
create new storylines, or recount already narrated stories in a new way, a new 
narrative coloring. In consequence, through action, we are able – or possess the 
capacity – to change our life-world. Even every act changes the life-world, since the 
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surroundings feed back the acting by reacting. Thus, transformation can be performed 
by even little changes in behavior caused by reaction. Considering that acting and 
performance flow through every corner of our life, agency, indeed, “is ‘the ability to 
transform the world’” (Sax 2006: 474). Although Sax (2006) is referring to ritual 
theory, here ‘transformation’ can be considered as expressive action which is able to 
change already existing habits and behavior. Thus, reflecting the our “action through 
the perspective of another human – by taking the attitude of the Other” is present in 
all areas of life (Kapferer 1986: 190). This transformation is performed through the 
paradigm of reflected perception, which indicates that the motivation of acting is 
founded in the contextualization and reflection of experiences and their recounting as 
narratives (Ricœur 1992: 141). That particular ability to act with and against others 
highlights our capacities, motivations and reasons of acting. 
From a lifeworldly perspective, agency is fundamentally social, since the life-
world is a shared place where sociality is performed. Considering the notions of 
personhood described above, a solipsistic human is not conceivable. Every human is 
related to a life-world where other humans necessarily exist. Experiences and 
recounted stories are shared with others (Kapferer 1986: 188f). Agency has a direct 
effect on the social environment and, thus, is the ability and capacity to perform 
transformational action. In the context of the genuineness of social communities, with 
the concept of agency as the capacity and ability to act, the emergence of processuality 
could be described. 
In the light of the above, the act does not necessarily need a direct author. 
Narratives are nourished from the life-world; they are built from cultural and social 
frames. By this means, they are already there, when we ‘are thrown’ into the life-
world. They are given from the given traditional frame, and thus they surround us. 
They influence – or even initiate – acting by giving reasons for action. Therefore, one 
might say, narratives lead us to a particular decision to act. Here, autonomy occurs 
once more to allow and obey cultural influences as traditional narratives, since our 
will is already wired by culture and traditions. Therefore, Hess (2006: 294) can 
assume the existence of so-called outside causes for acting even within Western 
societies: “[w]hile this is not perceived to be the case in all situations alike it is quite 
common to attribute an outside cause to someone’s action that in a Christian moral 
sense could be deemed a ‘sin’”. Even if a so-called outside cause is deemed a sin, it is 
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thinkable and even possible. For the Melanesian person, in particular through the 
symbiosis with the life-world, an outside cause for actions is quite naturally: “agents 
do not cause their own actions; they are not the authors of their own acts. They simply 
do them. Agency and cause are split” (Strathern 1988: 273). This is primarily so 
because our criteria for acting authorship differs. 
 
There is a distinction then between a cause and an agent: a cause exists as 
a single reference point for the agent, in the same way as the effect of a 
relationship exists as a single outcome. The cause is the ‘person’ with 
whom the agent’s relationship is to be transformed, a unitary reference 
point for her or his acts. The one who is regarded as acting, however, is the 
one who in taking account of the cause – the reason for acting – also acts 
for him or herself. The agent’s position is intrinsically multiple (Strathern 
1988: 273). 
 
Integration into society overrules agency as a personal and individual attribution. 
Rather, the cause of action is found in the social relationship. In other words, agency 
becomes social in its nature. It cannot be considered any longer as individual 
attribution with social or interactive effect. The act is performed in society, in the 
social dimension of the life-world. Therefore, the act can be conceived separately; it 
does not belong to us as individual entity, rather to an individual outcome to enrich 
society. Agency is situated in the life-world, therefore, action is considered as life-
world-influenced. In a strict sense, we as part of the life-world can be conceived as 
‘authors’ in a certain way, but such a perception contradicts the social foudation of the 
sociomorphic and cosmomorphic human, who merges into the life-world. Although, 
the Melanesian perception of personhood shows a deeper interwoven sociality, the 
Western concept of agency secures the sociality of the individual. Each concept links 
in some way agency with sociality. Therefore, in conclusion, sociality fundamentally 
belongs to human agency (Thiesbonenkamp-Maag 2014: 125).  
Up to this point, there are not any feelings or modes of understanding within the 
concept of agency here described. Although empathy and its related concepts are 
human abilities and capacities, to approach agency on an empathic level, capacities, 
motivations and reasons are not sufficient, one has to go deeper, to understand the 
  Empathic Understanding as Act of Mutual Recognition 
 210 
‘feelings of agency’. Considering the aspects of empathy earlier introduced, all 
understanding, feelings of sympathy, care, and theories of mind seem to be deeply 
bound to either individual or social action. Different modes of understanding and the 
ability to act motivate and create action; but feelings of sympathy and care provide 
the ability to perceive and understand our surroundings and thus the other. In the 
concepts of a theory of mind, but also in the concept of the opacity of mind, all these 
aspects of empathy find a cognitive and biological basis. Understanding can be 
understood as empathy, since the ability to be empathic needs to be developed by 
experience and knowledge. As it has been shown, experience as well as knowledge is 
context-related by our own reflection. It is obvious that an empathic ability needs a 
certain grade of understanding. That does not necessarily include communication, 
however, the mere understanding of the processes of the life-world, and thus the 
ability to understand our own experience, is sufficient to be empathic. The fact is well 
investigated within the different approaches of theories of mind as described above. 
That leads to the relation of care and empathy, because, as already argued, 
fellow-feeling as a special case of feelings of sympathy, and care are mutually 
dependent; care needs fellow-feeling to understand and feel another’s needs, while 
fellow-feeling needs care to feel interest for the surroundings and others. To 
‘translate’ this into a Heideggerian terminology: we care about our being as well as 
the being of others; even more, the other as being-with embodies the only entity 
which acknowledges us to be in the world and with others. Thus, through the 
existence of others, we are reminded of our own transience. In turn, the other 
confirms in every second our existence by demanding care and calling up self-care. 
But care, as shown above, is only a supplier to ensure social acting; rather, Being-with 
is the fundamental social component in Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein. For the 
structure of Being-with within the concept of empathy, this abstract level is a gain, 
because Heidegger shows the inherence of Being-with within our being. Being-with 
becomes a fundamental structure of our being, and, as the mode of mutual 
recognition, it enables empathy on the level of agency which is realized in the sociality 
of Being-with. The capacity and ability for agency understood as empathic feeling with 
another, opens a new horizon of recognition of the other. In this way, empathy 
outlines our cohabitation which is founded on empathic understanding. The other is 
recognized intuitively for being her- or himself, insofar as the other recognizes our 
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self for being itself (Marx 1986: 25). Empathic feeling is the measure which 
determines recognition (Marx 1986: 25). Thus, empathy is a responsible factor to 
build social relations. 
Through acting –the question is not whether through verbal communication, or 
not – sociality is maintained. If we are fundamentally social, the verbal 
communication component as explanation is not necessarily given. As with 
Heidegger’s concept of ‘care’, verbal communication complies an intermediary role. 
From a non-Western point of view, if acting is fundamentally social, the acting 
motivation is social as well. Acting has not to be interpreted by an additional construct 
like communication, since the non-Western concept of personhood as described in 
this work is relational and socially conceived; the social component is already 
inherent in acting. In doing so, acting motivation includes the perception of ‘I do 
because …’ and ‘I do to …’. This applies, moreover, to the doctrine of the opacity of 
mind, because even in local communities, every member has a particular social role 
according to which the member performs social acting. The only act, excluded from 
the doctrine of the opacity of mind, is the verbal communication act according to 
pragmatic linguistics and philosophy of language (Austin 1962; Searle 1969; Bauman 
and Briggs 1990; Ahearn 2001; Robbins 2008; for critics see: Robbins and Rumsey 
2008). Social acting is not necessarily dependent on verbal communication; rather, it 
can be said, social acting depends on the point of view. The explanation for a particular 
point of view or a reason for action is not or cannot only be given through verbal 
communication, but also through practical action and emotions (Wassmann and 
Bender 2015: 18). And this point of view may include communication as a Western 
construct or not, as the case may be. Thus, in Western understanding, social acting is 
strongly related to communication, since − and that is at Western belief − through 
acting communication with the surroundings and the others is performed. The 
communication component of acting is just only necessary to explain the motivation 
of an act.  
Due to the Western concept of personhood, this account anticipates an 
individual and strongly subjective actor who needs the communication component as 
‘add-on’37 to overcome, in a Heideggerian sense the solipsism of our existence, 
                                            
37 Here, the term ‘add-on’ is understood as modular extension. 
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because in Western thinking sociality is not inherent in the theoretical concept of 
personhood. 
Therefore, the focus shifts to implicit and non-verbal processes which underlie 
“stereotypical and routine actions” (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 249) and are closely 
related to folk psychological narratives (Hutto 2007a). These assumptions are 
founded on the idea that “humans are natively endowed with a set of cognitive 
abilities and behavioral dispositions that synergistically work together to endow 
human face-to-face interaction with certain special qualities” (Levinson 2006: 44). 
Language might be one of these qualities, but it does not reign supreme. Levinson 
(2006) just calls all these abilities and dispositions “human interaction engine”, since 
they are, all over the world, the universal human way to interact. The way this engine 
works differs according to cultural and traditional conditions (Danziger 2006: 273). 
As already shown above with regard to the Melanesian view of the person, “actions 
are often more important than the verbal expression, especially in traditional 
cultures” (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 249). Thus, it is possible to make assumptions 
and judgments about another’s behavior. 
According to the acting motivation and performance related theories of mind 
and the doctrine of the opacity of mind, mutual recognition can be considered as an 
intrinsic motivation. By this means, all modes of empathy are defined as personal and 
social motivated acts of mutual recognition. Derived from that conclusion, empathy is 
needed to be able to recognize others. However, within the stages of appreciation and 
adequate regard, an evaluation of the recognized human is implied. In an ideal 
context, Jane recognizes Peter equivalently. 
 
 
7.4 Summary 
In the concept of a self-based model of mutual recognition, empathic understanding 
is still the foundation. Such an understanding results from our experiences and 
knowledge gained in the life-world. In this way, our ethos, our stand is marked. The 
life-world belongs to us, we have no other chance to perceive and recognize our 
surroundings, but without doubt there is a world which includes all other life-worlds, 
ours and those we have no access to (Blumenberg 2010: 54f). Concering our being, 
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ethos means both our phenomenological stand in the life-world and our 
hermeneutical stand in the face of our relationship to the other. This interwovenness 
shows our ‘being in the world’ as Heidegger would say. The life-world as our being 
enables us to develop a sense of being oneself and being another, since the other as 
other being becomes part of our world. Thus, the consciousness of the other’s being 
enables us to sympathize and care, not only for us but also the other. 
But this circumstance does not address the issue of the doctrine of the opacity 
of mind on an epistemological level. On the level of empathy, however,our being 
encompassed by the life-world pushes the scientific distinction of a theory of mind 
and the opacity of mind into the background, in favor of an empathic understanding 
of the other’s being. Here possibilities become apparent which enable empathic 
understanding without assumptions or negations of the other’s mind. Especially 
through the perspective of agency, empathy appears as an intrinsic motivation of 
recognizing and being recognized.  
A further problem − which has not been mentioned yet − is the emotional 
component within the act of mutual recognition. Usually, folk psychology holds it true 
that we do not only equally respect others, but make differences on an axiological and 
deontic level. 
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8. An Outlook to Social Appreciation 
By completing the circle, the last stage of the self-based concept of mutual recognition 
deals with social appreciation. This realm of mutual recognition is already well 
investigated and accepted in the current discussion on mutual or social recognition 
following Honneth, Butler, and Fraser, a discussion already described at the beginning 
of our journey to a self-based model of mutual recognition.  
Appreciation describes the factual existence and the degree of the other’s value. 
In the context of appreciation of the other, appreciatory recognition is not arbitrarily 
given; rather it is linked to particular values. These values belong to the other as social 
acting human. By this means, the other is recognized in her or his social role, or as 
individual in the context of the values appreciated in the social community, since 
every social community has particular values which are appreciated more than other 
values. Thus, values are relative to the cultural community. On a theoretical level, such 
recognized values refer to social appreciation, in case that we do something for our 
social community, or they refer to personal appreciation, in case that we fall in love 
with another. Such a distinction is strictly theoretical, since every one of us is bound 
to and acts against a cultural background. But this general cultural background is not 
the only thing which leads and constitutes our appreciation. 
Every one of us has individual desires and beliefs, thus, social value regulations 
and personal appreciation merge smoothly in our relational self. In consequence, 
values, norms, and their recognition as practiced appreciation are central issues of 
social appreciation. They are related to the “idea of the autonomous, context-
independent individual” as it is considered in Western politics and law (Poser and 
Wassmann 2012: 18). In other words: within the act of mutual recognition, others are 
recognized as ‘persons’ (Ikäheimo 2007: 225f) who have a particular role within the 
social community. Therefore, fulfilling of a social role is appreciated. So far the current 
state of the debate on mutual or social recognition. 
In our Western perception values are above all related to the individual. We 
think inside our cultural community within a value universalism, and thus relate 
values only to individuals. Such a construction highlights the values of the human 
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biological individual, whereas in other societies, like ‘the Melanesian’, the value of 
social relationships and the fulfillment of social duties are emphazised. However, such 
a perception of social structures and their value management results in an 
overemphasis of antagonisms. Indeed, in every social community traces of both can 
be found. 
Let us remember our previous conclusions: we have considered mutual 
recognition as an act of self-affirmation and “as the good of personal identity-
formation” (Honneth 2003: 176). With Ricœur (2005), this good can be understood 
as a gift which is given from oneself to another, and vice versa. To construct self-
affirmation which forms our identity, mutual recognition has to be established as an 
act of mutual commitment and sharing. On the basis which has been elaborated so far, 
mutual recognition is linked to empathy. 
On the social level of interaction, mutual recognition is an intrinsic motivation. 
It has to be remembered, this means that all modes of empathy are defined as personal 
and social motivated acts of mutual recognition. Undeniably, without being empathic, 
self-perception, self-affirmation, and recognition of the other are unthinkable. In the 
face of our empathic abilities to understand ourselves and others, we sense feelings 
of appreciation for the acts of others, but also for our own acts. Every one of us just 
feels particular sympathy with a particular other, or not. Feelings of sympathy are in 
fact empathic, since they are, as already shown, the human disposition and way to 
perceive, understand and interact with others. In our everyday life, we use such 
feelings of sympathy or antipathy to manage our relationships with others, but also 
to become engaged in our way of life, and to reflect another’s deeds. 
Treating feelings of sympathy from an epistemological point of view, as Scheler 
did, they appear as cognitive functions to perceive our surroundings (cf. chap. 4.2). 
The difference to understanding results from “enabling us to grasp how a man, or 
living creature, as such, is our equal in worth” (Scheler 1979: 60). By this means, 
within the feelings of sympathy a particular empathic content, which allows providing 
a particular value to the other, is given. In contrast to commiseration, feelings of 
sympathy provide a focus to the value of the other without being emotionally 
submerged, since a certain distance is given by cognitive anchorage. This cognitive 
anchorage is our self-reflexive position and awareness of being in the world. This 
means, we know that we are in a world and aware of our surroundings as life-world. 
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Following the assumption of the theories of mind, we are also aware of other beings 
who are ‘like us’. 
To start thinking from the relational self which is indissolubly linked with 
mutual recognition, a total individual perception of evaluation appears as biased and 
far from social reality; we move in groups and derive and adapt values and norms 
from group behavior. By adaptation, we actualize already existing values and norms, 
as shown with Ricœur’s concept of mimesis. As individuals we take effect on the 
group, but by adapting, the group takes effect on us. In respect of the concept of the 
relational self, appreciation has not only a social aspect, but also an empathic one. 
Here, I give a short alternative reading of social appreciation as a mode of mutual 
recognition by introducing its axiological and deontic significance, its declarational 
status, and its role in comparing persons within groups. All threads mentioned here 
are possibilities which should be further elaborated essays on relational selfhood and 
mutual recognition. They can be understood as parts which build up social 
appreciation, since every part highlights another aspect. 
Axeological and deontic appreciation decribes a person’s worth against a 
particular traditional, cultural and social background. Within such a structured net of 
appreciation, appreciation is not only about the evaluation of a person or a group, but 
it is also executed within culturally and socially assumed ‘good values’ and a 
comparison between values of different persons. Such good values also play a 
fundamental role within appreciation as a declarational act. Perceived from another’s 
point of view, appreciation has a declarational function, since others perceive the act 
of appreciation, and react. This can be a positive reaction by adopting the prior act of 
appreciation, or a negative reaction by not agreeing with the prior act of appreciation. 
The declarational status of appreciation seems to be a complex construct consisting of 
(pseudo-)individual evaluation within a confusing net of traditional, cultural and 
social ‘value defaults’ from which some are actually conscious, others unconscious. As 
already indicated, with the declarational status of appreciation, with adequate regard, 
social appreciation receives normative colouring. Here, the normative value of the 
person herself or himself for the social community becomes visible. The difference 
between the declarational status of appreciation and adequate regard is that the 
declarational status of appreciation needs an inclusion of all participants within the 
act of recognition, whereas adequate regard is broader constituted, and can be 
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performed so to speak ‘anonymously’, since attributed values are appreciated in 
respect to a social community’s normative values. 
 
 
8.1 Axiological and Deontic Appreciation 
Indeed, we are organized within social values and norms, what basically is considered 
axiological. Starting from the thesis that the act of recognition is performed on the 
basis of phenomenal recognition of the other and the reflection of this experience, the 
other is always perceived on an individual level and afterwards as a part of something, 
or a unity of parts. Hence, we are always primarily detected in our own individual 
values against the background of cultural, traditional and social frameworks. Such a 
structure of the act of recognition always refers to the axiological dimension of 
appreciation.  
With his interpretation of love as a motivational force for realization and 
knowledge Scheler offers an axiological account of appreciation: it “is the full 
understanding of the person based on love” (Scheler 1973a: 491), then values are 
recognized through our interest and engaged involvement in the life-world. However, 
full understanding of the world does not work without understanding ourselves. This 
is “[t]he highest form of self-love” (Scheler 1973a: 491). It is possible to recognize our 
value through the love of another, “to show me the path to my salvation38 through his 
completely understanding love of me” (Scheler 1973a: 491). To understand the values 
of our life-world, love for others is needed. In addition, Scheler (1973a: 493) – in his 
own way – takes into account the cultural, traditional and social framework by writing 
that 
 
[e]very moment of life in the development of an individual represents at the 
same time a possibility for the individual to know unique values and their 
interconnections, and, in accordance with these, the necessitation of moral 
tasks and actions that can never be repeated. 
 
                                            
38 ‘Salvation’ here means the full understanding of oneself which Scheler interprets through his 
phenomenological-epistemological account in reference to Christianity. 
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By this means, values are objective, since they are not directly dependent on their 
carrier, but simultaneously they are subjective, since they are only visible through our 
individual disposition.  
 
The complete evidence […] can be given only in the coincidental grasp of 
values which temporally are universally valid and of ‘historical’, concrete 
situational values, i.e., in the frame of mind in which one continuously 
surveys the whole of life and listens for the unique ‘demand of the moment’ 
(Scheler 1973a: 493). 
 
An individual value relativism is expressly excluded; values are always there, what 
makes them universal; only their order differs (Scheler 1973a: 494). Heidegger’s 
concept of care becomes relevant at this point of investigation. As already shown, 
every act of recognition is an act of empathy and care. That makes every act of 
recognition also an act of appreciation derected in the face of the other. The 
recognizing directedness towards the other is coupled with an intrinsic interest in the 
life-world. In reference to Dewey, Honneth (2008: 36) describes Heidegger’s concept 
of care as follows: “every rational understanding of the world is always already bound 
up with a holistic form of experience, in which all elements of a given situation are 
qualitatively disclosed from a perspective of engaged involvement”. Considered from 
this perspective, it is not only Heidegger’s concept of care which secures our relation 
to the life-world within an involvement of care and interest, but there is also an 
intrinsic interest and engaged involvement in the life-world vouched by Scheler’s 
concept of love. Both Heidegger’s and Scheler’s concept secure a deep-going relation 
to the outer life-world. But, whereas Heidegger’s care just confirms our connection to 
the life-world, Scheler’s concept of love also allows the recognition of values. A fruitful 
further development of this path could be a comparison of Scheler’s notion of love and 
Heidegger’s concept of Being-with. 
These approaches are substituted by the concept of deontic appreciation which 
says, generally formulated, “when a person respects the relevant others and is 
similarly respected by them as a coauthority of the norms or institutions of a 
collective, she is free or autonomous in the sense of governed by collectively self-
authorized norms” (Ikäheimo 2010: 349). In reference to Hegel, Ikäheimo (2010: 347) 
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points out that we do not only realize and recognize each other on an axiological level, 
but also in a ,,deontic dimension” by respecting each other. It is fair enough to 
acknowledge that respect is constitutive for social appreciation, since respect directly 
refers to our qualities and characteristics (Ikäheimo 2010: 347). The deontic 
dimension creates a ‘bubble of ethical grammar’ within which social behavior is 
organized (Ikäheimo 2010: 349). That makes “the axiological dimension […] 
dependent for its part on the deontic” (Ikäheimo 2010: 352). 
Following this alternative reading of mutual recognition as social appreciation, 
love has to be considered as the leading factor of engagement and action motivation 
within the life-world. It levels out the distinction between an axiological and a deontic 
account of mutual recognition. Both deontic as well as axiological reasons of mutual 
recognition are led by love. Even on a legal level, where the deontic dimension is 
situated (Ikäheimo 2010: 348), love as intrinsic interest or engagement leads the 
awareness for the legal dimension, and thus respect for the rights of others. Ikäheimo 
(2010: 351) himself writes that 
 
[i]n caring about the happiness of another person one values and wishes 
those things that she values to flourish. Valuing things, and thereby 
wishing that they flourish, simply because they are constitutive of another 
person’s happiness, or in other words for her sake, is one of the basic 
senses of what we mean by loving someone. In loving someone in this way, 
one internalizes the value horizon of the loved as part of one’s own value 
horizon. 
 
Although Ikäheimo (2010: 351) follows here a very sensual and emotional notion of 
love, he connects love with the motivation of caring. For our purpose may be 
significant that care is also the motivational force to follow legal conditions. In 
addition, considering ourselves as ‘social autonomous acting relational selves’, it is 
not relevant, whether our action is either axiological or deontical, since our act − 
performed in accordance with a cultural, traditional, and social frame – is itself 
already based within the axiological and deontic dimension. Here, the importance of 
social integration as well as the importance of self-confirmation appears. 
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It is obvious that it is not that simple to focus only on mutual recognition and 
derive from this basis conclusions for the subject; rather, it has to be investigated how 
the social framework and the relational self presuppose each other. To secure that, 
the life-worldly relationship ensured through care between the relational self and the 
other is essential. Actually, the act of recognition cannot be performed without respect 
for another’s acting. It is also essential to examine another’s special behavior and 
bodily expressions. And unavoidable as it might be, therewith an intrinsic evaluation 
comes along. With a closer look at another’s performance we apply empathic 
understanding, actually all the time, which leads to an implicit evaluation of another’s 
action. In conclusion, respect is directly dependent on the phenomenal perception and 
recognition of a human within her or his own personality. 
 
 
8.2 The Declarational Status of Appreciation 
Whereas the speech act theory has already been criticized as a ‘human plug-in’ into 
the subject theory, it seems to be fruitful to have a closer look at the declarative 
function of acting; “declarations and status functions are connected to the community 
members’ thinking and acting in terms of individualistically conceived collective 
acceptance (recognition)” (Tuomela 2011: 712). Since appreciation is always bound 
to individual as well as social relationships, it has a declarative coloration as social 
esteem. If we are appreciated in view of particular values, these values are highlighted 
and will most likely be recognized by others (Searle 2010: 102). Thus, social esteem 
is a symbol whose “’skills and talents’” (Schmidt am Busch 2010: 263) or − as Honneth 
(1995) already pointed out − “abilities and threats” are socially honored. Considered 
in this way, social esteem as appreciation is always directly related to self-worth 
(Honneth 2007: 136). “Someone who is not socially esteemed can therefore not 
consider him- or herself a valuable human being” (Schmidt am Busch 2010: 263). It is 
obvious that Honneth’s approach does only refer to Western capitalist society when 
he writes: 
 
[a] mere glance at studies on the psychological effects of unemployment 
makes it clear that the experience of labor must be assigned a central 
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position in the model emerging here. The acquisition of that form of 
recognition that I have called social esteem continues to be bound up with 
the opportunity to pursue an economically rewarding and thus socially 
regulated occupation (Honneth 2007: 75). 
 
Following this example, Schmidt am Busch (2010: 264) is able to distinguish two 
different kinds of social esteem: “1. esteem related to specific skills; and 2. esteem 
related to socially useful achievements”. Both kinds of esteem refer to Western 
capitalistic claims, which Schmidt am Busch (2010: 275) underlines with 
characteristic examples: 
 
striving for professional success as well as personal qualities necessary in 
this respect (discipline, enthusiasm, etc.); striving for the highest possible 
income; displaying professional success (for example through a specific 
consumptive behavior); and calling into question social welfare policies 
and programs. 
 
The distinction of both forms of esteems does not have to remain on a meritocratic 
level. Esteem related to socially useful achievements is obviously related to work; 
esteem related to specific skills can also be applied to trivial realms like free-time 
activities or hobbies. Schmidt am Busch, nevertheless, remains very close to 
Honneth’s approach by just focusing on the economic aspect of social esteem. 
The crucial point in Schmidt am Busch’s approach is that he assumes the 
classical philosophical subject by perceiving recognition as attachment, since he 
offers “a social explanation of why people seek to maximize their earnings or profits” 
(Schmidt am Busch 2010: 276). By this means, people seek to maximize their earnings 
or profits to receive recognition in terms of social esteem. In Schmidt am Busch’s eyes 
as well as in the eyes of Honneth, this striving for recognition is a social construct and 
not an intrinsic motivation. Schmidt am Busch’s concept of meritocratic esteem, 
however, offers an account of the performance-related evaluation of ourselves as well 
as others. While Honneth’s term of work is very specific and obviously related to 
Western capitalist society, work can also be defined in a broader sense. Perceived in 
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this way, work can be any kind of activity or action. Trivial realms like free-time 
activities or hobbies as fields of mutual recognition are included. 
Therefore, Schmidt am Busch’s distinction is ideally suited for a self-confirming 
and action-based model of mutual recognition and should be further investigated in 
this context elsewhere. The question that arises at this point is how appreciation 
conceived as social esteem conducts ourselves within a dividually perceived 
composition of the self. For the purpose of mutual personal recognition, appreciation 
as an act of mutual recognition is both constitutive for personal development as well 
as for inclusion in the social community (Ikäheimo 2010, 2007), since every act causes 
reactions from others. These reactions are either affirmative or depreciative. Thus, 
 
[r]espect is related to self-respect, esteem to self-esteem, denigrating 
feedback concerning one’s abilities is related to an internalized sense of 
incapacity, experienced humiliations are related to a sense of inferiority, 
and so on. The connection between recognition from others and self-
relations is a readily intelligible and interpretative one, although also 
causal (Laitinen 2010: 320f). 
 
On the kind of experiences mentioned, self-perception and thus personal identity are 
founded. Whether a reaction to an act is affirmative or depreciative depends on this 
act’s adequate regard. The work-related examples Schmidt am Busch has pointed out, 
refer to culturally framed values, as in this case of capitalist society. Within this value 
framework, we strive for self-confirmation by others, and we act accordingly; in this 
case by working, earning money, attending meetings, etc. In other cultures, values 
might differ. 
The declarational status of social appreciation comes along with some 
ontological and, of course, ontic − since they are quite real − problems. One of these 
problems, which occur in this context, is resource management. The context-related 
regard for particular values can be understood as awareness guiding. Actually, 
awareness, especially for the moment, is a limited resource which cannot be split. By 
this means, when we have something in focus of attention, we might miss other things. 
In a particular moment of attention, only particular values are recognized, which leads 
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to misrecognition of other values which might be carried by another. This could be a 
scenario where a struggle for recognition might occur. 
 
 
8.3 Adequate Regard 
Laitinen (2010) describes adequate regard as a further mode of mutual recognition. 
Adequate regard enables within mutual recognition the evaluation of a society’s 
members as persons. Considered in this way, mutual recognition includes a normative 
comparison between humans. According to the formula x recognizes y for z adequacy 
can only be given in comparison to other competitors. Thus, adequate regard consists 
of at least two participants and at least a third party, who distributes recognition. By 
this means, we have to accept that the other deserves regard more than we do. In 
consequence, the third party has to be a person of authority who declares adequate 
regard for another person A, who deserves to be honored, and facing a person B, who 
accepts the regard given to the other. 
In respect to the perception of recognition as an act, adequate regard can be 
understood ”in terms of responsiveness to the real normative relevance of the 
features of the other” (Laitinen 2010: 325). Thus, we are recognized according to 
values. It has to be highlighted that adequate regard does not deal with respect, but 
with the acceptance of adequate regard within a group or social community. If this 
acceptance is not brought about, the honored person is only appreciated without any 
adequacy. In this case, it remains open whether adequate regard is adequate or not. 
In the context of mutual recognition on a social level, Laitinen (2010: 319) 
distinguishes between two divergent insights, which he calls “the mutuality-insight 
and the adequate regard-insight”. Mutuality-insight describes the theoretical 
structure of recognition, as “ego has to recognize the alter as a recognizer in order 
that the alter’s views may count as recognizing the ego” (Laitinen 2010: 319), which 
is similar to the description concerning the declarational status of appreciation. In 
turn, adequate regard–insight is “that we do not merely desire to be classified as 
recognizers, but to be treated adequately, in the light of any and all of our normatively 
relevant features” (Laitinen 2010: 319). To bring it down to the point, adequate 
regard can be defined as follows:  
  An Outlook to Social Appreciation 
 224 
[s]omething is adequate regard towards a person if it is an appropriate 
response to the normatively or evaluatively significant features F of the 
other. These features generate reasons to respond in certain ways − 
certain responses are called for or required by the features. The reason-
governed ‘responses’ at stake can arguably be of a variety of sorts of things: 
there is a plurality of kinds of responses that are normatively called for 
(Laitinen 2010: 323f) 
 
It can be considered as a ‘state of peace’, as Ricœur already named it. “‘Being 
adequately recognized‛ is the state that follows when the demands for respect, social 
esteem and so on are being adequately met, and when that is achieved, all parties may 
rest content” (Laitinen 2011: 46). Although this state of peace follows a broader 
definition as Ricœur intended, such interpretation can be integrated into normative 
claims, without being lost in transcendental idealism. The crucial point in this 
approach is the broader account of the adequate regard-insight. Laitinen (2010: 320) 
points out that 
 
[t]he mutuality-insight leads naturally to a strict conception of recognition 
(only recognizers can be recognized; recognition takes place only when 
two-way recognition takes place). By contrast, the adequate regard–
insight leads to an unrestricted view (also other beings than recognizers 
can be treated adequately, and one-way adequate regard is conceptually 
possible). 
 
The act of recognition can only be performed, if both recognition giver and recognition 
receiver are on the same ‘level’. By this means, they have to recognize each other as 
potential resources of mutual recognition. Therefore, the mutuality-insight 
 
leads to the restricted view that recognition in the relevant sense concerns 
quite sophisticated beings only: ones capable of regarding each others 
(and themselves) as recognizers. That is, recognition of recipients, who are 
capable of normative expectations concerning the regard and treatment 
they receive from others. Such recipients can stand in relations of mutual 
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recognition and can experience being recognized or misrecognized in the 
sense which presupposes that the recipient in turn recognizes the 
recognizer as a relevant judge (Laitinen 2010: 327). 
 
In particular, it is this capability of normative expectations, which can cause Hegel’s 
and Honneth’s famous struggle for recognition. Let us take the following example: a 
musician plays both the piano and the violin. She loves to play the piano, but she is 
only booked for violin concerts. Thus, she struggles for recognition of her piano 
playing ability. In this example, the musician struggles for a particular kind of 
recognition, even if she receives recognition from the audience and concert 
organizers for her violin play. It is not necessary to speak about restricted recognition, 
since at every step recognition is performed. According to Bedorf (2010), recognition 
does not always have to be performed in a positive sense, since recognition is always 
already misrecognition. In the case of the musician, that means that only the part of 
her identity as violin player is recognized, whereas the part of the identity which 
stands for the piano player is misrecognized. Nevertheless, the act of misrecognition 
is and will remain an act of recognition. This example shows that recognition can be 
given and received, but if the recognition, given or received, does not fit in our 
normative schema, the struggle begins.  
For this reason, on the level of the act of recognition, a tension between 
mutuality-insight and adequate regard-insight does not exist. The tension occurs only 
on the personal level of perception. Since in both cases the act of recognition is 
performed along normative evaluations, it is the personal perception which leads to 
a successful or unsuccessful act of recognition. When Laitinen considers adequate 
regard as unrestricted act of recognition, it is an act of recognition which is based on 
the pseudo-objective level of society. By this means, the values of society which are 
set by society determine the act of recognition, and compared to other members of 
the society – this could be a diffuse crowd – a particular member deserves adequate 
regard. By implication, mutuality-insight focuses on the subjective level of evaluation, 
since the recognition receiver considers the attributed values of recognition in 
reference to the recognition giver. This is the context where both participants have to 
be recognized. 
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Within adequate regard, the other forces a particular reaction which Laitinen 
(2010: 324) calls “responsiveness”. The reaction refers to the “normative features of 
the other that directly call for or require responses” (Laitinen 2010: 324). Therefore, 
every reaction is a response to the other’s attitude or behavior, perceived as initiative. 
It does not have to be a direct or intentional behavior on a conscious level which forces 
a reaction in an offensive way. Rather it is the typical everyday behavior which always 
creates a demand for reaction and can be perceived as ‘force’, since the other has not 
any opportunity ‘not to react’ or ‘not to response’, “[s]ome initiatives may of course 
be normatively insignificant, and make no difference to the normative predicament of 
the other agent” (Laitinen 2010: 324). In this context, Laitinen (2010: 325) assumes 
that adequate regard is identical with adequate recognition, since particular features 
of another are regarded adequately within this particular act of recognition. 
 
[T]he features in question must be normatively relevant features (although 
any normatively relevant features will do − they need not be, for example, 
ones had by recognizers only), the entities in question must be bearers of 
normatively relevant features (although any kinds of entities will do − they 
need not be recognizers), and the responses must be normatively called 
for or required responses (but any kinds of responses, emotional, 
cognitive, institutional, attitudinal, behavioural, expressive, etc will count 
as different varieties of recognition) (Laitinen 2010: 326). 
 
From that derives that all human features, characteristics, and attitudes are able to 
cause adequate regard. Such an account of adequate regard, therefore, offers an 
account of recognition which is both intrinsic and extrinsic. In this perspective, “any 
kinds of responses that are normatively called for by any normatively relevant 
features may be cases of recognition” (Laitinen 2010: 320). 
In view of the above results, the word ‘adequate’ as it is used here is ambiguous. 
On the one hand, normativity is set by society. Thus, adequate regard is given in 
relation to a society’s postulated values. Regarded from a theoretical point of view, 
adequate regard provides an “unrestricted normativist view” (Laitinen 2010: 320). 
On the other hand, and also in reference to the mutuality-insight (Laitinen 2010: 320), 
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the term ‘adequate’ could mean ‘in an adequate way of my own values’. Thus, we are 
considered as adequate, if we suit with the value scheme of another who evaluates. 
An aspect, which has not been mentioned so far, is the necessary mutual 
relevance of recognition. Receiving recognition from someone, who is not recognized 
by the recognition receiver has no value for the recognition receiver. Without doubt, 
the act which the recognition giver performs, is in deed an act of recognition, but the 
evaluation of the recognition receiver sets an evaluated ‘normative zero’. 
Especially in the case of adequate regard it becomes visible how thick we are 
related to action and mutual recognition. Since adequate regard shows axiological and 
normative adequacy with and towards others, the act of recognition becomes socially 
and individually relevant. Considered in this way, every one of us is situated in a 
tension between self-confirmation and confirming others. Both sides know that it is 
necessary for their self-perceived ‘surviving’, as already pointed out and shown with 
a sketch of the debate about ‘struggling for recognition’. Since, “struggles for 
recognition are not merely struggles for being held to be a ‘recognizer’ […], but for 
getting adequate regard from others” (Laitinen 2010: 325), it shows that Hegel’s 
assumption of mutual recognition being generally a struggle is mistaken: adequate 
regard shows up that, when a struggle occurs, it would happen here. Mutual 
recognition is the everlasting tension between us and the other. This tension does not 
have to end in a struggle; rather it is a continuous process of mutual self-confirmation. 
Thus, mutual recognition builds a continuous belt between single dividual selves to 
be unified them within a social community.  
 
 
8.4 Summary 
Mutual recognition within social groups is a well-investigated scientific field. All 
threads mentioned here in this last chapter obviously have connecting links to a self-
based model of mutual recognition, despite being rooted in the classical discourse 
about mutual recognition approached from subject theory. Nevertheless, social 
appreciation appears in a new light by introducing loosely the concept, elaborated 
here, of the relational self into the debate on mutual recognition as social 
appreciation. Actually, we do not treat all of our contemporaries in the same way. We 
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make differences in respect, relationships and behavior. Thus, we let our 
surroundings feel by which emotions we are driven. Here, social appreciation is an 
empathic motivation to show feelings like sympathy and antipathy to the world. 
Perceived in this way, care as motivational force to move in the world secures the 
relational account for the world. Appreciation, thus, works as mutual evaluation on 
an axiological and a deontic level. But, the role of care and love as motivational 
interest in the world remains open, so in further investigations of self-based mutual 
recognition this aspect has to be considered.  
The same applies to the declarational status of appreciation. Honor and social 
appreciation are also constitutive factors for the development of social relationships 
within groups. Nowadays, through time management, economic circularity and 
pressure, social appreciation becomes a rare value. In this respect, the dynamic of the 
declarational function of social appreciation in relation to the concept of mutual 
recognition, elaborated here, has to be further investigated; especially the role of the 
self, which is developed and confirmed by the social community, has to be focused. 
With Laitinen’s approach of adequate regard, I brought in an already well 
investigated and in the current discourse well anchored concept. But even with such 
a concept, it becomes visible that the concept of the relational self, elaborated here, 
allows further thinking of mutual recognition far away from struggle. 
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Epilogue 
 
 
There are no safe paths in this part of the world. 
Remember you are over the edge of the wild now, and in 
for all sorts of fun wherever you go (Tolkien 2006: 161). 
 
 
 
Beginning the epilogue of the path we have been going till now with my opening 
quote, I like to finish my journey on the path of the self in the same way as it began. 
This does not mean that we walk in circles, but we have made our round to reach out 
for the self, and consequently further questions rise which hopefully will lead to 
further investigations on the role of the relational self within mutual recognition. 
Our journey with the relational self and mutual recognition has crossed the 
borders of two broad and well-established disciplines. In accordance to the Tolkien 
quote above, such a path is not ‘safe’, since it goes through areas which have not been 
linked in this way yet. “[O]ver the edge of the wild” (Tolkien 2006: 161) we crossed 
the border, and have begun our journey with a simple tree metaphor. Let us just 
remember shortly the image: the tree stands for our self, and to repeat it: the tree’s 
branches can be imagined as composed of narrative threads, as if every single one of 
them were a biography. They merge in the tree’s trunk. The roots are hidden in the 
ground; they are one with the world. This image is a metaphor for our being in the 
world, since, in every moment, we are interwoven with our surroundings. By this 
means, we do not exist being isolated from others, rather, we are influenced by others 
from our very early existence. Our mother’s nutrition, or maybe even her taste of 
music, influences us even in the womb. Thus, this journey has shown how the 
relational self can enrich and even change the discourse of mutual recognition and 
personhood, which still are based in subject theory. 
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In consequence, against the general and current flow of scientific debate, this 
work points out the chances to overcome the subject with alternative concepts, but, 
above all, this work points out alternative perceptions and their possible involvement 
in the current scientific state-of-the-art. With an approach from anthropology and 
philosophy, I show how much a ‘multi-cultural’ point of view can enrich theoretical 
fields. In times where theories all over the world, even in the humanties, influence 
each other, one cannot just proceed from Western approaches and so-called other – 
spiritual and mythical– approaches. Therefore, my purpose is to build a bridge 
between philosophical and anthropological, Western and non-Western approaches to 
selfhood and recognition. Such a path cannot be gone without considering 
‘personhood’ as the acting variable in the human being. Therefore, I have chosen a 
Melanesian-rooted approach to show that Western thinking cannot hold a 
predominant position in the human sciences; that non-Western approaches to the 
subject discussed here are quite similar to the Western ones and they can enrich each 
other. 
All through the structure of my work, I have been able to show how the 
disciplines of anthropology and philosophy are related. Without doubt, they have a 
direct effect on each other, since, as already said at the beginning of our journey, both 
disciplines have one outstanding subject in common: they deal with the human being, 
her or his emotions, rationality and performance, yet differ in their approach. 
However, a mere explanation of selfhood, personhood or recognition does not show 
how these concepts could work together in detail. As already shown in the summary 
of the last chapter, there are several points which have not been explained yet.  
A further journey to the relational self has already begun in the previous 
chapter. But there are many more starting points for further investigations: as 
explained in accordance with Gallagher and Zahavi, the first-person-account is not the 
only account for perceptual processes of the human mind. Through the neurologist’s 
account, which already maintains a tight connection to the philosophy of mind and 
phenomenology, an additional cognitive account with the help of cultural 
anthropology is possible. It may be true that the explicit or implicit application of 
concepts or perceptions like personhood, self, sociality, empathy, agency and 
autonomy is universal, and in a particular form present in every community 
worldwide, but it is also true that Western perceptions are not universal. The journey 
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is not finished here. We may take the disciplinary border crossing initiated here as a 
starting point for further investigations and deepening of this scientific topic. 
With new theories of self-concepts, the relational self can be investigated in its 
role within the social interactional context. As already mentioned above, Gallagher 
introduced “a pattern theory of the self”. Within this theory he tangibly assumes that 
“[d]ifferent selves are constituted by different patterns, but within one individual 
these patterns may change over time” (Gallagher 2013: 3). The theory can work on 
several levels, as meta-theory, it can pattern already existing theories, or pattern the 
individual self (Gallagher 2013: 3). This theory is prepared to include existing self-
concepts, but also to pattern them. Thus, a question for further investigations would 
be whether the self itself is a pattern theory of the individual self within a cultural 
background. Such a perception of the self could help to investigate or specify cultural 
differences in self-concepts. 
An excellent example for a culturally influenced perception is the verbal 
perceptions of time and space which actually is metaphorical: in Western perception, 
we speak of ‘the future in front of us’ or ‘we are running into the future’. In contrast, 
about the past, we talk as if it would lie ‘behind us’ or ‘we are looking back in the past’. 
Other examples may be 
 
we may think of time as moving up or down, which we do, or as staggering 
from left to right, which, under normal circumstances, we do not. It is to be 
expected that those aspects of space which best conform to our everyday 
experience in the spatial world are preferentially made use of and typically 
found across languages (Radden 2003: 226). 
 
Our usage of language determinates our perception of time and space. Western 
languages, thus, rather support the egocentric perception of our surroundings. In 
contrast to the Western perception of time and space, verbal perceptions of time and 
space, already investigated, for example, in Melanesia, Chile and Peru says just the 
opposite. The future lies behind and the past in front (Núñez and Sweetser 2006: 2). 
Such concepts may not be “relative, egocentric and anthropomorphic” (Wassmann 
1994: 646), rather, their perception of space is “geographically determined” 
(Wassmann 1994: 660). Thus, among the Yupno in Melanesia the future flows uphill 
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and the past downhill (Wassmann 1994; Núñez et al. 2012). If the focus shifts from an 
egocentric to a geocentric perception and recognition of the life-world and oneself, 
this has s purchase on cognitive concepts. In this way, a new basis for investigations 
on cognitive time and space perceptions in Western societies is given, since 
“[a]bstract concepts are commonly grounded in spatial concepts” (Núñez et al. 2012: 
34), which are also influenced by embodied perception and recognition. 
At the end of this journey, which actually did not take a straight way from 
anthropology to philosophy, but has taken some detours through neuroscience, 
psychology, literary theory and performance theory, remains the classical question of 
authorship. For instance, in her book Analytical Buddhism (2006) Miri Albahari, a 
original Buddhist, introduces a non-egological account into Western discourse. In 
particular, she writes about the illusion of selfhood from a Buddhist point of view. In 
this respect, Buddhist spiritual and culturally rooted perceptions of selfhood find 
their way into Western discourses. One might say, the author of this work is to blame 
for her approach’s being locked in with the Western point of view, since it is 
formulated in Western terminology. But, by linking here anthropology and 
philosophy, I introduce ‘the Melanesian concept of personhood’ beyond anthropology 
into at Western discourse, and not the other way around. The advantage of such an 
appropriation is clear: as said at the beginning of this work, ‘the Melanesian 
perception of personhood’ is a Western interpretation, anyway. That makes it a 
theoretical concept which is best suited for usage in Western discourses. Further 
work might investigate this link from the native’s point of view. Thus, with this work 
and hopefully in further works in this field, it has been shown that despite its spiritual 
and culturally related roots, the Melanesian perception of personhood enriches the 
Western debate about recognition, personhood and the self.  
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